Throughout history, the conventional explanations for the tax burden have neglected a crucial fact. Taxes serve the strong. In a democracy, power belongs de jure with the people. Once democracy gives way to bureaucracy, civil servants acquire considerable political leverage. This article argues that the French democracy has indeed become a bureaucracy, a transformation which casts light on the history of the tax burdens in France over the 1870–2017 period. An indicator of bureaucratic power (P) is created in order to track the transformation of French democracy into a bureaucracy. Public officials have the power to impose their tax preferences when the abstention rate is high (abs) and their proportion in the electorate high (PE), when they have succeeded in being elected to parliament (PP) or to be appointed to the government (PG), . Both a time series analysis and a Granger test are used, which reveal that the tax effort in France is positively and significantly correlated with this indicator of bureaucratic power.
AndréC.DelormeR.. 1983. L'Etat et l'Economie. Paris: Editions du Seui.
2.
AnziaS. F.MoeT. M.. 2015. “Public Sectors Unions and the Costs of Government.” The Journal of Politics77 (1): 114–127. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2123704.
3.
Arcy d’F.1985. La représentation. Paris: Economica.
4.
AsatryanZ.HeinemannF.PitlokH.. 2017. “Reforming the Public Administration: The Role of Crisis and the Power of Bureaucracy.” European Journal of Political Economy48 (C): 128–143. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2016.08.004.
5.
AsselainJ. C.BlanchetonB.. 2005. “L’ouverture international en perspective historique Statut analytique du coefficient d’ouverture et application au cas de la France.” Economies and Societies, “Quantitative economic history” series, AF, n°32: 49–179. 1970–2015, Trade (% GDP). Link: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.TRD.GNFS.ZS
BensonB.1999. “An Economic Theory of the Evolution of Governance and the Emergence of the State.” The Review of Austrian Economics12 (2): 131–160. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1007812008685.
BierbrauerF. J.BoyerP. C.PeichlA.. 2021. “Politically Feasible Reforms of Nonlinear tax Systems.” American Economic Review111 (1): 153–191. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20190021.
10.
BlaisA.BlakeD.DionS.. 1990. “The Public Private Cleavage in North America.” Comparative Political Studies23 (3): 381–403.
11.
BorjasG. J.1980. “Wage Determination in the Federal Government: The Role of Constituents and Bureaucrats.” Journal of Political Economy88 (6): 1110–1147. https://doi.org/10.1086/260931.
12.
BraendleT.StutzerA.. 2010. “Public Servants in Parliamentary Theory and Evidence an its Determinants in Germany.” Public Choice145 (1/2): 223–252. 10.1007/s11127-009-9563-3.
13.
BraendleT.StutzerA.. 2016. “Selection of Public Servants into Politics.” Journal of Comparative Economics44 (3): 696–719. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jce.2015.11.005.
14.
BrennanG.BuchananJ.. 1980. The Power to Tax. Ann Arbor: Texas A. & M. Press.
15.
BrewerG. A.2003. “Building Social Capital: Civic Attitudes and Behaviour of Public Servants.” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory13 (1): 5–25. https://www.jstor.org/stable/3525614.
16.
BushW. C.DenzauA. T.. 1977. The Voting Behavior of Bureaucrats, 1–291. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
17.
ChristianoL. J.EichenbaumM.EvansC. L.. 2005. “Nominal Rigidities and the Dynamic Effects of a Shock to Monetary Policy.” Journal of Political Economy113: 1–45. https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/426038.
18.
ColonnelliE.PremM.TesoE.. 2020. “Patronage and Selection in Public Sector Organization.” American Economic Review110 (10): 3071–3099. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20181491.
19.
CottaM.BestH., eds. 2007. Democratic Representation in Europe: Diversity, Change and Convergence. Oxford University Press. Link: DATACUBE, https://www.circap.org/political-elites.html (see Universities of Siena in Italy and Iona in Germany).
20.
CottaM.Tavares de AlmeidaP.. 2007. “From Servants of the State to Elected Representatives: Public Sector Background Among Members of Parliament (Chapter 3).” In Parliamentary Representation in Europe, 1848–2000, edited by BestH.CottaM.. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
21.
DelaisiF.1910. La démocratie et les financiers, Durand 1° roi de France, éditions La guerre sociale.
22.
