Abstract
Organization studies have consistently drawn from literature and film as tools to understand, explain, and analyze organizational phenomena. With that goal in mind, this article illustrates how Yojimbo, a movie by Akira Kurosawa, provides a critical representation of work and organizations as a context for how micro emancipation might be undertaken in contemporary organizational settings. The argument revolves around the claim that contractors might become the newest frontier in the study of both micro emancipation and organizational misconduct. Reinforcing this claim, the article draws heavily from the film Yojimbo and later supplements the argument with a case study focusing on Edward Snowden. This article sets the tone for an emergent area of discussion about contemporary micro emancipation across sectors.
Introduction
“Hungry dogs come running when they smell blood.”
In the contemporary workplace, the use of contractors has become pervasive, commonplace, and in many ways essential for the day-to-day operations of most organizations. One might argue that the practice of contracting occupies a central place in work, even though the impacts of contracting on the contemporary workplace remain relatively understudied. In the public sector in particular, some interesting phenomena have begun to emerge simultaneously with increases in contracting. They include an increased consideration of guerrilla government practices (O’Leary, 2006, 2014) and organizational misbehavior (Ackroyd, 2012; Kidwell and Valentine, 2009). Guerrilla government is understood to be a practice where the actions of career public servants work against the wishes of their supervisors (O’Leary, 2010: 8). It is interesting to note that the work of Ackroyd (2012) on organizational misbehavior in particular, parallels O’Leary’s work in many ways, especially in discussions of workplace resistance.
A more interesting aspect of these phenomena emerges from the observation that career public servant employment numbers are declining simultaneously relative to increasing numbers of contractors (Haque, 2001). This shift toward contracting is not limited to the public sector, but rather is one facet of a broader shift in the nature of work (Yelin, 2018). O’Leary’s (2006, 2014) work at its core focuses on actions by career public servants, sometimes not distinguishing them from contractors particularly in regard to assumptions about agency (Clegg, 2010), accountability (Romzek, 2011; Squillacote and Feldman, 2018), and legitimate action (Rohr, 1986, 1998). Yet, these differences between career public servants and contractors with their approaches to guerilla government merit consideration. This article considers some of the implications of these broader shifts in discretionary action, the nature of work, and their implications on organizations using the movie Yojimbo to argue that the ‘not so new’ frontier in worker resistance in broader discussions of critical management thought might be understood meaningfully by examining contractor relationships, rather than focusing exclusively on the behavior of career employees.
Using the film Yojimbo as a contextual touchstone uncovers a range of representations that pertain to contemporary contractor relationships in both the public and private sectors. It combines the use of historical fiction in film paired with a known, contemporary account of the actions of Edward Snowden as a starting point for discussions of critical management and contractors. Moreover, this article reinforces the conceptual value of film in organization studies consistent with the work of both Bell (2008) and Rhodes and Westwood (2008). The representations in the film Yojimbo suggest areas of future of analysis and critique, while reflecting contemporary behavior in the workplace. Exploring Yojimbo and connecting it with some brief examples of contemporary workplace behavior creates opportunities to reflect upon workplace behavior more generally, while suggesting avenues for future investigation. In particular, it raises alarms about unchecked government actions through contractors, guerrilla governance, and organizational misbehavior more generally.
Plot synopsis
Can’t tell whose money is whose anymore
The film itself has a relatively simple plot. A nameless ronin, who is a masterless samurai, wanders into a small village in the late Edo/Tokugowa period (roughly in the 1860’s). Two rival crime bosses are trying to gain control over the local gambling trade, and each seeks to limit the scope of the other. It is based on a historical theme of competing organized crime groups influencing both the public and private sectors incrementally. Going by the moniker ‘Sanjuro Kuwabatake’, the ronin is hired as a body guard for both Seibei and Ushitora (the respective leaders of the crime syndicates). Using a variety of subtle machinations and feints, the ronin undermines both sides which leads to a gang war. Ultimately, there is a violent showdown and in the end, the town becomes free of the corrupt hegemons. During the closing scene, the ronin leaves the now quiet peaceful town without fanfare.
