We analyze from an empirical point of view the evolution and determinants of Spanish regional public debt. Spain offers an interesting case study because of its high level of fiscal decentralization, implemented gradually during the past four decades, the parallel entry into force of a number of national fiscal rules in that period, and the heterogeneity of its regions, both in terms of economic fundamentals and some institutional features. Our main findings are the following: (i) on average, over the sample of study, regional governments’ fiscal policies reacted to public debt increase; (ii) fiscal rules played a limited role in controlling debt surges; (iii) a higher degree of regional fiscal coresponsibility tends to be linked to more subdued debt dynamics; (iv) market disciple has encouraged some fiscal restraint at the regional level; and (v) increases in public commercial debt have affected the standard debt.
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