Abstract
This note discusses three issues that Allen and Pardo believe to be especially problematic for a probabilistic interpretation of standards of proof: (1) the subjectivity of probability assignments; (2) the conjunction paradox; and (3) the non-comparative nature of probabilistic standards. I offer a reading of probabilistic standards that avoids these criticisms.
Get full access to this article
View all access options for this article.
References
1.
Allen
RJ
Pardo
MS
(2019 ) Relative plausibility and its critics . International Journal of Evidence and Proof 23 (1-2 ): 5 –59 .
2.
Allen
RJ
Stein
A
(2013 ) Evidence, probability, and the burden of proof . Arizona Law Review 55 : 557 –602 .
3.
Cheng
EK
(2013 ) Reconceptualizing the burden of proof . Yale Law Journal 122 : 1254 –1279 .
4.
Cheng
EK
Pardo
MS
(2015 ) Accuracy, optimality and the preponderance standard . Law, Probability and Risk 14 (3 ): 193 –212 .
5.
Gigerenzer
G
Todd
PM
ABC Research Group
(2000 ) Simple Heuristics that Make us Smart . Oxford : Oxford University Press .
6.
Williamson
J
(2010 ) In Defence of Objective Bayesianism . Oxford : Oxford University Press .