Abstract
Rule settings focusing on the sustainability of public-private partnership (PPP) infrastructure projects will require distinguished steering strategies at the planning stages to foster. Based on Elinor Ostrom’s institutional analysis and development (IAD) framework, this paper examines the extent to which formal rules prescribe environmental and social sustainability steering strategies in PPP infrastructure projects (sustainable PPP) in Nigeria. We analyse qualitative data from 18 semi-structured interviews and a review of PPP legal documents. The empirical focus is on two jurisdictional governments in Nigeria: the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) and the Lagos State Government (LSG). The findings indicate that sustainability-relevant PPP formal rules exist in four categories of legal frameworks. Moreover, they prescribe and cover only parts of the required sustainable PPP steering strategies. Additionally, there is an inadequate mix of institutional relations between these legal frameworks and the sustainability steering strategies, leading to gaps that hinder the adoption of sustainable PPP practices and have policy implications.
Introduction
Foreign investment is a key motivation for pursuing sustainable PPP projects in countries like Nigeria (Babatunde et al., 2022). When large investments are involved, foreign investors consider risks such as economic stability and social impacts, paying attention to whether local community interests are responsibly addressed. Clear and effective institutional frameworks are essential to guide investors and stakeholders in planning PPPs toward sustainability (Theesfe d et al., 2017; Wolsink, 2010).
In Nigeria, formal rules, mainly written regulations like constitutions, statutes, laws, and policies, dominate the institutional landscape, but informal practices such as social norms and customs also play a role. However, these frameworks are often imperfect and inconsistently followed, leading actors to navigate conflicting elements of institutional arrangements (Nwangwu, 2012; Soyeju, 2013). As a result, sustainable PPP planning can stall, and projects may face significant sustainability externalities even when formal rules mandate mitigation (Mouraviev & Kakabadse, 2015; Biygautane et al., 2019).
International cases, such as the Victoria Desalination Plant in Australia and the Great Western Hospital in the UK, illustrate successful integration of environmental and social considerations through robust PPP governace. These examples, supported by Baizakov (2008), demonstrate effective rule practices addressing environmental issues-like energy savings and pollution reduction, and social issues such as local job creation and healthcare access (Colverson & Perera, 2012; Ryan, 2004).
Conversely, PPP projects in Nigeria have faced infringements like forced evictions, shoreline mobility issues, high CO2 emissions, and labor abuses (Ajibade, 2017; Nwangwu, 2012; Osanyintuyi, 2022), which could be preventable with stronger formal rules. Ostrom (2011) emphasized that actors tend to rely on informal steering strategies influenced by the formal rules, but interactions between social norms and regulations often pose challenges (Winiecki, 2001). Ideally, informal practices compensate for formal rule shortcomings, while formal rules inspire sustainability focus. Therefore, analyzing these interactions helps determine if faults stem from weak formal rules, poor implementation, or both. The IAD framework (Ostrom, 2009) thus offers a valuable lens to assess whether sustainable PPP processes in Nigeria are properly structured and balanced across planning stages, by examining the linkages between formal rules and informal practices driving sustainability outcomes.
According to Ostrom (2009), the IAD framework helps analyze the institutional arrangements that govern resource use and decision-making, revealing how rules, norms, and their enforcement mechanisms impact environmental outcomes. By examining results and feedback loops, the IAD framework also enables the evaluation of the effectiveness of existing institutions and policies in achieving sustainability goals (Polski & Ostrom, 1999). This supports iterative institutional designs like sustainable PPP planning, ensuring they stay relevant and effective in addressing changing sustainability challenges and outcomes across various levels of action situations (Adebayo et al., 2023). All these aspects help us capture the interaction patterns and actions needed to safeguard environmental and social sustainability in PPP infrastructure projects in Nigeria, making the IAD framework the appropriate approach for this research. Despite its strengths, little attention has been given to the relationships between informal and formal rules across different levels-collective choice, constitutional, and meta-constitutional, beyond Plamonia (2020).
Inspired by Plamonia’s (2020) work on Indonesia’s water sector and Arimoro and Arinze-Umobi (2025) and Akinola (2016) on sub-Saharan Africa, this study explores how meta-constitutional rules, such as international best practices, influence Nigeria’s sustainable PPP planning. Existing literature shows mixed results regarding the alignment of rules-in-use, rules-in-form, and international best practices. To fill this gap, we analyze seven environmental and seven social sustainability strategies and how meta-constitutional rules constrain planning at the collective choice level. The main research question asks: How do formal rules specify fourteen strategies for achieving sustainable PPPs in Nigeria? To answer this, we pose three sub-questions. (1) In which documents can the applicable sustainable PPP formal rules in Nigeria be found? (2) To what extent do PPP formal rules prescribe steering strategies for both environmental and social sustainability principles at the planning stages in Nigeria? (3) Which of the sustainable PPP steering strategies require revisions in the Nigerian context?
Given the complexity of sustainable PPP planning (Adebayo et al., 2023), understanding the relations between informal practices and the formal rules can promote institutional change and improve planning efficiency. Our empirical analysis covers two Nigerian jurisdictions: the FGN and LSG. In the following segment, we provide the theoretical perspective of the research on our system understanding, data gathering, and interpretation. The methodology used follows. Thereafter, the findings are presented, accompanied by discourse on the contributions and the importance of our discovery for thesis, practice, and subsequent research.
