Abstract
The internationalisation of political authority elongates the chain of delegation between the citizen and elected representatives. It increases executive dominance while weakening parliamentary control. International Parliamentary Institutions (IPIs), parliamentary assemblies affiliated with international organisations, could potentially mitigate the ‘parliamentary deficit’ of global governance but are commonly criticised for their weak authority. This paper revisits this critical perspective and argues that IPIs provide access to information circumventing the privileged access of governments. Thereby, IPIs strengthen national parliaments’ capability to control the executive. This benefit explains the motivation of national MPs to attend IPIs. The study is based on novel data on the attendance of parliamentarians to the sessions of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Parliamentary Assembly from 2007 to 2015. The results speak in favour of intertwined parliamentary arenas, as attributes of national parliaments drive attendance. For one, parliaments with higher scrutiny capacity participate more in delegations to IPIs. Moreover, the composition of delegations is related to control incentives, causing a difference in attendance patterns of government and opposition parties.
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