This article explores some limitations on the power of the public bureaucracies to control public sector budgets. Two conditions are considered within a majority rule election framework. First, individuals may react to the potential loss of income resulting from a bureaucratically chosen output of public goods. Second, bureaucratic control of the public budget is constrained by the existing tax structure. The model demonstrates that the bureaucratic ability to set public expenditure levels has been seriously overestimated. Further, the model raises questions as to the role of the median voter in elections when the agenda is controlled by a public bureaucracy.
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