Abstract
Digital media use can connect citizens across geographic boundaries into coordinated action by distributing political information, enabling the formation of groups, and facilitating political talk. These activities can lead to political consumerism, which is an important and popular form of political participation that translates across geographic borders. This article uses original survey data (
Keywords
Introduction
How people participate in politics has changed dramatically over time, with more people opting for more expressive, personalized, and individualized forms of participation (Dalton, 2017; Newman and Bartels, 2011; Nonomura, 2017; Theocharis and van Deth, 2018). Digital media use supports these new forms of participation as both a mode for participation and a tool for mobilizing people to participate. In this article, we use original survey data from the United States, United Kingdom, and France (
Political consumerism is a distinct form of political behavior because it transcends geographical borders and creates opportunities to influence global politics. This is important because, in an increasingly globalized economy, people lack formal procedures to express their political views or influence environmental and ethical business practices. In this context, political consumerism is an important form of political participation that represents a shift in focus from the state to the economy. This results in a change in the balance of political power from the government to the market (Ward and de Vreese, 2011), as citizens use public concerns to guide their private purchasing decisions (Neilson and Paxton, 2010).
Our survey-based study makes four contributions to scholarship: (1) we explore three different types of digital media use and their role in political consumerism, highlighting theories about information, social ties, and social interaction; (2) we examine
To address these gaps in the literature, we use a large sample, three-country study of people in the United States, United Kingdom, and France. We use a similar case method (Seawright and Gerring, 2008), choosing countries that have similar macro-level characteristics. Macro-level characteristics, such as Gross Domestic Product per capita and quality of democracy scores, have been found to predict cross-national variations in political consumerism. We find that discussing politics online, joining groups (associated with social causes) on social media, and searching online for political information are positive and significant predictors of boycotting and
Digital media use and political consumerism
Digital media are defined as media in which data are communicated via computerized networks, allow one-to-one, one-to-many, and many-to-many communication in a variety of formats and include sites where people share and exchange information in online communities and networks (e.g. Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and Instagram) (Gordo, 2020).
In relation to political consumerism, digital media have been described in terms of email use, web use to find information and make purchases, and use of social networking sites. Digital media use plays a variety of roles in political consumerism. Kelm and Dohle (2018: 1524) summarize these roles as follows: Online media provide political consumers with greater access to information; Web 2.0 offers numerous channels for communication with like-minded others, and online marketplaces enable easier ways for political consumerism, for example,
In other words, people who search for political information or who discuss politics online should be more likely to engage in political consumerism. Finally, digital media use should correlate with political consumerism because of the opportunities presented by online purchasing of ethical products and services. In this article, we extend this argument further. Through social media, people can join a group associated with a political cause. Connecting to these groups opens a line of communication through which these groups can mobilize their followers to participate in boycott or
Digital media use increases exposure to political information, which can increase awareness of political issues and specific campaigns (Becker and Copeland, 2016; Boulianne, 2016). This increased exposure to information is believed to translate into increased participation, replicating expectations from traditional media use (e.g. Atkinson, 2015). We hypothesize that if people use digital media to seek out news and information online, they will be more likely to participate in political consumerism. Indeed, the unique feature of digital media, as opposed to traditional or broadcast media, is the opportunity to easily seek a vast amount of information.
