This paper deals with possible compensation mechanisms for damage caused by occupational diseases. Specific attention is paid to the potential influence of these compensation mechanisms on prevention of work related incidents. The economic analysis of law is used to pay attention to liability and liability insurance whereby both the preventive effects of liability and liability insurance are discussed as well as their capacity to compensate. Attention is equally paid to social security, compensation funds and first party as well as direct insurance schemes. Some empirical evidence concerning the effectiveness of various compensation mechanisms as far as the prevention of occupational diseases is concerned is also discussed.
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