DicksonM.Postel-VinayF.TuronH.. 2014. “The Lifetime Earnings Premium in the Public Sector: The View from Europe.” Labour Economics3 (C): 141–161. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.labeco.2014.07.015.
23.
DurR.ZoutenbierR.. 2015. “Intrinsic Motivations of Public Sector Employees: Evidence for Germany.” German Economic Review16 (3): 343–366. https://doi.org/10.1111/geer.12056.
24.
EliasN.[1939] 1975. La dynamique de l’Occident, Agora, Paris, Calmann-Lévy, French translation über den prozess der zivilisation, tome II über den progress der zivilisation, 1° édition 1939n 2° édition 1969.
25.
FacchiniF.2024. “Welfare State, Rent Seeking and Interest Group.” In Handbook on the Political Economy of Social Policy, edited by GreveBent, et al, 67–78. Edward Elgar Publishing.
26.
FreyB. S.PommerehneW. W.. 1982. “How Powerful are Public Bureaucrats as Voters?” Public Choice38 (3): 253–262. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00144851.
GargS.GoyalA.PalR.. 2017. “Why Tax Effort Falls Short of Tax Capacity in Indian States: A Stochastic Frontier Approach.” Public Finance Review45 (2): 232–259. https://doi.org/10.1177/109114211562385.
29.
GeysB.MurdochZ.SørensenR. J.. 2022. “Political (Over) Representation of Public Sector Employees and the Double-Motive Hypothesis: Evidence from Norwegian Register Data.” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory32 (2): 326–341. https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/muab034.
GuptaA. S.2007. “Determinants of Tax Revenue Efforts in Developing Countries.” International Monetary Fund, Working Paper, No. 07/184. https://doi.org/10.5089/9781451867480.001
32.
HélaryX.2016. VII Guerre et fiscalité dans la France des grands capétiens (1180-1328), dans Baechter, J., (éd.) Guerre, Economie et fiscalité, Paris, Hermann.
33.
HillmanA.2009. Public Finance and Public Policy. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
34.
HolcombeR. G. 2018. Political Capitalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
JenserJ.SumP. E.FlynnD. T.. 2009. “Political Orientation and Behavior of Public Employees: A Cross-National Comparison on Suit (a Direct Voting Channel).” Journal of Public Administration Research Policy19 (4): 709–730. https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/mun031.
37.
JohnsonR. N.LibecapG. D.. 1991. “Public Sector Employee Voter Participation and Salaries.” Public Choice68 (1/3): 137–150. https://www.jstor.org/stable/30025372.
38.
JohnsonR. N.LibecapG. D.. 1994. The Federal Civil Service System and the Problem of Bureaucracy. National Bureau of Economic Research Book, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
KaragözK.2013. “Determinants of tax Revenue: Does Sectoral Composition Matter?” Journal of Finance, Accounting and Management4 (2): 50–63. https://doi.org/10.4236/me.2012.32031.
41.
KennyL. W.WinerS. I.. 2006. “Tax Systems in the World: An Empirical Investigation into the Importance of tax Bases, Administration Costs, Scale and Political Regime.” International Tax and Public Finance13 (2/3): 181–215. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10797-006-3564-7.
42.
KimD.KodelC.Xiang.B.2021. “The Trade-off Between Pension Costs and Salary Expenditures in the Public Sector.” Journal of Pension Economics & Finance20 (1): 151–168. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1474747219000362.
43.
KnutsenO.2005. “The Impact of Sector Employment on Party Choice. A Comparative Study of Eight West European Countries.” European Journal of Political Research44 (4): 593–621. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6765.2005.00240.x.
44.
KorenS.StiassnyA.. 1998. “Tax and Spend, or Spend and tax? An International Study.” Journal of Policy Modeling20 (2): 163–191. https://www.jstor.org/stable/1925496.
Leroy-BeaulieuP.1888. Traité de la science des finances, 4° éditions, Volume un, Paris, Guillaumin et Cie, Bookstores.
47.
LottJ. R.KennyL. W.. 1999. “Did Women's Suffrage Change the Size and Scope of Government?” Journal of Political Economy107 (6): 1163–1198. https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/250093.
48.
MarxK.1852. The eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, translated by Saul K. Padover from the German edition of 1869; Chapters 2 through 6 are based on the third edition, prepared by Engels (1885), as translated and published by Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1937; First Published: First issue of Die Revolution, 1852, New York.
