Abstract
This article attempts to establish a link between voting theory and price theory. The median voter is characterized as a monopsonist who sets a price for the winning vote in an election. As such, the median voter can extract rents from the political sector as a function of the price of substitute winning voters, which in turn will depend on the distribution of voter preferences.
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