Abstract
This article presents a critique of Michel Foucault's work during the middle and later periods of his scholarship and the notions of preventative control that arise therefrom. A number of important deficiencies in Foucault's theories are demonstrated, which limit the efficacy of a Foucauldian approach as a basis for critical engagement with contemporary penality. Particularly, Foucault's formulations offer scant resources for understanding the affective dimensions of penality, and particularly the significance of the weight of the past to the insecurities and popular vengeful moralism of today. The arguments presented are substantiated by reference to my research on unsolved crimes and criminal detection practices. It is suggested that scholars analyse the thoroughgoing imbrication of past, present and future in relationships between identity, power and penality, rather than limiting their work to the study of risk-avoidance technologies and other future-orientated aspects of penality.
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