Informal Practices, Formal Rules, and the IAD Framework
To institutionalists who are curious about the correlation between the institutional facet of society (e.g. the social formation and public policy arrangement), and the growth of its economy, the interplay between formal rules and informal practices, produces a vital force that drives the transposing composition of industry, consequently modifying its accomplishment over time (Siu, 2007). A major role of informal practices is to modify, supplement, or extend formal rules. However, by variance, formal rules sometimes cannot influence behavior (Kingston & Caballero, 2009). Therefore, formal and informal practices and their “enforcement characteristics” constitute the institutional settings for sustainable PPP interactivity. While formal rules can be transposed by the polity, informal practices are transposed slowly. The pair, however, is molded by people’s discernment to analyze the world around them, which also determines the clear choices of formal rules and non-formal practices (North, 2005).
Moreover, in real-life situations, formal rules frequently come into conflict with the extant informal rules. For this to occur, the current formal rules must be explicitly at odds with the previous ones. Yet, informal practices are to some degree, life-long adaptations to the prescriptive rules-in-form, and the transpose, even if its push is largely in the same outlook. Such may cause discordances as alternative modification procedures have to occur (Winiecki, 2001). Consequently, as the new informal rules are thoroughly dissimilar, the measure of conflict rises, acutely reducing the anticipated environmental and social impacts of formal rules, in the intermediate to medium term at least. In extremity, formal rules make these outcomes almost futile in sustainable PPP, especially in countries with inadequate institutional mechanisms (Malvestio et al., 2018).
Elinor Ostrom’s IAD framework (Figure 1) constitutes a paramount theoretical outset for exploring and classifying rules (Polski & Ostrom, 1999). The framework proposed a system for methodically exploring rules within common-pool resources. Because sustainable PPP planning is occasioned by common-pool resource management and also shaped by rule settings, the framework delivers key parameters for exploring both RiF and RiU and their transpositions. The action situation is the focus of the IAD framework, where involved actors interact collectively (Ostrom, 2009). Their interaction generates certain patterns of interaction and leads to measurable outcomes (Ostrom, 2014). Additionally, the structure of the action situation and the patterns of interactions are influenced by three exogenous considerations: biophysical conditions, community attributes, and the rules-in-use (Cole, 2017). The IAD Framework Components. Source: Ostrom (2011, p.10)
This study focuses on the social interactions (rule settings) within the action situations of the IAD framework. Previous literature sees the IAD framework as an instrument to examine the institutional strand of resource governance. Andersson (2006), propounds its value in comprehending the joint efforts between stakeholders. The IAD framework’s influence emanates from its structured conceptual pivot about the effect of regulations and standards on independent inducements in multiplex arrangements (Rudd, 2004). The framework examines how the actors can decide how to make policy outcomes accessible, which can then be applied to analyze social problems, such as sustainable PPPs.
Furthermore, the IAD framework operates at degrees of social preference (Figure 2). For instance, constitutional rules occur at the constitutional level and are the outcomes that create the regulations for making rules (meta-rules). At the policy-making level, regulations and laws are ratified by constitutional rules and are the outcomes that institute rules designed to impact the actors at the operational level (Cole, 2017). In aggregate, the day-to-day operational-level relations of actors within or among the group of actors set up the patterns of interaction that can condition sustainable PPP planning. IAD Framework’s Degrees of Social Interaction and Choice. Source: Cole (2017, p. 832)
Although the get-go for sustainable PPP planning is sufficient cogitation of both the environmental and social sustainability aspects in related regulatory frameworks (Adebayo et al., 2023), it has proven arduous to achieve (Hueskes et al., 2017; Koppenjan, 2015). It has also been reported that Nigeria’s PPP legal frameworks cannot fully internalize environmental and social objectives at the planning stages (Nwangwu, 2012). Further, the impact of PPP formal rules on sustainability outcomes in Nigeria remains unassessed (Werneck & Saadi, 2015). Therefore, the diagnosis of sustainable PPP formal rules in Nigeria becomes imperative.
For clarity, working rules or the rules-in-use (RiU), may follow upon (and thus overlap with) the written rules or the rules-in-form (RiF). These RiFs are applied because they are understood as the rules everyone agrees upon as having to be adhered to. Thus, RiFs would also have an informal aspect in that they are agreed upon in practice. Still, there are also RiUs that do not agree with RiFs, so informal sine or contra RiFs exist.
Materials and Methods
Study Approach
The research framework is shown in Figure 3. In stage 1, the conceptualization of informal practices-formal rules on sustainable PPP was done. This guided the research’s theoretical approach, the choice of the analytical framework, and the collection of data. A diagnostic gap analysis between the steering strategies and formal rules on sustainable PPPs in Nigeria is presented in stage 2. In Stage 3, the research findings are presented. The study approach involved qualitative data analysis of the formal rules, in comparison with sustainable PPP steering strategies, along the three planning phases (prepare, procure, and contract). This synthesis between the informal practices and formal rules reveals the novelty of sustainable PPP steering strategies and their indicators, providing an understanding of how informal practices can upend the long-term ecological and social sustainability objectives in infrastructure projects. Such positivist inputs are requisite as they provide the study area, necessary insights into planning processes, and robust institutions that will enable both collective action and cooperative behavior. Research Framework. Source: Authors’ Contribution
Background on Case Settings
The FGN and the LSG are the two jurisdictions in Nigeria selected for the empirical analysis. The main Nigerian law for PPPs is the 2005 Infrastructure Concession Regulatory Commission Establishment Act. In Lagos State, the relevant law is the 2011 Lagos State PPP Law. This means that state governments in Nigeria have the autonomy to develop their legal frameworks for PPP projects. Therefore, there can be several regulations at different levels of government. However, there are several reasons for comparing data at the FGN level with the LSG. First, Lagos has a more mature PPP program compared to many other Nigerian states, with a wider range of projects and a more established framework. Additionally, Lagos has led the way in implementing PPPs in Nigeria, especially in infrastructure projects. This makes it a strong case for understanding how PPPs function at the state level within a federal system.
