The literature on comparative political institutions highlights a tradeoff between majoritarian/plurality and proportional/consensus models of democracy. The former arrangement is said to enhance having governing parties held accountable. The latter is said to promote representation of a range of views, with a coalition of multiple parties governing. A tradeoff may be that the representativeness of multi-party coalitions can make it difficult for voters to hold government accountable, while single-party governments that facilitate accountability might fail to represent a range of parties in government. The ability of voters to respond to such differences is, however, subject to some skepticism given that the public opinion literature finds serious limits on a person’s ability to know basic facts about political institutions, let alone have preferences for governments that reflect democratic norms of accountability and representativeness. We assess public preferences for single versus multi-party governments and find evidence of systematic preferences that suggests people may link democratic norms of accountability and representativeness to the governmental system that promotes the respective norm. Preferences are also associated with the party system that people are familiar with.
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