European Regional Organizations,Political Conditionality,and Democratic Transformation in Eastern Europe

Abstract

How and under which conditions have European regional organizations been effective promoters of democratic change in Central and Eastern Europe? In this article, the author argues that only the credible conditional promise of membership in the European Union and NATO has had the potential to produce compliance with liberal-democratic norms in norm-violating transformation countries. These incentives, however, were not sufficient when the power costs of compliance were high for the target governments. They did little to alter the policies of authoritarian governments, which forewent the benefits of accession rather than risk losing power as a result of democratic reforms. Thus, whereas political conditionality was largely redundant in the forerunner countries of democratization in Central and Eastern Europe (except for some specific reform issues) and generally ineffective with entrenched authoritarian regimes, it proved highly effective in supporting democratic forces and locking in democratic reforms in the unstable democratic countries of the region.

Keywords

conditionality democracy enlargement European Union human rights

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References

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There is a broad consensus in the literature on the essential condition of credible membership incentives for an effective impact of European regional organizations on democratic change and consolidation in the Central and Eastern Europe. See Judith G. Kelley , Ethnic Politics in Europe: The Power of Norms and Incentives (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), for a comparison of socialization and conditionality strategies in ethnic politics; Paul J. Kubicek, ed., The European Union and Democratization (London: Routledge, 2003), for a comparison of numerous target countries; Frank Schimmelfennig, Stefan Engert, and Heiko Knobel, International Socialization in Europe: European Organizations, Political Conditionality, and Democratic Change (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), for a qualitative comparative analysis of conditions of successful international strategies of promoting democratic change; and Milada Anna Vachudova, Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage, and Integration since 1989 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), for a comparison of “passive” and “active leverage” in EU policy toward Central and Eastern Europe.

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This section is based on Frank Schimmelfennig, “Strategic Calculation and International Socialization: Membership Incentives, Party Constellations, and Sustained Compliance in Central and Eastern Europe,” International Organization 59:4(2005): 827-860.

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See Michael McFaul , “The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship: Noncooperative Transitions in the Postcommunist World,” World Politics 54:2(2002): 212-244, for a similar three-way categorization based on the domestic balance between democratic and ancient régime parties, and Vachudova, Europe Undivided, for the distinction between transition countries with a liberal and an illiberal pattern of domestic change. The illiberal pattern is congruent with a mixed party constellation here.

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Richard Youngs , The European Union and the Promotion of Democracy: Europe's Mediterranean and Asian Policies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 90-91.

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Judith Kelley , “New Wine in Old Wineskins: Promoting Political Reforms through the New European Neighborhood Policy,” Journal of Common Market Studies 44:1(2006): 29-55.

16.

On the conditions of such situations, see Michael McFaul , “Transitions from Postcommunism,” Journal of Democracy 16:3(2005): 5-19.