Data Collection and Techniques
The data collection includes triangulation of semi-structured interviews, legal documents, and literature reviews. The semi-structured interview focuses on issues related to sustainable PPP steering strategies. The interviewees were classified into three groups: PPP legal transaction advisors, government officials, and academics. A total of thirty legal experts were identified through online searches for the interview sessions. However, only twenty of them met the selection criteria. The criteria for selecting legal experts include a thorough understanding of PPP legal frameworks, including relevant national and international laws, concession agreements, and contract law; knowledge of sustainable development principles and their incorporation into PPP contracts; understanding the planning process of PPP infrastructure projects to address legal issues effectively; and proven experience advising on PPP projects, especially those focused on sustainability.
Next, all the interviewees were contacted either by email or telephone, asking them to take part in the research. Two legal experts declined to take part after preliminary interaction, citing official reasons. The interview guide and questions were shared with the remaining 18 legal experts, and saturation was achieved with the 15th interviewee. Saturation occurs when the latest interrogation of interviewees does not provide a piece of extra information beyond the previous ones. According to Miles et al. (2013), sample sizes in anecdotal studies are resolved by saturation.
Thereafter, ZOOM interviews were conducted between December 2022 to February 2024. Interviewees’ consent was also sought before the interviews were recorded. Data were transcribed into MS Word files and handwritten notes. Formal rules published and not revoked by July 2024 were identified from PPP databases within the FGN and the LSG. Keyword search related to environmental and social laws, regulations, and documents selected, considering infrastructure projects. The anonymity of interviewees was preserved by Pseudonyms.
Data Analysis
Step 1 of data analysis answered research question 1 (where can we find formal Nigerian sustainable PPP rules?). The research process entails a comparative analysis of the different steering strategies and arrangements for their implementation in formal rules across the process principles. We confronted the meta-analysis of the steering strategies with findings from interviewees. This allowed the comprehensive identification of formal rules on sustainable PPP. In Step 2 of the data analysis, assiduous interviews, legal transactions, and policy reports were utilized to answer question 2 (Do formal rules relate adequately with specific sustainable PPP steering strategies?). Comments from interviewees on the appropriateness of each steering strategy help resolve question 3 (Which of these rules need revision?).
Results and Discussions
The Sustainable PPP Process Principles and Indicators
ESS: Environmental Steering Strategies; SSS: Social Steering Strategies. Source: Adebayo et al. (2023. p. 14–15).
Sustainable PPP Formal Rules Nigeria
A review of sustainable PPP formal rules for the jurisdictions, FGN, and LSG is presented in this section. An initial related question asked the interviewees to suggest the documents in which sustainable PPP formal rules can be found. Four categories of identified legal frameworks were traced, and the documents were analyzed upon contents. The four categories that were traced are labeled as PPP laws, regulations, and policies (PPPLRP); Public Procurement Laws and Regulations (PPLR); General Laws, Policies, and Regulations (GLPR); and Sector-specific Laws and Regulations (SLR). The logic behind the classification shows that PPPLRP is the most specific to making PPPs. PPPLR is most specific to public procurement, among which are some rules relevant to PPPs. GLPR are general rules, but some are also relevant to PPP. SLR is the most specific to an infrastructure sector, but relevant to either environmental or social sustainability considerations. These documents, ordered by the four categories, form the basis for further in-depth analysis.
Overview of Rules, Jurisdiction: Federal Government of Nigeria
Sustainble PPP Formal Rules (FGN)
Also, roles in public procurement laws on PPPs can be fairly compact (almost as a ‘law of the horse’). PPPLRP and PPLR have fewer rules. The reported rules cut across hard and soft rules, with the hard rules being dominant. Within the ESS, ESS1 has the most rules. Similarly, like ESS, all SSS were reported across the four categories of PPP legal frameworks except SSS1, SSS2, SSS4, and SSS7. Also, GLPR and SLR contributed the most reported rules within the SSS. The same explanation of the logic and relevance behind the prominence of GLPR and SLR within the SSS is the same as that of the ESS. The reported rules cut across hard and soft rules, with hard rules again being the most dominant. Within the SSS, SSS 2 has the most rules.
Overview of Rules, Jurisdiction: Lagos State Government
Sustainble PPP Formal Rules (LSG)
Giving Meaning to the Data, Summary
We observed that if sustainability is considered in PPP infrastructure projects, it is primarily from an environmental dimension, with the social dimensions largely neglected. However, at the LSG level, environmental and social sustainability rules were evenly distributed across all the categories of legal frameworks. This is at variance with the priority usually accorded to environmental sustainability principles. From our analysis, one could argue that environmental legal policies have evolved to greater uniformity and harmonization, while social policies are still scant and haphazardly addressed. However, these are mere first impressions that would still require further scrutiny.
