The intensity of asylum flows over the last 20 years represents a significant challenge to national and European policy making. This article studies the dynamic reciprocal effects between asylum applications and recognition rates in 29 European countries over 24 years. Furthermore, it explores the impact of the national economic and political context on these two aspects of asylum policy. Using a wide range of statistical models and approaches, the article reveals that asylum applications exert a negative effect on recognition rates, and recognition rates exert a positive effect on applications. However, despite their statistical significance, the effects are rather small and mostly related to between-country rather than within-country variation, which implies that they are of limited practical significance. Unemployment is only weakly related to recognition rates and not at all to application shares, while government positions favoring immigration and multiculturalism have no effect on asylum application shares and recognition rates.
BartelsL (1991) Instrumental and ‘quasi-instrumental’ variables. American Journal of Political Science35(3): 777–800.
2.
BöckerAHavingaT (1998) Asylum applications in the European Union: Patterns and trends and the effects of policy measures. Journal of Refugee Studies11(3): 245–266.
3.
BoswellCGeddesA (2011) Migration and Mobility in the European Union, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
4.
BovensLChatkuptCSmeadL (2012) Measuring common standards and equal responsibility-sharing in EU asylum outcome data. European Union Politics13(1): 70–93.
5.
BrandtPT (2007) Multiple Time Series Models, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
6.
BudgeIKlingemannH-DVolkensA (2001) Mapping Policy Preferences. Estimates for Parties, Electors, and Governments 1945–1998, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
7.
CollyerM (2005) When do social networks fail to explain migration? Accounting for the movement of Algerian asylum-seekers to the UK. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies31(4): 699–718.
8.
CzaikaM (2009a) Asylum cooperation among asymmetric countries. European Union Politics10(1): 89–113.
9.
CzaikaM (2009b) The political economy of refugee migration. Jahrbucher für Nationalokonomie und Statistik229(6): 803–821.
10.
des PlacesSBDeffainsB (2004) Cooperation in the shadow of regulatory competition: The case of asylum legislation in Europe. International Review of Law and Economics23(4): 345–364.
11.
EngleRGrangerC (1987) Co-integration and error correction: Representation, estimation, and testing. Econometrica55(2): 251–276.
12.
FreemanJR (1983) Granger causality and the times series analysis of political relationships. American Journal of Political Science27(2): 327–358.
13.
GelmanAHillJ (2007) Data Analysis Using Regressson and Multilevel/Hierarchical Models, Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
14.
GrangerC (1969) Investigating causal relationships by econometric models and cross-spectral methods. Econometrica37(3): 424–438.
15.
GrangerCNewboldP (1974) Spurious regresssions in Econometrics. Journal of Econometrics2(2): 111–120.
GudbrandsenF (2010) Partisan influence on immigration: The case of Norway. Scandinavian Political Studies33(3): 248–270.
18.
GuildE (2006) The Europeanisation of Europe’s Asylum Policy, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
19.
HattonTJ (2009) The rise and fall of asylum: What happened and why?Economic Journal119(535): 183–213.
20.
HattonTJRichterWFFainiR (2004) Seeking asylum in Europe. Economic Policy19(38): 5–62.
21.
Hatton TJ and Williamson JG (2004) Refugees, asylum seekers and policy in Europe. (NBER Working Paper) (10680): 1–42.
22.
HavingaTBöckerA (1999) Country of asylum by choice or by chance: Asylum seekers in Belgium, the Netherlands and the UK. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies25(1): 43–61.
23.
HolzerTSchneiderG (2002) Asylpolitik auf Abwegen: Nationalstaatliche und Europäische Reaktionen auf die Globalisierung der Flüchtlingsströme, Opladen: Leske und Budrich.
24.
HolzerTSchneiderGWidmerT (2000a) Discriminating decentralization. Journal of Conflict Resolution44(2): 250–276.
25.
HolzerTSchneiderGWidmerT (2000b) The impact of legislative deterrence measures on the number of asylum applications in Switzerland (1986–1995). International Migration Review34(4): 1182–1216.
26.