Few studies examine how digital media use differs for boycotting versus
Social media can be used to circulate information, and this information may have stronger implications for political behavior because it is filtered and promoted through family and friends (Bode, 2012; Boulianne, 2016). In the case of political consumerism, family and friends can share information about boycott and
Social media uses are a subset of activities related to the broader concept of digital media use. Social media use may have different effects than digital media use. Combining a variety of social media activities and a variety of digital media activities, Gil de Zúñiga et al. (2014) find much larger effects for social media use than digital media use. Trying to capture the essence of what is distinctive about social media use, later studies explore the role of social interaction on social media and its implications for political consumerism. Becker and Copeland (2016) argue that social media use allows people to meet and engage with others with similar interests and identities, developing a networked public that can be mobilized to participate in specific campaigns. Using Pew Research data of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) adults in the United States, they find people are more likely to engage in political consumerism to promote LGBT equality if they use social media to meet new LGBT friends online or discuss LGBT issues (Becker and Copeland, 2016). Here, we extend this research by offering a robust measure of political talk online and its influence on political consumerism, similar to Kelm and Dohle (2018) who found slightly larger effects of online communication for boycotting (β = .147) than
Social media platforms are also important for creating social ties to groups that may circulate news and information about boycott campaigns. People with more organizational ties are more likely to participate because they are more likely to be asked to do so (Schussman and Soule, 2005; Verba et al., 1995). Using the European Social Survey 2002–2003, Neilson (2010) found that associational involvement was a stronger predictor of
Existing research does not address whether online ties to social groups are associated with political consumerism. Instead, the scholarship focuses on whether online information matters more for organizationally driven political consumerism versus self-directed political consumerism. Several studies show online information-seeking matters more for lifestyle political consumerism, which tends to be self-directed, than for contentious political consumerism, which tends to be organizationally directed (Earl et al., 2017; Gotlieb and Cheema, 2017). Self-directed activity may depend on people’s own political awareness rather than on organizational cues. At the same time, digital media use also enables individuals to connect with organizations, which can create opportunities to learn about and connect with social media groups as well as increase participation in organizationally driven activities (Earl et al., 2017). Following other studies about social group participation and political consumerism (Neilson, 2010; Neilson and Paxton, 2010), we expect social ties to online groups will help mobilize people to participate. Our third set of hypotheses is as follows:
Differential effects
Scholars argue the effects of digital media use on civic and political participation may differ by age (Andersen et al., 2020; Boulianne and Theocharis, 2020; Gotlieb et al., 2015; Shah et al., 2001, 2009). Much of this research utilizes youth or student samples. In some cases, the choice of sample reflects an assumption that both political consumerism and digital media use are more popular among young people (e.g. Atkinson, 2015; Gotlieb et al., 2015; Shah et al., 2009). In other cases, the use of student samples seems to be one of convenience (e.g. Baumgartner and Morris, 2010; Boulianne, 2016; Conroy et al., 2015). Regardless, studies with student samples report very small effects (cf. Wang et al., 2012).
Gotlieb et al. (2015) argue that digital media may have larger socialization effects for young people because they have more agency in
A recent meta-analysis of 66 studies on political consumerism suggests the effects of age are nonlinear, with middle-aged people more likely to participate in this activity (Copeland and Boulianne, 2020). That said, the effects of digital media use on political participation may be larger for younger people compared to older adults because their political identities are more malleable and they use digital media more extensively (Boulianne and Theocharis, 2020; Shah et al., 2001, 2009) As such, rather than a hypothesis we propose the following research question:
Few studies on political consumerism and digital media use are conducted outside of the United States. Zhang (2015) is the only study of digital media use and political consumerism that includes multiple countries, finding that Internet use, gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, and quality of the political system (civil liberties and political rights) have statistically significant effects on political consumerism. However, his models do not consider whether the effect of digital media use on political consumerism differs by country.
Cross-national studies of political consumerism exist outside of the digital media context, including a key study in the field that compared students in Canada, Belgium, and Sweden (Stolle et al., 2005) as well as studies that used pooled country data, such as the European Social Survey (Christensen, 2016; Filetti, 2016; Gallego, 2007; Grasso, 2016; Koos, 2011; Moeller and de Vreese, 2013; Neilson, 2010; Neilson and Paxton, 2010; Sandovici and Davis, 2010; Solt, 2015; Vassallo and Ding, 2016; Yates, 2011), International Social Survey Program (ISSP) (Summers, 2016), and World Values Survey (Campante and Chor, 2014; Crepaz et al., 2017; Gundelach, 2020). For the most part, these studies do not focus on whether the predictors of political consumerism differ by country characteristics (exception: Summers, 2016) and do not present country-specific coefficients (exceptions: Stolle et al., 2005; Yates, 2011).