Time and context of Yojimbo
Yojimbo is set in the late 19th century at the end of the Tokugowa or Edo period on the cusp of the Meiji enlightenment (Walker, 2015). During this time, Japan was ruled by a shogunate, which is a feudal style military government. It is commonly understood during that period that hegemony over the entire country was achieved using strategically placed allies, collateral houses, and the requirement to maintain households in the Tokugawa administrative capital (Walker, 2015). In practice, this particular arrangement in the late Tokugowa period mirrors Deyermond’s (2009) discussion of multilevel cooperative hegemonic encounters. Yojimbo expresses this phenomenon in the context of an Edo era town. In Yojimbo, the hegemonic behavior coheres around an established system of semi-autonomous, centrally controlled domains that were a feature of the time (Walker, 2015). Particular to the film, there are two localized hegemons in the village, Seibei and Ushitora. Both are crime bosses, and the mayor, Tazaemon, serves at the pleasure of Seibei while the constable is receiving payment from Ushitora. At a more macro level, there is some manufactured consent (Deyermond, 2009) through the shogunate, combined with micro level threats from both crime bosses and their allies.
Ronin
Samurai, wanna make some dough as a bodyguard? The going rate has hit the roof.
Central to the plot of the film is the concept of a ronin. Understanding what a ronin is before moving forward is essential. Ronin is used in Japan to describe a samurai without a lord or master. It was most commonly used in the feudal era. Samurai become ronin if their master dies, if they lose face, or if they lose privileges. Basically, a ronin is an unemployed, professional swordsman for hire without the power or social status of samurai with masters. In many ways, a ronin functions as the embodiment of homo sacer (Agamben, 1998) if we consider the earliest, non-Christian roots of the term. Both contractors and ronin, in very practical terms, are set apart from common society, since both lack the legal protections afforded to public employees in the case of contractors, and samurai in the case of ronin. Neither are seen as mainstream parts of societal organizational units.
Consequently, normal people, members of organizational ‘in groups’, are suspicious of these ronin who were often described as drifters or wanderers. Often, in both story and film, they are portrayed as vagrants. In such a class conscious society, such ronin are seen as undesirables and reprobates by most citizens. Due to such perceptions, ronin often were unwelcome in most communities. Some even became bandits. Despite misgivings about them, ronin were also situationally useful hired men at arms. Briefly understood, in contemporary discussions, we could call them independent contractors. The movie Yojimbo highlights an uncommon occurrence in Japan where a ronin acts heroically.
Despite some of the negative connotations drawn from historical contexts, the ronin in Yojimbo captures the imagination about contemporary work as a contractor. He is not an organizational employee and is not bound by the public service motives, regime values (Spicer, 2014), or the oaths (Rutgers, 2010) commonly associated with public employees. Nor are his actions always consistent with historical organizational norms (Vardi and Wiener, 1996). Within the context of the film, the actions undertaken by the unnamed ronin capture many elements of guerrilla government (O’Leary, 2014) and organizational misbehavior more generally (Ackroyd, 2012). One specific item of note emerges from the actions undertaken on behalf of citizens by a contractor. It is a public if not altruistic perspective by a contractor, rather than a public employee or elected official that is engaging in value violating behavior (Vardi and Wiener, 1996). Altruistic or not, since it violates the terms of the agreement with an employer, it technically harms (Vardi and Wiener, 1996: 155) the organization. In Yojimbo, the ronin’s actions harm both syndicates.
More generally, such actions by contractors can open possibilities for micro level resistance (Ackroyd, 2012; Alvesson and Willmott, 1992) in the face of multilevel hegemonic control (Deyermond, 2009). It also offers a context to consider contractor action more broadly. Unburdened by public service constraints (Rohr, 1986; Rutgers, 2010), contractors also might embrace differing forms of organizational client commitment (Coyle-Shapiro and Morrow, 2006), while possibly engaging in value violating behavior (Vardi and Wiener, 1996) or organizational misbehavior (Huault et al., 2014) more generally.
