Democratic representation is increasingly remote from citizens. Many institutions exacerbate this remoteness, but the shrinking ratio of legislative representatives to citizens is perhaps the most obvious. Around the world, the number of representatives has not kept pace with growing populations. To what extent does this distance, between citizens and their elected politicians, explain our current democratic malaise? Relying on both quantitative and historical evidence, this article maps the remoteness of democratic representation and considers its causes, consequences, and potential remedies. Strongly associated with economic inequality and rural elites, the remoteness of representation has far-flung implications, ranging from deficits of diversity and accountability in political representation to the weakened capacity of citizens to engage in political collective action.
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