Abstract
This study argues that the adoption of a policy by the European Union increases popular support for that policy. Elite cue theory implies that this effect only materializes among those members of the public who trust European Union institutions. Moreover, European Union member states’ unanimous policy support conveys a stronger cue than the Union’s policy endorsement despite vocal dissent. The argument is tested through original survey experiments and the quasi-experimental analysis of a survey that was fielded while the European Council endorsed a salient policy proposal. Support of the policy surged immediately after this decision—but only among Europeans who trust the Union. Experiments in original national surveys confirm that citizens who trust the European Union respond to signals from Brussels. Unanimity in the Council of the European Union augments the impact of these cues.
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