Abstract
The paper takes as its starting point the question of whether or not the journalistic normative commitment to full disclosure of information empirically finds favour with the public. We indicate that in the case of war reporting full disclosure is not always desired by the public and then examine if, in certain circumstances, full disclosure is desired by the public in civil situations. The area for examination is that of privacy. By conceptually drawing on the notions of the Liberal and Neo-Aristotelian we show, through both focus group research and survey questionnaires, that the existence of different value positions within the population provides different responses to the rights of the individual and the public good generally and, more specifically, in relation to the regulation of media content. Yet our research shows a virtually unanimous convergence on criteria taken to govern a person's right to privacy and justifiable full disclosure which neither hold privacy to be an absolute right nor wholly subservient to the public good. We then sketch the beginnings of an analytic framework which articulates how and why this should be so. Our conclusion is that so far as the public is concerned, there is no universal right to know, and that journalists ought to understand, in each case of reporting, the emergent ‘status rules' that govern audience response to the news.
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