The significance of the hard laws to sustainable PPP planning was also recognized. Scholars argued that to achieve sustainable PPP, it must be demanded hierarchically (Hueskes et al., 2017). However, interviewees agreed that the soft laws are not justiciable and could not replace legislation. They can, however, indicate the direction in which sustainable PPP governance tilts. For instance, soft laws like NSB, NSFP, NCCG, Lagos PPP Manual, and CCA provided insights into the sustainability ambitions and may thus inspire change. More generally, while hierarchical regulation seems (at least in environmental policies) more effective in the short run, non-hierarchical regulatory interventions may bring greater social acceptance and engagement, with perhaps better long-term outcomes. But, how consistent are they alongside the hard rules about the sustainable PPP steering strategies? This is discussed in the next subsection.
Analysis of Formal Rules on Sustainable PPP in Nigeria
So far, we have traced which ESS and SSS were found in the legal documents mentioned by the interviewees and grouped them into four categories. However, such does not share information on the extent of prescriptions of each steering strategy by formal rules (institutional relations). We analyzed them with interview data and reconstructed the perception of the interviewees on each of the steering strategies; their views on rule settings, whether they are consistent with the steering strategies, and whether they facilitated a serious sustainability focus. Then, we made an in-depth analysis of the sustainable PPP steering strategies, the rule settings, and their outcomes on the planning processes, presenting the results at definite aggregation levels in tabular form.
Five-point Scoring for Measuring Institutional Relations
Source: Inspired by Edelenbos and Klijn (2006) and Devkar et al. (2020, p. 727).
ESS 1- Evidence Towards EIA for Better Life-Cycle Performance
ESS2- Incentives/Subsidies to Private Partners That can Provide More Environmental Sustainability Expertise
ESS3- Liability and Compensation for Environmental Impacts
ESS4-Additional Points are Given to Bids That Include Innovation Related to Reducing Environmental Problems
ESS5 (Prequalification is Based on Experience in Environmental Sustainability Practices as Demonstrated by Relevant Certifications
ESS 6-Active Involvement of Environmental Civil Groups in Judging the Bids
ESS 7-Contract Review Provision Between and Updating Agreements to Do Justice to New Technological Findings and Socio-Economic/Political Realities
SSS 1. An Assessment Tool for Stakeholders’ Participation, Such as Building Information Modeling
SSS 2- a Special-Purpose Company That is Jointly Owned by the Government, Users, and Private Developers for the Development of PPP Projects as an Alternative Institutional Mechanism
SSS 3. Use of Two-Way Communication in Participative Forms
SSS 4. A Platform for Close Debate During the Bidding Stage via a Strategic Communication Plan as Part of the Procurement Policy
SSS 5. Fairness and Process Auditors are Appointed as Third-Party Experts to Monitor the Procurement Process
SSS 6. An Independent and Technical Review Panel That can Scrutinize PPP Projects and Safeguard Sustainability During the Bidding Process
SSS 7. Main Contractor-Subcontractor Relationships
ESS 1. Evidence Towards EIA for Better Life-Cycle Performance
ESS2. Incentives/Subsidies to Private Partners That can Provide More Environmental Sustainability Expertise
ESS3. Liability and Compensation for Environmental Impacts
ESS4. Additional Points are Given to Bids That can Include Innovation That is Related to Reducing Environmental Problems
ESS5. Prequalification is Based on Experience in Environmental Sustainability Practices as Demonstrated by Relevant Certifications
ESS 6. Active Involvement of Environmental Civil Groups in Judging the Bids
ESS 7. Contract Review Provision in Between and Updating Agreements to Do Justice to New Technological Findings and Socio-Economic/Political Realities
SSS 1. An Assessment Tool for Stakeholders’ Participation, Such as Building Information Modeling
SSS 2. A Special-Purpose Company That is Jointly Owned by the Government, Users, and Private Developers for the Development of PPP Projects as an Alternative Institutional Mechanism
SSS 3. Use of Two-Way Communication in Participative Forms
SSS 4. A Platform for Close Debate During the Bidding Stage via a Strategic Communication Plan as Part of the Procurement Policy
SSS 5. Fairness and Process, Auditors are Appointed as Third-Party Experts to Monitor the Procurement Process
SSS 6. An Independent and Technical Review Panel That can Scrutinize PPP Projects and Safeguard Sustainability During the Bidding Process
SSS 7. Main Contractor-Subcontractor Relationships
Jurisdiction, Federal Government of Nigeria
In this section, assessments for this juridical domain are presented, followed up by observations and quotes from the interviewees. The order of sustainability strategies is introduced in Table 1. The rating was explained before and summarized in Table 4. First, the overview of Environmental Steering Strategies (ESS1-7) at the Federal level.
From Table 5, ESS 1 has average institutional relations with PPP formal rules (+−). Four interviewees argued that the PPP leadership quality is poor at the FGN level, and therefore, deters lifecycle performances and assessments of infrastructure projects. An interviewee, Chibuz (personal communication, December,22,2022) said: “ How knowledgeable are the people in leadership? How altruistic are they? What are their objectives? People in government are looking at things other than what you want to achieve. One, do they have an interest? Second, do they know? Third, what level of citizen pressure or environmental pressure are you able to generate around the issue?”
Malvestio et al.(2018) found that the absence of quality leadership hinders environmental risk assessments in transport PPPs in Brazil. Opawole et al. (2020) affirm that administrative factors are a key barrier to policies on life cycle assessment in infrastructure projects in Nigeria.
