The explanations of turnover in legislatures developed by political scientists are
combined with an economic cartel model of the organization of legislatures to
explain interstate variation in turnover in the period 1972-1986. Few robustly
significant determinants are found and the results question the applicability of the
theory of industrial organization to this area of political organization.
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