The combination of possibilities, including relatively thin oversight (Rosenbloom, 2002; Svara, 1998), and the temporary nature of employment elevate questions of contracting, making it of particular interest to organizational scholars regardless of sector. The concept of an unnamed ronin elegantly captures both the problems and possibilities of contracted labor in contemporary organizations. Considering the film Yojimbo creates a simulation that might be explored in management thought through the use of representational forms (Rhodes and Westwood, 2008) and reflection. The accompanying accounts of the Challenger disaster and Edward Snowden later reground the discussion in managerial practices, providing both evidence and connections.
Themes in Yojimbo
All right make me an offer how about three ryo? I’m going to Ushitora. I bet he’ll pay more.
Guerilla governance/misbehavior
Understanding non-conforming behavior in organizations has emerged as a research priority in both the public and private sectors. As an example, O’Leary (2006, 2014) is often credited with coining the phrase guerilla government, referring to a type of non-conforming behavior in the public sector. It is understood as a form of dissent or resistance typically executed by dissatisfied or disaffected insiders operating in public sector organizations. They differ from whistleblowers (Callahan and Dworkin, 2000) who typically serve as an informant publicly. Guerillas instead tend to obey their superiors in public, while soldiering, ghostwriting letters, and otherwise disobeying them privately. This has been attributed to poor organizational culture and an implicit goal to be a public servant (O’Leary, 2014), rather than a ‘good’ employee (Vardi and Wiener, 1996: 155). The basic requirements for guerilla government then are (1) public employment, (2) an ethical or professional dilemma, (3) a clandestine emphasis, and (4) an insider role. The expression of dissent in Yojimbo represents a divergence from item 4, given that the ronin is an outsider, a contractor, and not a full time, public employee who has taken an oath of office (Rutgers, 2010) more consistent with the classic understanding of homo sacer (Agamben, 1998) within an organizational context.
In the private sector, a similar body of literature has cohered around the related topic of organizational misbehavior (see Ackroyd, 2012; Vardi and Wiener, 1996). In addition, there have been a number of treatments of micro emancipation and emancipation more generally (Alvesson and Willmott, 1992; Huault et al., 2014), which have broadened to include questions of agency alongside research on social issues that include minority groups (Zanoni and Janssens, 2007) and economic issues that highlight entrepreneurial roles (Verduijn et al., 2014). (Huault et al., 2014) in particular, help bring the actions of anyone ‘who creates scenes of dissensus’ (p. 44) into focus as part of critical management thought. This possibility of anyone taking action links micro emancipation research more explicitly to existing literature on resistance (Scott, 1985), opening possibilities for less conventional outlets for non-conforming behavior, contestation (Griffin et al., 2015), misbehavior, and resistance, including actions taken by contractors.
Multilevel hegemony and the public sector
50? … very well 25 in advance with room and board.
An environmental feature of the film Yojimbo includes the presence of a multilevel, hegemonic, and loosely cooperative governing structure common to the Tokugowa or Edo period which is comparable to Deyermond’s (2009) understanding of the phenomena. Most critical management thought has some expression of hegemony and how it impacts superior-subordinate relationships. In the broader literature, hegemony reflects some understanding of dominance or authority over people. It has often been associated with the work of Marx (Marx, 1984 (1867); Marx and Engels, 1998) and more recently asymmetric elements of power in organizational life (Griffin et al., 2015), while realizing that such asymmetries are ingrained within organizational life (Abel and Sementelli, 2002) without idealized speech situations as a priori (Sementelli, 2016). More recently, the emergence of multilevel cooperative hegemonic encounters Deyermond (2009) add some complexity to hegemonic expression. The peculiar aspect of a multilevel cooperative hegemonic encounter that is relevant to this discussion involves accommodation as described by Deyermond (2009). Specifically, the notion that different level hegemons can accommodate or cooperate creates possibilities for coordinated, system-wide approaches that can fundamentally change the experience of hegemony in administrative systems. In Yojimbo, it highlights complex relationships, with multiple layers of allegiance, bound by corruption and power, all verified through historical accounts of the period.