From Table 6, ESS 2 has average institutional relations with the formal rules (+−). Six interviewees agreed that competition for primacy with other interests, particularly political intrigues, hinders legislation on the support systems and schemes for private involvement in environmental sustainability. Comments like the one below were mentioned: “ To be honest. I don’t think the environment has been a major priority for Nigeria. We do not even have infrastructure. We just want infrastructure anyway. So there is limited environmental protection in Nigeria. The other areas are not. It is not just a priority” (George, personal communication, February 22, 2023).
Carlisle et al. (2015) studied the impediments to solar-energy infrastructure projects in the U.S. and reported that low political support is a barrier to power generation using solar PV. Likewise, Babatunde et al. (2022) found that incentives for environmental expertise in PPP infrastructure projects are encumbered by political intrigues in Nigeria.
From Table 7, ESS3 has an average institutional relation with the formal rules (+−). Four interviewees mentioned the lack of mechanisms to articulate the environmental sustainability targets as a key constraint to liability and compensation for environmental impacts in the PPP legal frameworks. On this, George (personal communication, February 22, 2023), commented: “Under Nigerian law, if you do well by the environment, you don’t get penalized. If you do not do well, you get penalized. That is the way Nigeria's legal system is based. It assumes that it is your duty, that you should not be rewarded for doing well, you should not be rewarded extra, but you should be penalized for not doing it”.
Colverson and Perera (2012), argued that the basic standard of PPP risk transfer and compensation requires changes to be useful as tools for sustainability. However, interviewees agreed that without stretching over the current economic and regulatory frameworks, ecological policies in Nigeria will not be realized in PPP projects.
From Table 8, ESS 4 has low institutional relations with the PPP formal rules (−). Six of the interviewees pointed out that public sector norms for environmental sustainability safeguards in PPP bid evaluation were discouraging. According to Toyin (personal communication, February 8, 2024): “There are no specific requirements, but in practice, when the scoring criteria are being prepared, that is for evaluation, it is usually added. You know, we are used to things just being done. This will end up with the transactional advisor on the project”.
Devkar et al.(2020) inferred that norms are critical to sustainable PPP institutions. Omotayo (2020) acknowledged that, within the Nigeria Railway Corporation PPP infrastructures, the contemporary ethos needs to be disrupted to hammer new norms of well-built institutions toward sustainable PPPs.
From Table 9, ESS 5 recorded very low institutional relations with PPP formal rules (− −). Poor coordination of the economic and environmental sustainability regulatory regimes was cited as a hindrance to statutes as per outlooks that hubs on demonstrated skill sets in ecological sustainability application. One of the interviewees said: “In our experience, when we work on a bid at the national level, to my mind the focus seems to be more on a commercially acceptable bid, a low bid for the sake of price. And again, what we see is that all the environmental concerns are also dealt with in the contractual structure of the concession” (Solape, personal communication, July 21, 2023).
Koppenjan and Enserink (2009) states that in several other jurisdictions and sectors, governments are often unskilled and unprepared to manage sustainable PPPs. In Nigeria, Ajai (2012) argued that to guard sustainability targets in PPP infrastructure procurement, forms of environmental instruments should complement economic regulations.
ESS 6 has low institutional relations with the PPP formal rules (−). Three interviewees argued that centrism around the PPP procurement processes in Nigeria impedes the statutes on environmental civil group involvement. For instance, Gloria (personal communication, February 19, 2023), averred: “…the culture of government wanting to be in total control and not yielding ground to third-party independent bodies remains, and that undermines all your best practices that you are domesticating. The jurisprudence has not evolved enough, and we still have this centrist type of thinking within governmental circles. I suspect more advocacy will help”.
Lenferink et al. (2013) observed that the connected characteristics of PPP transactions produce challenges for coordination between private companies and public entities and for involving civil society organizations in bid assessment. In agreement, Ojelabi et al. (2018) opined that the covert characteristics of PPP transactions in most infrastructure projects in Nigeria are a barrier to independent project scrutiny.
ESS 7, relates institutionally to PPP formal rules at a low level (−). Two interviewees pointed out that the practice of renegotiating the contract terms in mid-operation by public authorities affects ESS 7, negatively. For example, Chibuz (personal communication, December 22, 2022) said: “Nigeria PPP laws allow for contract review, but contract review is based on contractual terms. The ICRC Act has a provision for a contract review clause; the problem is that there is no peculiarity to sustainability in it. It just requires that there will be a review clause”.
Herweg et al. (2018) observed that when writing lengthy contracts, parties have to depend on renegotiation to make certain, efficient trade ex-post. Ogunsanya et al. (2022) recommended that procurement laws in Nigeria should adopt clauses that can mitigate hindrances to sustainabilty considerations within the construction industry.
Next, we move to the overview of social sustainability steering strategies (SSS 1–7), at the federal level.
SSS 1 has a low level of institutional relations with PPP formal rules (−). Three of the interviewees cited that the current level of PPP sophistication in Nigeria hinders regulations per the use of simulation techniques that focus on measurable social risks in infrastructure projects. Toyin (personal communication, February 8, 2024), offered her insight: “We just have not advanced to that level. You know, with our laws, a lot of things take time. It is when something happens over time, maybe after a few projects, and people complain and see the need for it. For now, it is still at the initiation stage. People are just seeing the relevance of implementing such a situation. But right now, it has not been implemented into law. I think we are just slow, a little bit behind”.
Toriola-Coker et al. (2023) investigated the success elements stimulating end-user and stakeholders’ support for PPPs in Nigeria and attributed the preponderant social sustainability challenges to the division that exists between community assumptions and the naivety standard enciphered in the PPP planning processes.