49.
MilwardA. S.1970. The New Order and the French Economy. Oxford; Clarendon Press: Oxford University Press.
50.
NewmanP.2019. “Personnel is Policy: Regulatory Capture at the Federal Trade Commission, 1914–1929.” Journal of Institutional Economics15 (6): 1037–1053. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1744137419000341 .
51.
NiskanenW.1971. Bureaucracy and Representative Government. Chicago: Aldine-Atherton.
52.
NogaroB.1945. Le financement des dépenses publiques et la liquidation des dépenses de guerre. Paris: Domat-Montchrestien.
53.
NombelaG.2001. “Effects of Public Ownership Over Firms’ Size and Overstaffing Problems.” Public Choice108 (1/2): 1–31. https://www.jstor.org/stable/30026337.
54.
OcchinoF.OosterlinckK.WhiteE. N.. 2006. “How occupied France financed its own exploitation in world war II.” Working Paper 12137, NBER. http://www.nber.org/papers/w12137
55.
OlsonM.1965. The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
56.
OlsonM.2000. Power and Prosperity, Outgrowing Communist and Capitalist Dictatorship. New York: Basic Books.
Postel-VinayF.TuronH.. 2007. “The Public pay gap in Britain: Small Differences That (Don’t?) Matter.” Economic Journal117 (523): 1460–1503. https://www.jstor.org/stable/4625563.
59.
PotvinM.1994. “Fonctionnarisation et orientation partisane des élus : étude com- parée des parlements et gouvernements de cinq démocraties libérales (1965 et 1985) .” Revue internationale des sciences administrativesLX (3): 503–526. https://doi.org/10.1177/002085239406000305.
60.
ReedR.2006. “Democrats, Republicans, and Taxes: Evidence That Political Parties Matter.” Journal of Public Economics90: 725–750.
61.
ReinhartC.SbranciaM. B.. 2015. “The Liquidation of Government Debt.” Economic Policy30 (82): 291–333.
62.
RothbardM.[1962] 2009. Man, Economy, and State. A Treatise on Economic Principles. Auburn Alabama: Ludwig von Mises Institute. Scholar's Edition, second edition.
63.
RoubanL.1998. “La politisation des fonctionnaires en France : obstacle ou nécessite ?.” Revue française d'administration publique86 (April – June): 167–182. https://doi.org/10.3406/rfap.1998.3195.
64.
RoubanL.1999. Les Attitudes politiques des fonctionnaires : vingt ans d’évolutionLes notes du CEVIPOF, Mai.
RoubanL.2004. “Politization of the Civil Service in France: From Structural to Strategic Politicization.” In Politization of the Civil Service in Comparative Perspective. The Quest of Control, edited by GuyPetersPierreJan, 20–23. London: Routledge.
RoubanL.2017. “Le vote des fonctionnaires.” Revue Politique et Parlementaire119 (1083–1084): 252–289. 2441/2o2ea2ieae92rqq6ddc3dh68it .
69.
SbranciaM. B.2011. “Debt and inflation during a period of financial repression.” University of Maryland, Department of Economics Working Paper.
70.
SearsD. O.FunkC. L.. 1990. “Self-Interest in Americans’ Political Opinions.” In Beyond Self-Interest, edited by MansbridgeJ. J., 147–170. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
71.
SiegH.WangY.. 2013. “The Impact of Unions on Municipal Elections and Fiscal Urban Fiscal Policies.” Journal of Monetary Economics60 (5): 554–567. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmoneco.2013.04.008.
72.
SimC. A.StockJ. H.WatsonW. M.. 1990. “Inference in Linear Time Series Models with Some Unit Root.” Econometrica58: 113–144. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2938337.
73.
TeeraJ. M.2004. “Tax Performance: A Comparative Study.” Journal of International Development16 (6): 785–802. https://doi.org/10.1002/jid.1113.
74.
TillyC.1985. “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime.” In Bringing the State Back, edited by EvansP. B.RueschemeyerD.SkocpolTheda, 169–191. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press.
75.
TullockG.1965. The Politics of Bureaucracy. Washington, DC: Public Affairs Press.
WrightJ. R.ChoD.. 1992. “State Employment, Class Location, and Ideological Orientation: A Comparative Analysis of the United States and Sweden”.” Politics and Society20 (2): 167–196. https://doi.org/10.1177/0032329292020002.
