This rejoinder replies to the twenty published commentaries on our article, “Relative Plausibility and Its Critics.” Our response has four objectives: 1) presenting further details regarding relative plausibility and the scope of our project in order to address some of our critics’ claims of ambiguity; 2) examining some important methodological considerations; 3) clarifying the significance of the conjunction problem and its role in the “probability debates”; and 4) noting avenues for future research.
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