Why do presidents appoint non-partisan ministers? Despite growing interest in technocratic appointments, little is known about the conditions that lead presidents to include non-party figures in their cabinets. This paper draws on an original dataset of 181 inaugural governments across 19 American presidential regimes from 1980 to 2025. It examines how institutional, ideological, and coalition-based factors shape the proportion of independent ministers. The findings suggest that non-partisan appointments are less frequent when cabinets are composed of multiple parties, supported by strong legislative coalitions, or led by left-leaning presidents. Conversely, right-leaning executives and disaggregated coalitions rely more heavily on nonpartisan actors. Constitutional powers, such as authority over decrees, are of limited explanatory value. These findings contradict preconceptions about durable presidential discretion and underline the importance of party politics for cabinet formation. The study advances our understanding of executive decision-making and raises new questions about the future of party-based representation.
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