Outside the study of management, hegemony and political issues often are considered at the national or international level. Despite recent research on hegemony and resistance (Courpasson, 2016; Courpasson et al., 2016, 2017), there is room for development by considering parallel developments in public administration along with developments in management more generally. Specifically, understanding the consequences of superior-subordinate hegemonic relationships at a micro level (Scott, 1985) in the context of broader hegemonic environments can inform both contracting and outsourcing in public sector organizations. As stated earlier, developing research on hegemony and resistance is fundamental to conceptually apprehend contemporary roles of contractors, as well as the historical roles portrayed in the film Yojimbo.
Deyermond (2009) specifically examined the phenomenon of ‘Matrioshka hegemony’ in the context of politics in post-Soviet Central Asia. Her research emphasizes how emerging hegemons might cooperate across levels while still competing, similar to an Edo style shogunate. It also captures elements of coopetition (Bengtsson and Kock, 2000; Dagnino, 2009; Tsai, 2002) in management. The possibility for a cooperative, multilevel hegemony that coordinates efforts similar to coopetition can impact state behavior meaningfully. What might this multilevel, somewhat cooperative hegemony look like? Eagleton (1991), in particular, illustrates a possibility by pointing to a contemporary public sector increasingly exhibiting intentional reactions (Abel and Sementelli, 2002) to macro level political changes via hegemons, and to changes in values and mores at the micro level, while processes become reinforced and routinized at the mezzo level.
Reactions might be expressed in a few different ways. As changes in political narratives lead to changes in oversight, they can also change practices. A central problem, in this case, emerges when street level bureaucrats or contractors perform tasks that are inconsistent with public value ‘safeguards’ (Rohr, 1986; Rutgers, 2010) or organizational values (Vardi and Wiener, 1996). They might engage in non-conforming behavior for good or ill (Lucas et al., 2017). One might also argue that such actions violate some implied social contract or term of employment. Exacerbating this is a tendency to benefit elected hegemons, while making the identity of social agents indeterminate (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001: 41). This can create opportunities for unchecked discretion by public employees and contractors (see Fennimore, 2017), given a lack of formalized organizational client commitment (Coyle-Shapiro and Morrow, 2006).
Workplace context
You’re mad to pay 25 in advance to a complete stranger.
The public sector relies on formalized organizational client commitment (Coyle-Shapiro and Morrow, 2006). This commitment is demonstrated through oaths of office and other ritualized practices (Rohr, 1986; Rutgers, 2010). In practice, this is understood to be a tenuous connection that often lacks substantive punishments for violation. Complicating things further, there was a suggestion by Rohr (1986), in particular, that public administrators could meaningfully check the power of elected hegemons, while remaining responsible to others by ‘choosing among their constitutional masters’ (Spicer, 1995: 6). Given concerns of a thin oversight (Amey, 2012) more generally, it creates unease.
Remaining questions surround how actions are chosen by ronin or contractors. Can public officials meaningfully resist? Can they protect the public (Fox and Cochran, 1990)? Would they employ leash slipping (Deyermond, 2009: 155), guerrilla governance (O’Leary, 2006, 2014) or something else to counteract domination (Griffin et al., 2015)? The third option, something else, is the most intriguing because it allows us to consider the real possibility of making tasks of resistance external to public organizations, placing them in the hands of contractors, unburdened by oaths of office (Rutgers, 2010), with different employment classifications and sources of commitment (Coyle-Shapiro and Morrow, 2006). As an independent contractor in particular, such people could have a lack of formal, long-term organizational commitment (Coyle-Shapiro and Morrow, 2006). Questions of agency (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001: 41) along with questions of thin oversight (Amey, 2012) would remain.
Notice that these characteristics continue to map elegantly to the ronin in Yojimbo. He is an independent contractor, a drifter, with limited formal commitment. He is an ‘oath breaker’, agreeing to work for the crime lords while simultaneously undermining them (Agamben, 1998). In the film, he sides with the peasantry against his contracts with hegemonic masters. The film provides an elegant example of leash slipping (Deyermond, 2009: 155), while pitting the two criminal groups against one another capturing organizational misbehavior (Ackroyd, 2012). If we consider the ronin to be a public official even though he is a contractor, then he is engaging in guerrilla governance (O’Leary, 2006, 2010, 2014) actively.
