Sage Journals: Discover world-class research

Abstract

We present a game-theoretical analysis of Commission appointment in the European Union. In the model, the European Parliament and the member states look ahead and consider the outcomes that result from the appointment of alternative Commissions. In contrast to earlier work, we assume the European Parliament and the member states have incomplete information on the consequences of policies, whereas the Commission acquires private information. We find that the increased use of codecision gives the Council an incentive to appoint a Commission that is closer to the European Parliament, because the European Parliament then trusts the Commission more and the Commission is more informative as a result. Thus, we shed new light on the Spitzenkandidaten Coup that preceded the appointment of the Juncker Commission.

Keywords

European Union European Commission agenda setting incomplete information

Get full access to this article

View all access options for this article.

References

Ballmann

Epstein

O’Halloran

(2002) Delegation, comitology, and the separation of powers in the European Union. International Organization 56(3): 551–574.

Black

(1958) On the rationale of group decision-making. Journal of Political Economy 56(1): 23–34.

Buchanan

Eulau

Ferguson

(1960) The legislator as specialist. Western Political Quarterly 13(3): 636–651.

Crawford

Sobel

(1982) Strategic information transmission. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society 50(6): 1431–1451.

Crombez

Hix

(2011) Treaty reform and the Commission's appointment and policy-making role in the European Union. European Union Politics 12(3): 291–314.

Crombez

Hix

(2015) Legislative activity and gridlock in the European Union. British Journal of Political Science 45(3): 477–499.

Döring H and Manow P (2014) Parliament and government composition database (ParlGov): An infrastructure for empirical information on political institutions. Available at: http://parlgov.org (accessed 7 December 2016).

The Economist (2014) Cameron versus the Spitzenkandidaten. The Economist. Available at: http://www.economist.com/blogs/blighty/2014/05/european-election (accessed 7 December 2016).

European Commission (2015) EU annual budget life-cycle: Figures. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/budget/annual (accessed 7 December 2016).

10.

Franchino F (2007) The Powers of the Union: Delegation in the EU. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press.

11.

Franchino

(2009) Experience and the distribution of portfolio payoffs in the European Commission. European Journal of Political Research 48(1): 1–30.

12.

Gilligan

Krehbiel

(1987) Collective decision making and standing committees: an informational rationale for restrictive amendment procedures. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 3(2): 287–335.

13.

Hix

Noury

Roland

(2006) Dimensions of politics in the European parliament. American Journal of Political Science 50(2): 494–511.

14.

Hug

(2003) Endogenous preferences and delegation in the European Union. Comparative Political Studies 36(1): 41–74.

15.

Johns

(2007) A servant of two Masters: Communication and the selection of international bureaucrats. International Organization 61(2): 245–275.

16.

König

Lindberg

Lechner

(2007) Bicameral conflict resolution in the European Union. An empirical analysis of conciliation committee bargains. British Journal of Political Science 37(2): 281–312.

17.

Krehbiel

(1991) Information and Legislative Organization, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.

18.

Mahony H (2015) The spitzenkandidaten coup. EU Observer. Available at: https://euobserver.com/europe-in-review/126456 (accessed 7 December 2016).

19.

Napel

Widgrén

(2008) The European Commission-appointment, preferences, and institutional relations. Public Choice 137(1): 21–41.

20.

Pollack M (2003) The Engines of European Integration: Delegation, Agency, and Agenda Setting in the EU. New York: Oxford University Press.

21.

Rasmussen

(2003) The role of the European Commission in co-decision – A strategic facilitator operating in a situation of structural disadvantage. European Integration Online Papers 7(10): 1–17.

22.

Steunenberg

(1994) Decision making under different institutional arrangements: Legislation by the European Community. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 150(4): 642–669.

23.

Thomson

Hosli

(2006) Who has power in the EU? The commission, council and parliament in legislative decision-making. Journal of Common Market Studies 44(2): 391–417.

24.

Tsebelis

Garrett

(2000) Legislative politics in the European Union. European Union Politics 1(1): 9–36.

25.

Wonka

(2007) Technocratic and independent? The appointment of European Commissioners and its policy implications. Journal of European Public Policy 14(2): 169–189.

Supplementary Material

Please find the following supplemental material available below.

For Open Access articles published under a Creative Commons License, all supplemental material carries the same license as the article it is associated with.

For non-Open Access articles published, all supplemental material carries a non-exclusive license, and permission requests for re-use of supplemental material or any part of supplemental material shall be sent directly to the copyright owner as specified in the copyright notice associated with the article.

0.00 MB

1.62 MB

0.34 MB