However, this set of studies offers repeated tests about whether GDP per capita and quality of democracy scores impact political consumerism (Christensen, 2016; Koos, 2011; Moeller and de Vreese, 2013; Solt, 2015; Summers, 2016; Vassallo and Ding, 2016). Using the 2004 ISSP, Summers (2016) finds that GDP per capita predicts political consumerism. Gundelach (2020) finds the degree of democracy predicts engagement in political consumerism in both high and low political trust political systems. Using European Social Survey data, Moeller and de Vreese (2013) confirm that the quality of a democracy influences political consumerism. We use a similar case method (Seawright and Gerring, 2008), choosing countries that have similar GDP per capita and quality of democracy scores.
Freedom House (2021) scores are based on political rights and civil liberties; Freedom House (2021) also includes Internet freedom scores. For both measures, the scores are consistently high for our three countries (Table 1). In sum, these three countries are quite similar on macro-level indicators, supporting our “most similar” case selection. As for GDP per capita, the United States is the highest, with the United Kingdom and France being similar (World Bank, 2018). Following this line of research, we raise questions about whether digital media effects are similar in all three countries.
Country comparisons.
Source: Freedom House (2021) and Digital News Report (2021) (cited as Newman et al., 2021).
In the scholarship on media effects, factors such as having public service media and a high degree of journalistic professionalism impact citizens’ exposure to diverse political news and political knowledge (Esser, 2019). The online environment, in contrast, offers more similarity in the infrastructure in terms of the platforms being used (Boulianne, 2020). As such, we might expect homogeneity in the effects of digital media use. Considering the platforms studied in the
Our final research question is as follows:
Data and method
This article uses survey data gathered in three countries in 2017 (May to June,
The survey was administered by Lightspeed Kantar Group in both years and in all countries. The pooled sample includes 3210 people from the United States, 3043 from the United Kingdom, and 3031 from France. Pooling samples across years is a common practice in this field (Grasso, 2016; Moeller and de Vreese, 2013; Shah et al., 2007; Solt, 2015; Vassallo and Ding, 2016). In our case, this pooling enables the age group analysis related to RQ1. The survey questions are identical in 2017 and 2019. We account for the year of data collection in our models. Given our choice of countries, we significantly extend scholarship by examining countries other than the United States, as implied by Research Question 2. Our choice of countries reflects the “most similar” case selection for large sample studies (Seawright and Gerring, 2008). We chose multiple cases that are similar on the variables of GDP per capita and quality of democracy, which have been the focal point of comparative research on political consumerism. Before country/case selection, we did not know whether the cases would be similar on the independent variables (specific digital media uses), given the lack of comparative research on these countries. As for political consumerism, the last two rounds of the World Values Survey in 2010–2014 and 2017–2020 (Gundelach, 2020; World Values Survey, 2020) did not include Great Britain or France in the line of questions about boycotting. As such, we did not know the participation rates across these countries.
Seawright and Gerring (2008) would call our design an exploratory design because we did not know the characteristics of x (digital media use) and y (political consumerism) in these three countries before data collection. We do know the countries are similar in background characteristics that have been tested in existing scholarship (GDP per capita and quality of democracy). A comparative approach does not necessarily have to focus on identifying differences. Identifying differences helps to advance more nuanced theories about contextual conditions that moderate the relationship; however, comparative approaches can also reveal similarities. In our case, we examine the robustness of theories beyond the US context and beyond limited samples of students/youth. We do not find substantial differences within each country; however, we see some differentiation in the strength of variables or predictors across countries.
Dependent variables
Our dependent variables are
Descriptive statistics.
