By placing candidates on electoral lists for European elections, national parties hold a very powerful position in the (re-)election of Members of the European Parliament (MEPs). This article analyses the factors or individual characteristics of MEPs that affect list placement decisions. I identify three possible national party goals in European elections, legislative leverage, loyalty and attractiveness to voters, and examine evidence for each. Based on a unique data set of German MEPs from 1999–2009, the analysis shows that national parties, in particular small parties, value MEPs from more powerful committees. National parties furthermore reward MEPs with national party positions during the European Parliament term. Surprisingly, I find little evidence that German parties reward very loyal parliamentarians.
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