SSS 2 has low consideration in PPP formal rules (−). Three of the interviewees commented that general corruption in PPP hinders the possibility of considering the end-users as equity holders in legal frameworks. Chibuz (personal communication, December 22, 2022), said: “ I don’t think the people who have refused to domesticate this law have even thought deeply about it. The thing, unfortunately, is that political leadership in Nigeria has a culture of grabbing, and so anything that will stop that grabbing, they are not enamored by it; they are not willing to go with it. Transparency improves consultation with stakeholders and, of course, it reduces the amount and things you can package and grab”.
Akelere and Gidado (2003) acknowledged the spiral nature of corruption in several infrastructure PPP projects in Nigeria. Hence, while a ‘special purpose company’ would enhance social inclusion, social exclusion still seems to be the dominant attitude of those in power.
SSS3 has a high institutional relationship with PPP formal rules (+). Six interviewees cited international pressures and funding requirements as the motivation for participative communication approaches in PPP legal frameworks. According to Toyin (personal communication, February 8, 2024): “ …most importantly, because financing is done by multilateral institutions, for example, the World Bank, AFDB, and others, they do require that this is done. From that aspect, you find that parties have to implement this in regulations”.
Hoffman (2007) buttressed that creditors are cognizant of the effects of PPP infrastructure projects on host communities; thus, almost all bilateral and funding institutions strive to steer off reputational risks that may spring up because of negative aspersions from special interest groups. In other words, ‘good governance’ requirements, such as the World Bank, are a relevant multi-level/external force for social sustainability consideration in PPP planning, particularly in developing countries.
SSS 4 has an average institutional relationship with the PPP formal rules (+−). Six of the interviewees mentioned that an unsuitable blend of expertise and skills in the regulator’s office hinders the consideration of bid strategies that capture the impacts and risks to the affected community in PPP legislation. Chibuz (personal communication, December 22, 2022) enthused: “…oftentimes when these issues arise, does the government hire the best hands, the people with the right experience, and the people with the right idea? Often, these people are not at the table. You have to know the strategy, be able to propagate it, argue it, and impress another person on it for it to be accepted”.
According to Akinbo et al.(2024), a fundamental pointer in Nigeria is the absence of knowledge sharing on several infrastructure projects, which could have been put to good use within the PPP legal regime.
SSS 5 has a low institutional relationship with PPP formal rules (−). Three of the interviewees argued that resistance to change by both public actors and politicians debars the third-party probity statutes in PPP legal frameworks. This narrative was lucidly captured below: “PPP seems to be like something politicians play with. That desire to see PPP work is not there, and again, it boils down to whether we understand what PPP is in the first place. Nigeria needs to go back to the drawing board to comprehend what PPP is and what Nigeria desires to attain with PPPs” (Moro, personal communication, February 6, 2023).
Anecdotes from the FGN contexts suggest that in Nigeria, a hazard to PPP probity arrangements is the opportunistic tendencies of third-party partners that arise because vested interests from both the bidders and politicians can tweak the public-private arrangements to achieve personal and economic benefits.
SSS 6 has a low institutional relation with PPP formal rules (−). Five respondents agreed that the lack of government support and cooperation with civil society organizations undermines independent project scrutiny in PPP statutes. For instance, Chibuz (personal communication, December 22, 2022) posited: “How willing is the political authority to allow independence to participate in decision-making in the public space?”
When interviewees were asked the question of who furnishes an external review of infrastructure PPPs at the FGN level, we discovered the Bureau of Public Procurement is the major infrastructure agenda-setter and evaluator, suggesting minuscule unfettered external review. This confirms Akinbo et al. (2024) that appropriate and rigorous public scrutiny of PPP infrastructure procurements is lacking in Nigeria.
SSS7 has a low institutional relation with PPP formal rules (−). Six interviewees mentioned a lack of mechanisms for developing sustainable PPP planning knowledge and expertise as a hitch to statutes on appropriate contractor-sub-contractor relationships that could foster social innovations. One of the interviewees said. “If you look at social and environmental sustainability, it became more prominent after 2015. These legislations were promulgated before 2015. The ICRC Act was promulgated in 2005, whereas the ICRC commission came into operation in 2009. NP4 was issued by the ICRC in 2012. You could see that the prominence of social and environmental sustainability came about under the SDG agreed by the UN in 2015” (George, personal communication, February 22, 2023).
Further, narratives from interviewees indicate that at the time when the laws were passed, PPPs were completely new concepts, novel, and difficult to get the national assembly to include most of the steering strategies in public procurement, primarily due to a lack of sufficient working knowledge.
Jurisdiction, Lagos State Government
In this section, assessments for this juridical domain are presented. This is followed up by observations and quotes from interviewees. The order of the sustainability strategies is introduced in Table 1. The rating was explained before and summarized in Table 4. First, the overview of Environmental Steering Strategies (ESS1-7) in Lagos State.
From Table 6, ESS 1 has average institutional relations with PPP formal rules (+−). Five interviewees avowed that the lack of foresight of legislators and regulators inhibits enactments that cater to the lifecycle performances of PPP infrastructure projects. As an example, Smith(personal communication, December 20, 2022), opined: “There is no foresight concerning that. The National Assembly, the various State Assemblies, and the regulatory agencies that regulate PPPs in Nigeria have not made laws in respect to that or issued any regulation or guidelines.”
