This article analyses the extent to which radical left parties (RLPs) and radical right parties (RRPs) invoke fear of the EU in their voters by cueing on the economic, immigration and integration dimensions. In the West, mainstream theories of party cueing hold, although not in the predicted direction. RLPs cue on the economic dimension, with more protectionist cues resulting in less EU fear. RRPs are cueing on immigration, although respondents who vote for a more xenophobic party are less Eurosceptic. In the East, RLPs cue on immigration, with the anticipated outcome that a more xenophobic cue conditions greater EU fear. At the same time, RRPs cue on integration directly, with respondents who vote for a more Eurosceptic party exhibiting less fear. Overall, the most Eurosceptic respondents in the West are those who vote for a RRP, while the same is true for RLP voters in the East.
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