The influence of government structure on the efficient allocation of public resources
is examined A test developed by Brueckner is used to examine differences in the
allocative efficiency of representative versus direct democracy forms of local
government. The empirical results suggest that the form of government has no
influence on the level of allocative efficiency.
Get full access to this article
View all access options for this article.
References
1.
Belsley, D., E. Kuh, and R.E. Welsh.1980. Regression diagnostics. New York: Wiley.
2.
Bergstrom, T., and R. Goodman.1973. Private demand for public goods. American Economic Review63.286-96.
3.
Bewley, T.F.1981. A critique of Tiebout's theory of local public expenditures . Econometrica49:713-40.
4.
Black, D.1958. The theory of committees and elections. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press .
5.
Brueckner, J.K.1979. Property values, local public expenditure, and economic efficiency. Journal of Public Economics11:223-45.
6.
—. 1982. A test for allocative efficiency in the local public good sector. Journal of Public Economics19:311-31.
7.
—. 1983. Property value maximization and public sector efficiency . Journal of Urban Economics14:1-15.
8.
Chicoine, D.L., N. Walzer, and S.C. Deller.1990. Participatory vs. direct democracy and government spending in a median voter model. Public Finance/Finances Publiques44:225-36.
9.
Deller, S.C.1990a. An application of a test for allocative efficiency in the local public sector. Regional Science and Urban Economics20:395-406.
10.
—. 1990b. Pareto-efficiency and the provision of public goods within a rural setting. Growth and Change21:30-39.
11.
Deller, S.C., and D.L. Chicoine.1988. Representative versus direct democracy: A Tiebout test of relative performance: Comment. Public Choice56:69-72.
12.
Greenwood, M.J.1985. Human migration: Theory, models, and empirical studies . Journal of Regional Science25:521-44.
13.
Henderson, V.J.1985The Tiebout model: Bring back the entrepreneurs . Journal of Political Economy93:248-64.
14.
Niskanen, W.1975. Bureaucrats and politicians. Journal of Law and Economics18:617-43.
15.
Ploch, L.1989. Turner: A study in persistence and change. Maine Agricultural Experiment Station Publication, Bulletin 824, University of Maine, Orono, May.
16.
—. 1990. Addison: Its persistencies and changes. Maine Agricultural Experiment Station Publication, Bulletin 829, University of Maine, Orono, August.
17.
Pommerehne, W.1978. Institutional approaches to public expenditure: Empirical evidence from Swiss municipalities. Journal of Public Economics9:255-80.
18.
Pommerehne, W., and F. Schneider.1978. Fiscal illusion, political institutions and local public spending. Kyklos3:27-43.
19.
Romer, T., and H. Rosenthal.1979. Bureaucrats versus voters: On the political economy of resource allocation by direct democracy. Quarterly Journal of Economics93:563-88.
20.
—. 1982. Median voters or budget maximizers: Evidence from school expenditure referenda. Economic Inquiry20:556-78.
21.
Rubinfeld, D.L.1987. The economics of the local public sector. In Handbook of public economies, vol. 2, edited by A. J. Auerbach and M. Feldstein.North-Holland: Elsevier Science.
22.
Samuelson, P.A.1954The pure theory of public goods. Review of Economics and Statistics36:387-89.
23.
Santerre, R.1986. Representative versus direct democracy: A Tiebout test of relative performance. Public Choice48:55-63.
24.
—. 1988. Representative versus direct democracy: A Tiebout test of relative performance: Reply. Public Choice56:73-76.
25.
—. 1989. Representative versus direct democracy: Are there any expenditure differences? Public Choice60:145-54.
26.
Sass, T.R.1991. The choice of municipal government structure and public expenditure. Public Choice71:71-87.
27.
Sonstelie, J., and P. Portney.1978. Profit maximizing communities and the theory of local public expenditure. Journal of Urban Economics5:263-77.
28.
Stiglitz, J.E.1977. The theory of local public goods. In Economics of public service, edited by M. Feldstein and R. Inman, 274-333. New York: Macmillan.
29.
Tiebout, C.1956. A pure theory of local expenditure. Journal of Political Economy64:416-24.