This article analyses the role of different potential determinants on the fiscal results of the Spanish regions (RGs). The empirical analysis suggests several conclusions. First, the fiscal rule in force between 1992 and 1998 does not appear to have had a significant effect on the fiscal balances of the autonomous regions. With regard to the degree of fiscal autonomy, a higher level in this variable is associated with a more disciplined behavior by RGs. The results also show that the greater transfer of tax revenues to the RGs, associated with a greater devolution of power, has generated greater dependency of fiscal performance on the economic cycle. There is also a strong inertial component in the implementation of fiscal policy in RGs.
AlesinaAlberto.1989. Alternative approaches to the political business cycle. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2.
2.
AlesinaAlbertoDrazenAllan.1991. Why are stabilizations delayed?The American Economic Review81:1170–88.
3.
AlesinaAlbertoRoubiniNourielCohenGerald D.1999. Political cycles and the macroeconomy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
4.
AlesinaAlbertoTabelliniGuido.1990. A positive theory of fiscal deficits and government debt. The Review of Economic Studies57:403–14.
5.
ArellanoManuelBondStephen.1991. Some tests of specification for panel data: Monte Carlo evidence and an application to employment. The Review of Economic Studies58:277–97.
6.
BarroRobert J.1989. The Ricardian approach to budget deficits. The Journal of Economic Perspectives3:37–54.
7.
BayoumiTamimEichengreenBarry.1995. Restraining yourself: The implications of fiscal rules for economic stabilization. IMF StaffPapers42:32–48.
8.
BordignonMassimoManassePaoloTabelliniGuido.2001. Optimal regional redistribution under asymmetric information. The American Economic Review91:709–23.
9.
CarlsenFredrik.1997. Counterfiscal policies and Partisan politics: Evidence from industrialized countries. Applied Economics29:145–51.
10.
CukiermanAlexMeltzerAllan1989. A political theory of government debt and deficits in a neo-Ricardian framework. The American Economic Review79:713–32.
11.
De MelloLuiz R.2000. Fiscal decentralization and intergovernmental fiscal relations: A cross country analysis. World Development28:365–80.
12.
DrazenAllanGrilliVittorio.1993. The benefits of crises for economic reforms. The American Economic Review83:598–607.
13.
EichengreenBarry.1992. The political economy of fiscal policy after EMU. Center for International and Development Economics Research (CIDER). Working Papers C92–004, University of California at Berkeley.
14.
EschenbachFelixSchuknechtLudger.2002. Asset prices and fiscal balances. Working Paper Series 141, European Central Bank.
15.
FornasariFrancescaWebbStevenZouHeng-Fu.2000. The macroeconomic impact of decentralized spending and deficits: International evidence. Annals of Economics and Finance1:403–33.
16.
FreitagMarjkusVatterAdrian.2008. Decentralization and fiscal discipline in sub-national governments: Evidence from the Swiss federal system. Publius: The Journal of Federalism38:272–94.
17.
García-MiláTeresaMcGuireTherese.1990. The effects of central government financing on regional government expenditures in Spain. Public Finance with Several Levels of Government, Proceedings of the 46th Congress of the International Institute of Public Finance (Ed.) R. Prud–homme, IIPF, Brussels.
18.
GordoLuisde CosPablo Hernandez.2003. El sistema de financiación autonómico vigente para el periodo 1997–2001. Working paper 0003. Banco de España.
19.
HemmingRichardKellMichael.2001. Promoting fiscal responsibility: Transparency, rules, and independent fiscal authorities. Banca d–Italia: Third Workshop on Fiscal Rules, Perugia, 1–3, 433–60.
20.
HibbsDouglas A.1992. Partisan theory after fifteen years. European Journal of Political Economy8:361–73.
21.
JinJingZouHeng-fu.2002. How does fiscal decentralization affect aggregate, national, and subnational government size?Journal of Urban Economics52:270–93.
22.
KontopoulosYianosPerottiRoberto.1999. Government fragmentation and fiscal policy outcomes: Evidence from OECD countries. In Fiscal institutions and fiscal performance, ed. PoterbaJamesHagenJurgen Von, 81–102. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
23.
