Weakly institutionalized party systems are a defining feature of third-wave democracies. Yet, in some countries like Peru, party weakness is not a static equilibrium but rather part of a dynamic process of “party system erosion” in which weak parties become weaker over time as independents come to dominate subnational posts. As I argue, party system erosion is driven by a particular configuration of institutional factors—weak party brands, ease of ballot access, and limited partisan control over resource distribution. These institutional features increase the likelihood that experienced candidates will run as independents. When these candidates are elected, they obtain more intergovernmental discretionary transfers, which are used to improve performance and maintain clientelistic networks. This resource advantage of independent officials further weakens party brands and reduces experienced candidates’ incentives to run with parties in future elections. I test this theory using a data set of 80,000 subnational officials and a regression discontinuity design.
AldrichJH (1995) Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Political Parties in America. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
2.
AnsolabehereSSnyderJM (2006). Party control of state government and the distribution of public expenditures. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics108(4): 547–569.
3.
BardhanP (2002) Decentralization of governance and development. The Journal of Economic Perspectives16(4): 185–205.
4.
BesleyTCaseA (1995) Does electoral accountability affect economic policy choices? Evidence from gubernatorial term limits. The Quarterly Journal of Economics110(3): 769–798.
5.
BrancatiD (2008) Winning alone: the electoral fate of independent candidates worldwide. The Journal of Politics70(3): 648–662.
6.
BrolloFNanniciniT (2012) Tying your enemy’s hands in close races: the politics of federal transfers in Brazil. American Political Science Review106(04): 742–761.
7.
CalonicoSCattaneoMDFarrellM (2017) Coverage Error Optimal Confidence Intervals for Regression Discontinuity Designs. Working paper.
CareyJM (1998) Term Limits and Legislative Representation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
10.
CarsonJLEngstromEJRobertsJM (2007) Candidate quality, the personal vote, and the incumbency advantage in congress. American Political Science Review101(2): 289–301.
11.
Casas-ZamoraKZovattoD (2015) The Cost of Democracy: Campaign Finance Regulation in Latin America. Washington: Brookings Institution.
12.
CaselliFMorelliM (2004) Bad politicians. Journal of Public Economics88(3-4): 759–782.
13.
DargentEMuñozP (2011) Democracy against parties? Party system deinstitutionalization in Colombia. Journal of Politics in Latin America3(2): 43–71.
14.
De LucaM (2012) Political recruitment in Argentina. In: PeterMSScottM (eds.) Pathways to Power: Political Recruitment and Candidate Selection in Latin America. University Park: Penn State Press, pp. 189–218.
15.
DesposatoSScheinerE (2008) Governmental centralization and party affiliation: Legislator strategies in Brazil and Japan. The American Political Science Review102(4): 509–524.
16.
DietzHAMyersDJ (2007) From thaw to deluge: party system collapse in Venezuela and Peru. Latin American Politics and Society49(2): 59–86.
17.
DunningT (2012) Natural Experiments in the Social Sciences: A Design-Based Approach. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
18.
EatonK (2004) Politics Beyond the Capital: The Design of Subnational Institutions in South America. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press.
19.
GonzalezCYRosenblattDWebbSB (2002) Stabilizing Intergovernmental Transfers in Latin America: A Complement to National/Subnational Fiscal Rules?Washington: World Bank.
20.
HagopianFGervasoniCMoraesJA (2009) From patronage to program: the emergence of party-oriented legislators in Brazil. Comparative Political Studies42(3): 360–391.
21.
HaleHE (2005) Why Not Parties in Russia? Democracy, Federalism, and the State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
22.
HickenAKuhontaEM (2014) Party System Institutionalization in Asia: Democracies, Autocracies, and the Shadows of the Past. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
23.
HollandA (2016) Insurgent successor parties: Scaling down to build a party after war. In: StevenLJamesLBrandonVDJorgeD (eds.) Challenges of Party-Building in Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 273–304.
24.
ImbensGWLemieuxT (2008) Regression discontinuity designs: a guide to practice. Journal of Econometrics142(2): 615–635.
25.
JonesMPSaieghSSpillerPT, et al. (2002) Amateur legislators—professional politicians: the consequences of party-centered electoral rules in a federal system. American Journal of Political Science46(3): 656–669.
26.
JüptnerP (2008) Local lists in the Czech Republic. In: MarionREverhardH (eds) Farewell to the Party Model?: Independent Local Lists in East and West European Countries. Berlin: Springer Science & Business Media, pp. 20–39.
27.
KatzRSMairP (1995) Changing models of party organization and party democracy: the emergence of the cartel party. Party Politics1(1): 5–28.
28.
Latinobarómetro (2001-2013, 2016) Available at: www.latinobarometro.org (accessed 25 July 2017).
29.
LeeDS (2008) Randomized experiments from non-random selection in US House elections. Journal of Econometrics142(2): 675–697.
30.