Several factors can provide opportunities for leash slipping (Deyermond, 2009). The hegemonic environment relies on politicized discourses (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001). Language games (Clegg et al., 2006: 295; Wittgenstein, 1953) are used to shift services and provision to contracted options (Cooper, 2003). Given the tenuous relationships, such a shift provides different, external spaces for resistance (Courpasson et al., 2017) by contractors, driven by different standards for organizational client commitment (Coyle-Shapiro and Morrow, 2006) and shaped by differential standards for administrative oversight (Rosenbloom, 2002; Svara, 1998).
An external shift
You want to hire me as a body guard? Watch. I’ll show you my ability.
Typically, spaces for resistance are contextualized around insiders experiencing an ethical dilemma or change in perception of the workplace more generally (Lucas et al., 2017). As mentioned earlier, there has not yet been enough consideration given to the disparities that emerge from being external to an organization. Specifically, these external spaces can differ from guerrilla governance as expressed by O’Leary (2006, 2014) in the sense that contractors are not necessarily beholden to some institutionalized public service construct (Rohr, 1986; Rothstein, 2009; Rutgers, 2010; Spicer, 2014) with a delineated source of power from a public institution or long-term socialization in a private organization. Consequently, contractors are simply held to the scope of work in the contract itself with the legal remedies associated with it. This becomes more complex in the public sector where power relationships are often couched in more mainstream arguments about a Foucauldian style ‘governmentalization of the State’ (Rose and Miller, 2010: 175) of street level bureaucrats (Prottas, 1978) legitimacy (Rohr, 1986; Rothstein, 2009) and administrative oversight (Rosenbloom, 2002; Svara, 1998) with an emphasis on some aspect of political control (McCubbins et al., 1989).
Within these sociopolitical constructs are supervisor hegemons who coordinate with managers and organizational leadership to alter organizational mores, to shift expectations for both rewards and sanctions consistent with contemporary literature (Clegg et al., 2006; Laclau and Mouffe, 2001) reshaping public sector administration in particular, from one based on service delivery to one that embodies thin oversight (Amey, 2012). More specifically, multilevel hegemony sets the rules for ‘encounters’ (Blommaert, 2017: 8). These rules can be written and rewritten through political narratives, alongside surveillance (Foucault, 1977) and routinizing processes (Attewell, 1987). Hegemonic processes become broadly normalized, self-sustaining reactions to narrative shifts in the public sector. Consequently, the confluence of normalized multilevel hegemony, with its politicized discourses (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001), and the combination of both decision making and ideological power (Lukes, 2005) afford opportunities for political hegemons to incrementally change the rules for encounters regarding public goods and services replacing tasks of production with ritualized (Goffman, 1967) tasks of oversight, creating a need for contractors.
Reconsider the neoclassical (Rohr, 1986) and contemporary theorists (O’Leary, 2014) who argued that public sector administrators, including street level bureaucrats, should check political decisions to mitigate the emergence of hegemony. As employees in organizations are replaced by independent contractors, it can substantively change how public organizations might react to Rohr (1986) and O’Leary’s (2014) charge. Public employees, most commonly tasked with resisting hegemony (O’Leary 2014), functionally cannot once contracting and outsourcing reach a certain threshold. The burden for resisting hegemony falls upon these independent contractors. This is problematic given that contractors have different functional classifications (Coyle-Shapiro and Morrow, 2006), are not held to an oath of office (Rutgers, 2010), nor the ‘strong’ oversight that public sector employees are purported to have (Amey, 2012).
Microemancipation
Think about it Seibei, Ushitora, the gamblers and drifters—with them gone, the town could have a fresh start.