KimKCohenJE (2010) Determinants of international migration flows to and from industrialized countries: A panel data approach beyond gravity. International Migration Review44(4): 899–932.
27.
KlingermannH-DVolkensABaraJ (2007) Mapping Policy Preferences II: Estimates for Parties, Electors and Governments in Central and Eastern Europe, European Union and OECD 1990–2003, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
28.
LavenexS (2001a) The Europeanisation of Refugee Policies: Between Human Rights and Internal Security, Burlington: Ashgate.
29.
LavenexS (2001b) The Europeanization of refugee policies: Normative challenges and institutional legacies. Journal of Common Market Studies39(5): 851–874.
30.
Monheim-HelstrofferJObidzinskiM (2010) Optimal discretion in asylum lawmaking. International Review of Law and Economics30(1): 86–97.
31.
MooreWHShellmanSM (2007) Whither will they go? A global study of refugees’ destinations, 1965–1995. International Studies Quarterly51(4): 811–834.
32.
MulveyG (2010) When policy creates politics: The problematizing of immigration and the consequences for refugee integration in the UK. Journal of Refugee Studies23(4): 437–462.
33.
NeumayerE (2004) Asylum destination choice – what makes some West European countries more attractive than others?European Union Politics5(2): 155–180.
34.
NeumayerE (2005) Asylum recognition rates in Western Europe – their determinants, variation, and lack of convergence. Journal of Conflict Resolution49(1): 43–66.
35.
NiemannA (2008) Dynamics and countervailing pressures of visa, asylum and immigration policy treaty revision: Explaining change and stagnation from the Amsterdam IGC to the IGC of 2003–4. Journal of Common Market Studies46(3): 559–591.
36.
PfaffB (2008) VAR, SVAR and SVEC models: Implementation within r package vars. Journal of Statistical Software27(4): 1–32.
37.
PhillipsPCBOuliarisS (1990) Asymptotic properties of residual based tests for cointegration. Econometrica58(1): 165–193.
38.
RobinsonVSegrottJ (2002) Understanding the Decision Making of Asylum Seekers, London: Home Office: Home Office Research Study 243.
39.
RosenbergerSKönigA (2012) Welcoming the unwelcome: The politics of minimum reception standards for asylum seekers in Austria. Journal of Refugee Studies25(4): 537–554.
40.
SchusterL (2003) The Use and Abuse of Political Asylum in Britain and Germany, London: Frank Cass.
41.
ShorBBafumiJKeeleL (2007) A Bayesian multilevel modeling approach to time-series cross-sectional data. Political Analysis15(2): 165–81.
42.
SicakkanHG (2008) Political asylum and sovereignty-sharing in Europe. Government and Opposition43(2): 206–229.
43.
Teitgen-CollyC (2006) The European Union and asylum: An illusion of protection. Common Market Law Review43: 1503–1566.
44.
ThielemannER (2003) Does policy matter? On governments’ attempts to control unwanted migration. IIIS Discussion Paper9: 1–39.
45.
ThielemannERDewanT (2006) The myth of free-riding: Refugee protection and implicit burden-sharing. West European Politics29(2): 351–369.
46.
Thielemann ER, Williams R and Boswell C (2010) What System of Burden-sharing between Member States for the Reception of Asylum Seekers? European Parliament, Directorate General for Internal Policies.
47.
ThunoM (2003) Channels of entry and preferred destinations: The circumvention of Denmark by Chinese immigrants. International Migration41(3): 99–133.
48.
ToshkovDde HaanL (2013) The Europeanization of asylum policy: An assessment of the EU impact on asylum applications and recognitions rates. Journal of European Public Policy20(5): 661–683.
49.
VinkMMeijerinkF (2003) Asylum applications and recognition rates in EU member states 1982–2001: A quantitative analysis. Journal of Refugee Studies16(3): 297–315.
Supplementary Material
Please find the following supplemental material available below.
For Open Access articles published under a Creative Commons License, all supplemental material carries the same license as the article it is associated with.
For non-Open Access articles published, all supplemental material carries a non-exclusive license, and permission requests for re-use of supplemental material or any part of supplemental material shall be sent directly to the copyright owner as specified in the copyright notice associated with the article.