LevitskyS (2003a) Argentina: From crisis to consolidation (and back). In: JorgeIDMichaelS (eds) Constructing Democratic Governance in Latin America. Baltimore: JHU Press, pp. 244–269.
31.
LevitskyS (2003b) Transforming Labor-Based Parties in Latin America: Argentine Peronism in Comparative Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
32.
LevitskySCameronMA (2003) Democracy without parties? Political parties and regime change in Fujimori’s Peru. Latin American Politics and Society45(3): 1–33.
33.
LevitskySLoxtonJVan DyckB (2016) Introduction: Challenges of party-building in Latin America. In: StevenLJamesLBrandonVD, and DominguezJorge (eds) Challenges of Party-Building in Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1–51.
34.
LienertI (2010) Role of the Legislature in Budget Processes. Washington: International Monetary Fund. Google-Books-ID: t2028HU7pacC.
35.
LinekL (2003) Antistranické postoje české veřejnosti. In: VladimraD and AndreaH (eds) Kongres Českých Politologů: Praha – SuchdolČeská společnost pro politické vědy: Prague. pp. 455–469.
36.
LublinD (2014) Minority Rules: Electoral Systems, Decentralization, and Ethnoregional Party Success. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
37.
LupuN (2014) Brand dilution and the breakdown of political parties in Latin America. World Politics66(4): 561–602.
38.
LupuN (2016) Building party brands in Argentina and Brazil. In: StevenLJamesLBrandonVDJorgeD (eds.) Challenges of Party-Building in Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1–51.
39.
MainwaringS (1999) Rethinking Party Systems in the Third Wave of Democratization: The Case of Brazil. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press.
40.
MainwaringSScullyT (1995) Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press.
41.
Martinez-VazquezJSepulvedaCF (2011) Intergovernmental Transfers in Latin America: A Policy Reform Perspective. Atlanta, GA: Georgia State University.
42.
McCraryJ (2008) Manipulation of the running variable in the regression discontinuity design: a density test. Journal of Econometrics142(2): 698–714.
43.
MershonCShvetsovaO (2013) The microfoundations of party system stability in legislatures. The Journal of Politics75(4): 865–878.
44.
MorganJ (2011) Bankrupt Representation and Party System Collapse. University Park: Penn State Press.
45.
MoserRG (1999) Electoral systems and the number of parties in postcommunist states. World Politics51(3): 359–384.
46.
MotzN (2012) Who Emerges from Smoke-Filled Rooms? Political Parties and Candidate Selection. Working paper, University Library of Munich, Germany.
47.
NovaesLM (2017) Disloyal brokers and weak parties. American Journal of Political Science62(1): 84–98.
48.
O’NeillK (2006) Decentralized politics and political outcomes in the Andes. In: ScottM (ed) The Crisis of Democratic Representation in the Andes. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, pp. 171–203.
49.
PalombaraJLWeinerM (2015) Political Parties and Political Development. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
50.
PiomboJNijzinkL (2005) How are South Africans being represented? In: PiomboJNijzinkL (eds) Electoral Politics in South Africa: Assessing the First Democratic Decade. Berlin: Springer, pp. 64–86.
51.
SamuelsD (2006) Sources of mass partisanship in Brazil. Latin American Politics and Society48(2): 1–27.
52.
SchadyNR (2000) The political economy of expenditures by the Peruvian social fund (FONCODES), 1991-95. The American Political Science Review94(2): 289–304.
53.
SeawrightJ (2012) Party-System Collapse: The Roots of Crisis in Peru and Venezuela. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press.
54.
SekhonJSTitiunikR (2017) On interpreting the regression discontinuity design as a local experiment. In: MatiasDCEscancianoJC (eds.) Regression Discontinuity Designs: Theory and Applications, Advances in Econometrics. Vol. 38, Bingley: Emerald, p. 7.
55.
SethulegoM (2017) Civil Strife against Local Governance: Dynamics of Community Protests in Contemporary South Africa. Leverkusen: Barbara Budrich.
56.
SnyderJMTingMM (2002) An informational rationale for political parties. American Journal of Political Science46(1): 90–110.
57.
SpearSAlesinaA (1988) An overlapping generations model of electoral competition. Journal of Public Economics37(3): 359–379.
58.
StratmannT (2005) Ballot access restrictions and candidate entry in elections. European Journal of Political Economy21(1): 59–71.
59.
StromK (1990) A behavioral theory of competitive political parties. American Journal of Political Science34(2): 565–598.
ZavaletaM (2014) Coaliciones de independientes: Las reglas no escritas de la política electoral. Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos.
Supplementary Material
Please find the following supplemental material available below.
For Open Access articles published under a Creative Commons License, all supplemental material carries the same license as the article it is associated with.
For non-Open Access articles published, all supplemental material carries a non-exclusive license, and permission requests for re-use of supplemental material or any part of supplemental material shall be sent directly to the copyright owner as specified in the copyright notice associated with the article.