KornaiJanosMaskinEricRolandGérard.2003. Understanding the soft budget constraint. The Journal of Economic Literature41:1095–136.
24.
Lago-PeñasSantiago.2005. Evolving federations and regional public deficits: Testing the bailout hypothesis in the Spanish case. Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy23:437–53.
25.
López LabordaJulioVallésJaime.2002: Evolución del endeudamiento autonómico entre 1995 y 1997: La incidencia de los escenarios de consolidación presupuestaria y de los límites de la LOFCA. Working Paper IEF 2/2002.
26.
MayesDavidVirenMatti.2000. Exchange rate considerations in a small open economy: A critical look at the MCI as a possible solution. In Monetary policy regimes, ed. Lavan Mahadeva and Gabriel Sterne, 585–628. London: Routledge.
27.
MonasterioCarlosSánchezIsidroBlancFrancisco.1999. Controles internos del endeudamiento versus racionamiento del crédito: Estudio especial del caso de las comunidades autónomas españolas. Bilbao, Spain: Fundación BBV.
28.
MonasterioCarlosSuárez-PandielloJavier.1993. El endeudamiento autonómico. Teoría y evidencia empírica. Bilbao: Fundación BBVA.
29.
Monasterio, Carlos, and Javier Suárez-Pandiello. 1996. Sobre las causas del endeudamiento autonómico, III Congreso de Economía Pública. Sevilla.
30.
NordhausWilliam.1975. The political business cycle. The Review of Economic Studies130:169–78.
31.
PerssonTorstenSvenssonLars.1989. Why a stubborn conservative would run a deficit: Policy with time-inconsistent preferences. The Quarterly Journal of Economics104:325–45.
32.
PerssonTorstenTabelliniGuido.1996. Federal fiscal constitutions: Risk sharing and moral hazard. Econometrica64:623–46.
33.
PoterbaJames.1994. State responses to fiscal crises: The effects of budgetary institutions and politics. Journal of Political Economy102:799–821.
34.
QianYingyiRolandGerard.1998. Federalism and the soft budget constraint. The American Economic Review88:1143–62.
35.
RoddenJonathan.2002. The dilemma of fiscal federalism: Grants and fiscal performance around the world. American Journal of Political Science3:670–87.
36.
RoubiniNourielSachsJeffrey.1989a. Political and economic determinants of budget deficits in the industrial democracies. European Economic Review33:903–33.
37.
RoubiniNourielSachsJeffrey.1989b. Government spending and budget deficits in the industrial democracies. Economic Policy8:99–127.
38.
SalinasJavierAlvarezSantiago.2003. La efectividad de los límites al endeudamiento autonómico. Una Perspectiva de teoría de la elección pública, XXVIIIReunión de Estudios Regionales.
39.
SinghRajuPlekhanovAlexander.2005. How should subnational government borrowing be regulated? Some cross-country empirical evidence. IMF Working Paper 54.
40.
Spolaore, Enrico. 1993. Policy making systems and economic efficiency: Coalition governments versus majority governments. Unpublished paper.
41.
TabelliniGuido.1991. The politics of intergenerational redistribution. The Journal of Political Economy91:335–58.
42.
TufteEdward R.1978. The political business cycle: An empirical test. Southern Economic Journal78:504–16.
43.
VallésJaime.2002. Un modelo explicativo de las causas del endeudamiento autonómico. El impacto de los límites de la LOFCA. Revista Galega de Economía11:173–208.
44.
VallésJaimeZárateAnabel.2004. Un análisis de las restricciones institucionales pare el control de la deuda regional en perspectiva histórica. Moneda y Crédito219.
45.
VelascoAndrés.1995. The common property approach to fiscal policy. New York, NY: New York University Press.
46.
VelascoAndrés.1999. A model of endogenous fiscal deficits and delayed fiscal reforms. Fiscal institutions and fiscal performance. In Fiscal institutions and fiscal performance, ed. PoterbaJamesVon HagenJurgen, 37–57. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
47.
VelascoAndrés.2000. Debts and deficits with fragmented fiscal policymaking. Journal of Public Economics76:105–25.
48.
Von HagenJurgenEichengreenBarry.1996. Federalism, fiscal restraints, and European monetary union. The American Economic Review2:134–38.