Supplemental Appendix Table A2 presents country-specific statistics for these variables.
The 2019 questionnaire included some follow-up questions about political consumerism. We asked, “For products and services that you boycott, how important were the following reasons for boycotting?” The response scale ranged from 1 (

Cross-national comparison of motives for boycotting.
Digital media variables
We asked a series of questions about online activities in the past 12 months. These activities included the frequency with which respondents “searched for political information online” (H1). The full question wording is available in Supplemental Appendix A3. We offered relative frequency categories: never, rarely, from time to time, and often. In relation to H2, we also asked, “How often have you talked about politics with people online (e.g. via social media, chats or emails)?” We offered relative frequency categories: never, rarely, from time to time, and often. People who did not use social media were coded as “never.” We asked whether people had, in the past 12 months, “Joined a special group that is defending a social or political cause or in response to a current event” (H3).
Other variables
The models control for sex, age, education, income, and political interest (see Supplemental Appendix A3 for specific question wording). The choice of variables is based on a meta-analysis of existing research on political consumerism. This meta-analysis finds strong effects for education and political interest (Copeland and Boulianne, 2020). Different countries have different education systems. As such, we revised the responses into high school or less, some college, bachelor’s degree, and more than a bachelor’s degree. In the pooled sample, approximately 52.64% of the respondents had completed more than high school.
Age is well-tested in this body of research, with the weight of the evidence in favor of nonlinear effects (Copeland and Boulianne, 2020). To further examine these nonlinear findings, we decided to code age as a series of categories. This approach helps highlight nonlinear effects observed in other studies, but also how the effects may differ by age group, as suggested by the review of literature on digital media effects (RQ1). The average age in the pooled sample is 47.76 years (
The effects of income are also inconclusive in the meta-analysis (Copeland and Boulianne, 2020). Income was measured in different currencies in the United States, United Kingdom, and France. To enable comparisons across countries, all values are standardized (respondent’s answer minus the country’s average divided by the standard deviation for the country). In the United States, respondents’ average income was US$63,836 (
Political interest is measured by the question, “How interested would you say you are in politics,” with responses of not at all interested, not very interested, fairly interested, and very interested (
Analytic technique
Our analysis proceeds in three stages. First, we examine the pooled results across countries, years of data collection, and age groups (H1–H3). Then, we examine whether the relationships between digital media uses and political consumerism differ by age group (RQ1). Finally, we examine whether the relationships between digital media uses and political consumerism differ by country (RQ2). Because the dependent variables, boycotting and
Results
Overall, all of our research hypotheses are supported with positive and statistically significant coefficients across all models (Table 3). As such, our analysis focuses on the strength of these coefficients rather than merely documenting their statistical significance. Standardized coefficients are presented to enable this comparison. Our first hypothesis (H1) is about whether searching online for political information has a positive correlation with political consumerism. We find it positively relates to boycotting (
OLS regression of boycotting and
Supplemental Appendix Table B1 presents these results as binary logistic regression.
