In this paper, I examine four roots of conversational practices that are particularly germane to the understanding how the uses of the word ‘person’ as displays of the concept of person are both products and producers of the intelligibility of such practices. These roots are empirical facts used as if they were necessary truths – Wittgenstein’s ‘hinges’; the resolutions of relevant mereological fallacies; the grammar of indexical expressions, particularly pronouns; ad finally positioning theory, the study of the conversational devices by means of which rights and duties are distributed among the members of a population of human beings.
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