Tests of whether candidate A or B would fare better against C—and other polling enrichments to open up party strategy

Abstract

Our main setting is a single-winner election contested by two major parties. A goal is to find whether candidate A or B of one party would be the stronger opponent running against candidate C of the other party. A poll (as many polls do) asks the same set of respondents to choose both between A and C and between B and C. The classical McNemar test and two novel extensions thereof can evaluate the difference between A and B regarding their strength against C. The first extension treats the case where some respondents answer one question but not both, a condition that the McNemar test itself does not handle well. The second covers the case where respondents who do not answer a question are probed further to see if they lean toward either candidate. We provide empirical examples related to the 2016 US presidential election. The A-versus-B strength difference vis-à-vis C can be statistically significant even if the difference between A’s showing against C and B’s showing against C is small. We argue finally that other insights helpful to party and candidate strategy can also emerge from novel augmentations to polling practices.

Keywords

Condorcet candidate election polls McNemar test political campaign primary elections

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