Second, we hypothesize that talking about politics online increases engagement in political consumerism (H2). We find that political talk online increases the frequency of boycotting (
We also examine how joining groups on social media is associated with political consumerism. We see substantial effect sizes for boycotting (
The explained variance is higher for
Age has a different influence on
Age differences (RQ1)
Our next set of analyses examines the extent to which the results differ by age (Table 4), referring to our first research question. Searching for political information (H1) increases the likelihood of boycotting for all age groups, with coefficients ranging from .156 to .193. These strong, positive correlations also occur with
Age group comparison of boycotting and
The coefficients for talking politics online (H2) are also positive and statistically significant in every model. The standardized coefficients for talking politics and boycotting range from .135 to .184. In relation to
The coefficients for joining social groups on social media (H3) and political consumerism are also positive and significant for all age groups. For joining social groups on social media and boycotting, the coefficients range from .128 to .218. For joining social groups on social media and
Cross-national comparisons (RQ2)
Our next set of analyses (Table 5) addresses our research question about the extent to which the relationships differ across countries (RQ2). Searching for political information (H1) has a consistent role in boycotting for all countries. The coefficients range from .154 to .188. These strong, positive correlations also occur with
Cross-national comparison of boycotting and
Talking politics online (H2) has the largest correlation with political consumerism in the United States (boycotting
We also see cross-national differences for joining a social group on social media (H3), with a larger impact in the United Kingdom (boycotting
Discussion and conclusion
This article examines how digital media use can mobilize citizens to boycott and
Although all correlations between digital media use and political consumerism are positive and significant, they vary in strength. In the United States, we see evidence to support the idea that people are self-mobilizing and/or mobilizing their own networks to participate in political consumerism. Earl et al. (2017) ask about whether people participated in self-directed, organizationally directed, or hybrid boycotts and
Furthermore, we see larger correlations between searching for political information and political consumerism in the United States, affirming that mobilization in the United States works differently than in the two European countries. The difference is a degree of magnitude rather than a completely different process. Again, Earl et al. (2017) offer insights about these differences; they find that information searching has a larger impact on self-directed versus organizationally driven political consumerism. The larger coefficient in the United States may reflect American political consumerism being more self-directed than is the case in the other countries, thus requiring greater effort to search for information.
Using a similar case method of country selection (Seawright and Gerring, 2008), we found that the theory of digital media uses and political consumerism applies to the United Kingdom and France in addition to the United States; the difference is in the magnitude of the relationships. As mentioned, the United Kingdom and France have not been included in the latest rounds of the World Values Survey (Gundelach, 2020; World Values Survey, 2020), and thus, this data source could not compare the United States to these two countries. As such, while our research focuses on those types of countries that are overrepresented in this body of research, that is “industrial and developed countries with democratic political systems” (Zhang, 2015: 434), there is a gap in understanding with respect to transatlantic differences in political consumerism. In addition to addressing this gap, we offer unique insight into the role of digital media use for political consumerism in these well-established democracies. We find a mobilization process that transcends geographic borders; the countries vary in terms of the magnitude of relationships, but our findings suggest a consistent process of mobilization.
Our study addresses clear research gaps in terms of the lack of attention to
Further research should try to directly assess how often
Our findings suggest joining social groups on social media has a larger effect size on
Citizens are choosing more expressive and personalized forms of participation (Dalton, 2017; Newman and Bartels, 2011; Nonomura, 2017; Theocharis and van Deth, 2018). In this study, we examined how digital media use supports these new forms of participation. Political consumerism is distinctive as a form of political participation because it transcends geographical borders. People can participate in transnational campaigns to reward companies for ethical, environmentally sound business practices and punish companies with poor ethical and environmental practices. In this context, people are empowered to influence environmental and ethical business practices in the current globalized system. This form of participation also represents a shift in power structures from the state to the economy (Ward and de Vreese, 2011), creating a set of citizen consumers using their purchasing power to reflect their concerns about labor and environmental practices (Neilson and Paxton, 2010). Digital media are well-positioned to offer a transnational mobilization process. Digital media uses have significant positive correlations with political consumerism, but the strength of different mobilization processes differs by age group, by country, and for boycotting versus
Supplemental Material
sj-pdf-1-nms-10.1177_14614448221083025 – Supplemental material for Digital media and political consumerism in the United States, United Kingdom, and France
Supplemental material, sj-pdf-1-nms-10.1177_14614448221083025 for Digital media and political consumerism in the United States, United Kingdom, and France by Shelley Boulianne, Lauren Copeland and Karolina Koc-Michalska in New Media & Society
Footnotes
Funding
The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This project was funded by a Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) Insight Grant (435-2019-04-94), as well as research grants from Audencia University and Baldwin Wallace University.
Supplemental material
Supplemental material for this article is available online.
Author biographies
References
Supplementary Material
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