This study examines transparency and censorship in the Council of Ministers of the European Union from 1999 to 2009. We measure transparency by considering the timeliness of record release and the levels of censorship applied to records when (and if) they are released. We show that legislation introduced in 2001 (Regulation 1049) triggered a massive shift towards greater transparency, in line with its intention. However, we also show that the trend towards greater transparency has been interrupted by the enlargement rounds in 2004 and 2007. We attribute this fact to inexperience on the part of the new member states and the resulting need for censorship while these states adjusted to the negotiation styles in the Council.
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