These factors of thin oversight, functional classifications, and differential power in organizations create opportunities for organization misbehavior, resistance, and microemancipation. Power and power disparities in particular implicitly create spaces for action by organizational members. As alluded to above, resistance (Scott, 1985), microemancipation (Alvesson and Willmott, 1992; Huault et al., 2014), and emancipation more generally are connected to the work of critical theory in organizations applied in a circumspect manner. In practice, the nature of organizations offers limited if any possibilities for broad, wholesale changes within them. Lukes’ (2005) understanding of power captures elegantly the limits of emancipatory actions in organizations and institutions (Clegg, 2010). Combined with the work of Willmott (2015), it becomes clear why we often discover that broad emancipation and resistance are difficult if not impossible. Yet in the movie Yojimbo, the ronin engages in localized emancipatory resistance as a foil to corruption, while serving the public interest as an external actor.
In this work of historical fiction, we find potential for microemancipation in both the public and private sectors. Yet microemancipation has come to represent a ‘minor form’, or mode of resistance to confront domination (Huault et al., 2014: 23), albeit without a long-term focus on crafting major changes to the organization or institution. Huault et al. (2014) have gone as far as to describe these acts as being ‘minor and insignificant’ (p. 27). Huault et al. (2014) also point to an under considered issue that of ignoring the broader consequences of what they call ’everyday misbehavior’ (p.27) or alternatively ‘resistance’ or ‘guerilla governance’ (O’Leary, 2006, 2014). Though uncommon, such possibilities exist arguably in the presence of thin oversight (Amey, 2012), different functional classifications (Coyle-Shapiro and Morrow, 2006), and a notion of multilevel hegemony consistent with somewhat fragmented organizational power structures.
As these incremental processes are continuous, the behaviors they inspire are continuously normalized or routinized allowing for drift (Toruflo, 1997). Such processes can, in turn, minimize struggles over ideas or (professional) beliefs. Compliance might replace internal opportunities for resistance, while internal resistance also can be recast as administrative overreach (Kelly and Lindsay, 2016) or as abuse of discretion (Squillacote and Feldman, 2018). Such narratives emphasizing oversight and conformity might reduce the time and opportunities to engage in microemancipation and work generally thereby creating opportunities for external actors such as contractors.
Life imitating art
Despite the real challenges associated with uncovering externally initiated prosocial, altruistic, or guerilla actions outside of film, there are a few examples of government contractors acting on behalf of the public. Consider first the Challenger disaster. Actions by the engineering contractors could be understood as engaging in microemancipation, acting on behalf of the public in the sense that they attempted to halt the launch based on information they had garnered (Garrett, 2001: 68). The engineering contractors sought to prevent the launch by acting within normal channels by bringing information to decision makers and articulating clear concerns based on engineering specifications. At one point in the discussion, these contractors thought they were successful in preventing the launch. Yet, because of a lack of data and an inability to articulate concerns effectively to institutional hegemons (Garrett, 2001: 69), along with changes in accountability systems (Romzek, 2011; Romzek and Dubnick, 1987), the Challenger launched and failed.
A more recent account captures the nuances of dissent in contemporary organizations. At the front of O’Leary’s (2014) book, Donald Kettl recounted the case of Edward Snowden, a private contractor, who was trusted with governmental secrets. Snowden was a computer professional employed by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) both directly and as a contractor, just like the ronin in Yojimbo, who served a shogunate before becoming a ronin. As a contractor, Snowden worked both for Booz Allen Hamilton and Dell. Media reported that Snowden leaked several classified documents to journalists, both violating the conditions of his security clearance and acting against the interests of his employer. One might argue that he engaged in either resistance or organizational misbehavior depending on your perspective. Snowden was then charged with espionage and fled to Russia. Since then, Snowden has been labeled a dissident, a whistleblower, traitor, and even a hero. The label that resonates best is that of ronin, since it captures most if not all of the cultural understanding and unease associated with the concept examined earlier.