According to Lenferink et al. (2013), confirming contractors to systems engineering standards stimulates lifecycle perspectives in PPP infrastructure projects. However, Malvestio et al. (2018) found that the absence of strategic vision due to economic short-term purposes hinders environmental impact assessment and mitigation options in developing and emerging economies. Similarly, the Lagos PPP office also admitted this specific problem and emphasized that the strategies and tasks were being rationalized, so it is noteworthy that this problem is being handled.
ESS 2 has a low institutional relation with the PPP formal rules (−). Three of the interviewees claimed that complex bureaucratic procedures debarred the enactment of support systems and schemes that could stimulate private actors on environmental expertise. Ade (personal communication, April 4, 2023), affirmed that: “Currently, the law does not allow issuing a financial guarantee. The law prohibits us and prevents us from issuing financial guarantees, which is not in line with best practices, as we have seen all over the world. Some projects can not be done without the full backing of the Lagos state government, which will not make the financiers comfortable giving credit to such projects because of the peculiarities of some PPPs. We have experienced such in two of our projects, which we have noted now.”
According to Bolomope et al.(2021), government bureaucracy was among the influences that constrained PPP statutes per financial guarantees to private entities in Lagos state. This often occurs when funding via a viability gap is necessary for infrastructure project sustainability.
ESS 3 has an average institutional relationship with the PPP formal rules (+−). Three interviewees identified the practice of improper risk sharing as a major obstacle to laws on liability and compensation for environmental impacts in PPPs in Lagos State. For example, Solape (personal communication, July 21, 2023), observed that “There is nothing under the current Lagos state law that speaks to protecting the environment, and certainly under the public procurement law of Lagos state, I do not recall that we have specific provisions”.
Stafford & Stapleton (2022) acknowledged that PPP risk reduction can be achieved by adequately allotting tasks and risks to both the procuring authority and investor. Admittedly, this is not a trivial activity. Moreover, findings suggest that the Lagos State government’s approach is to shift all risks, instead of appropriate risks, to the private actors.
ESS 4 has a low institutional relation with PPP formal rules (−). Lack of in-house expertise in sustainability criteria in PPPs inhibits enactments that prioritize the avoidance of environmental externalities at the bidding stages. The comment below corroborates this finding: “ What we typically have in our system is that you have people who do not know anything about PPPs. These are people who end up writing our laws. even when they consult with experts, they end up jettisoning proposals and recommendations from experts because the position they want to take is a position that benefits their interests.” (Fred, personal communication, December 13, 2022).
Within the LSG, interviewees agreed that the right mix of expertise that could create mechanisms for sustainability consideration and the reengineering of existing informal technical and institutional arrangements is not encouraged.
ESS 5 has a very-low institutional relationship with the formal rules (−). Six interviewees commented that the absence of an apparatus to comprehend localized interests and environmental sustainability goals constrained statutes as regards demonstrated competence in ecological sustainability practices. One of the interviewees offered his insight as follows: “ For our stage of development, we are a people in a hurry to develop because of the infrastructure deficits that we have. When you find a would-be concessionaire who wants to develop one project or another, and you start imposing burdensome obligations on them, it makes it a lot more difficult for them to come to the table and invest, and at the same time, it makes it difficult for that project to get off the ground. Do you, as a government entity, prefer that we have this rail line at least to move people from one part of Lagos to the other on the basis that the concessionaire complies with the basic, or would you rather not have that rail line? The populace suffers because you want the concessionaire to meet certain benchmarks. These are some of the questions the government asks itself. That is why some of these ideals, standards, and benchmarks are not in our laws” (Fred, personal communication, December 13, 2022).
Enserink and Koppenjan (2005) suggest that to achieve sustainable PPP planning. Institutional arrangements should encourage civic organizations, stakeholders, and users to take part in the procurement life cycle. However, Ajibade et al. (2016), confirmed that LSG’s economic policies for PPP infrastructure projects do not focus on environmental sustainability competition.
ESS 6 has a low institutional relation with PPP formal rules (−). Three interviewees argued that the philosophical and ideological antipathy to working with NGOs inhibits statutes on multi-actor dialogue at the bidding stage. In line with this argument. Chibuz(personal communication, December 22, 2022),observed: “ You see, the NGO space in Nigeria was propagated by an ideological bend that was very socialist-oriented, completely socialist-oriented. A number of the core leaders of the NGO community, even at my age, were socialists. So again, if, for example, you have a structure that you are talking about and these were the people sitting in the room, only them, what will be the impact? Give me a real socialist, a core socialist who will allow a modern-day PPP process to go through”.
The above implies that the socio-political independence for NGOs, at the FGN level, to make decisions on public matters towards the safeguarding of social sustainability principles in the procurement processes is yet to evolve. So, beyond still having to evolve, there is a legislative reluctance in Lagos State.
ESS 7, has low institutional relations with PPP formal rules (−). Five interviewees opined that the lack of regulatory capacity on sustainable PPP is a key barrier to the statutes that allow updates of PPP contracts to meet sustainability and new technological findings. For instance, Fred (personal communication, December 13, 2022),opined that: “If you get people in governance, visionary people, people who understand these things you are talking about, who insist on these things being implemented even though in the short term it will be painful, I am sure we will change all these rules we find in our statute books. We will be able to convince people in the legislature to put these things in place”.
Supportively, Opawole and Jagboro (2017) found that the domestication and implementation of international codes, in legal regimes, are low in PPP projects in Lagos State.
Next, the overview of Social Steering Strategies (SSS1-7) in Lagos State.
