Students of bargaining have long focused on the dual nature of international negotiations, which take place both internationally and domestically. The prevailing wisdom is that under certain conditions political leaders can use domestic constraints to get a better deal at the negotiating table. In this article, I argue that under certain conditions leaders have an incentive to use ‘international constraints’ to pressure their domestic constituents into accepting a particular policy. I apply this argument to the Serbian and Croatian cases of Western pressure for cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (Hague Tribunal).
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