Snowden further engaged in a sort of weak affective commitment (Coyle-Shapiro and Morrow, 2006) to the citizens, despite a contract with the National Security Agency (NSA). The agreement legally linked the NSA and Booz Allen Hamilton, but not necessarily Snowden and the NSA. Snowden was a contractor hired to execute certain tasks on behalf of a firm. Yet something triggered Snowden to act, to misbehave—acting against his employer. Perhaps, the materials and tasks conflicted with his values or ethics, but who is to say. The actions taken when faced with inconsistencies are important, since Snowden in many ways embodied the guerrilla government concepts and practices (O’Leary, 2014) specifically as a contractor. They are also consistent with the actions undertaken by the ronin in Yojimbo. These actions are not limited to the contractors in these two accounts, or even the United States. One might also consider emerging examples such as Nae Pasaran (Sierra, 2018), which captures resistance and reactions to the Pinochet government by Scots who grounded a significant portion of Chile’s Air Force, or the anonymous ‘Satoshi Nakamoto’ moniker linked to the bitcoin phenomena warrant consideration in the future.
Concluding remarks
In the context of a multilevel hegemonic environment, to achieve the sort of ethical and professional outcomes expressed by narratives of a professional public service, citizen representatives might be forced to shift their efforts toward more extensive vetting and selection of ronin, hired guns, skilled contractors, and other forms of consultants typically operating outside public organizations to deliver public goods and services. Like the ronin, a samurai without a master in Yojimbo, there is no implicit affective organizational commitment (Coyle-Shapiro and Morrow, 2006) and no consistent guarantee that the contractor will fulfill his or her obligations to the contracting party. There is no consistency from person to person, rather it is driven by ‘perceptions of attractiveness of the client organization as a potential employer’ (p. 427). As previously stated, ronin were often little more than bandits, yet infrequently these same ronin are recast as the saviors of small communities—often for a price. With the increased thinning of governance (Stivers, 2008), the hollowing of the administrative state (Milward and Provan, 2000), and the rise of governing by contract (Cooper, 2003), the appearance of modern ‘ronin’ in the form of contractors could increase.
A contractor is not limited to acting as a hired gun, a bodyguard, or a supplier. Contemporary contractors provide extensive goods and services to governments at all levels. From construction to Internet services and analysts and from security to sustenance, the US government as well as the private sector relies upon contractors for the day-to-day operations. It becomes easy to argue that the sectors have become blurred, and the presence of these public, private, and nonprofit partnerships drastically change the nature of administrative discretion, accountability, and performance.
As governing by contract (Cooper, 2003) becomes even more commonplace, the practices of oversight might become far less adequate and far more limited. Arguably, it is significantly easier for contractors to engage in the behaviors associated with guerrilla government or misbehavior due to thin oversight (Amey, 2012) than for full time employees. In some cases, the consequences can be less severe (see Amey, 2012; Van Laer and De Ruyter, 2010). The Snowden case, in particular, highlights both the possibilities and problems the emergence of guerrilla government can have on organizations.
Consider the sort of things that guerrillas might attempt. O’Leary (2014) spoke about the possibility of leaks, neglecting services, filing lawsuits, and a variety of other possibilities. Inside a public organization, an employee undertaking such behavior could be dismissed with cause. A contractor, however, does not have the same oversight as a public employee. This can allow for great opportunities as well as great abuses, including the removal of flexibility and inhibiting competition (Amey, 2012: 697). It is the culmination of a hollow state (Milward and Provan, 2000), where the discretionary power to act has shifted into the hands of nongovernmental actors through multilevel hegemony.
Since public administration is sometimes seen as a ‘headless fourth branch of government’ (Strauss, 1984: 578), then contractors, these nongovernmental, not formally political, hired people could emerge as an ersatz, uncontrollable unchecked horde with the capacity of destroying everything in their path (Fennimore and Sementelli, 2019). Alternatively, they might also embody the unusual ronin from Yojimbo. Contractors might emerge as one of the last lines of defense for the public interest with no ritualized oath of office (Rutgers, 2010). Unencumbered by socialization, loosely bound by contract, and unfettered by ties to political actors, these contractors might become one of the few mechanisms that allow for professional resistance in contemporary management.