SSS 1 has a low level of institutional relations with the PPP formal rules (−). Two interviewees acknowledged that the lack of political will hinders efforts at probabilistic social risk assessment within the PPP statutes. One interviewee said: “Until recently, the social impact of PPP projects has never really been at the forefront for both the government and concessionaire; that is why it has not crossed anyone's mind to include such provisions in the statutes that you have in place” (Fred, personal communication, December 13, 2022).
Toriola-Coker et al. (2023) argued that fit-for-purpose data aid the assessment of social risks and impacts of PPP infrastructures and will require government support to generate. However, Igboka (2015) concluded that political conditions in Lagos State do not support risk allocation and assessment.
SSS 2 has low institutional relations with the formal rules (−). Three interviewees mentioned inadequate evolution of jurisprudence for the non-inclusion of end users as equity owners in PPP SPVs within legal frameworks. There were comments such as: “I think our jurisprudence has not developed to that extent, but I suspect that as our localization framework continues to expand to other sectors outside the oil industry, it is not a long time coming when communities will be given a stake in the infrastructure PPPs. Right now we don’t have that ingrained in our laws, and it is not a common practice” (Gloria, personal communication, February 19, 2023).
Lekan (personal communication, February 21, 2024), also averred: “It is a result of greed from the leaders; they always try to bring in policies that favor them, but not policies that favor the end users. The leaders know what to do; they only play down issues that will favor the common man. If they can allow the common man to be a stakeholder in most of the opportunities that they want to bring in terms of infrastructural development, things will not go the way it is going in Nigeria”.
The above comments suggest that public sector advocacy is yet to extend to scenarios where end users have equity in infrastructure PPPs.. Some portrayals also brought to the fore statutes in legislation that empower Lagos State to act in trust for the community. This implies that the rights of the communities are subsumed by the powers of the State to contract and legislate on their behalf, and since governments see PPPs as business, PPPs are not tilted to favor the community.
SSS 3 has a high institutional relationship with the PPP formal rules (+). Within the four legal frameworks, efforts at community involvement and participation were evident. Four interviewees attributed this to growing localization and requirements. For instance, Ade (personal communication, April,4,2023), commented: “Stakeholder management is allowed; it is a must in projects. Specific regulations do not mandate it, but the legal frameworks, policy direction, and emerging practice allow it to happen”.
This implies that related commitment schemes and decision-making capabilities can drift from policymakers, who hold the paramount decision authority, towards the citizens through dynamic engagement.
SSS 4 has an average level of institutional relationship with the PPP formal rules (+−). Six interviewees opined that legislation on procurement policy that could safeguard the effects and risks to the local community is constrained by complex bureaucratic procedures. To buttress this point, Ade (personal communication, April,4,2023), averred: “As I said, our laws are written on a rule basis, not principles-based, which allows for a lot of innovations. You know the way the law works is that you can not think of everything, but you allow for flexibility such that you can do certain things that do not offend the law”.
Babatunde et al.(2014) observed that the bureaucratic nature of state governments hampers the implementation of Nigeria’s infrastructure PPP projects. Further narratives from interviewees suggest that the lack of clarity, predictability, and fairness in selecting private parties characterizes Lagos State infrastructure PPP procurements.
Appointment of fairness and process auditors has high institutional relationships with the PPP formal rules (++). Despite the result indicating a very low score for GLPR, we considered this inconsequential in scoring the level of institutional relations. This is because there is a solid specialized legal arrangement (for PPPs, for Procurement, for SSS). Consequently, GLPR’s status portends no issues in this particular strategy. Three interviewees attributed the consideration of SSS 5 in PPP regulations to legal obligations. There were comments as: “It is mandatory, we don’t even have the power to waive that. Even the governor can not waive that. It is required in the law, it is operational and enforceable” (Ade, personal communication, April,4,2023).
Further, Malvestio et al. (2018), posited that although social sustainability issues come late in the PPP planning process, providing little or no room to impact decision-making, it is probable to materialize for PPP infrastructure projects because of legal obligations.
SSS 6 has a low institutional relation with PPP formal rules (−). Three interviewees mentioned that insufficient public sector capacity was responsible for the gaps in legislation about independent project scrutiny. For instance, Ade(personal communication, April,4,2023), said: “I told you that law is evolving. There is a process of law-making. So as things evolve, the law grows to keep up. The stage of the law is that it has not been reviewed. It is just a matter of how fast we review our legal processes. It may be slow, but some of the principles are taken on board in the contract.”
Implicitly, we deduced that though sustainable PPP planning was at the teething stages when the laws were made, the slow development of public commitments to policy issues adversely hindered these laws from catching up with best practices.
SSS 7 has a very high institutional relationship with the PPP formal rules (++). Five interviewees alluded to social pressures. Gbolahan (personal communication, February 24, 2024): “You see, as I said earlier, today information is moving more than ever before. Awareness is coming every day. More and more educated people outside the government have increased, unlike before. So in the long run, they will metamorphose into positive pressures that can drive businesses.
A key lesson from the Lagos State example suggests a record staff throughput in procuring agencies, which may have affected institutional schemas and comprehension processes regarding this particular steering strategy.
Observation and Discussion on ESS and SSS
From Tables 5–32, at the federal level, ESS4, 6, and 7 score low. In Lagos, ESS 2, 4, and 6 score low. Integratively, ESS 4 and 6 score low in both jurisdictions. Moreover, ESS 5 pans out very low in both jurisdictions. At the federal level, SSS1, 5, 6, and 7, all scored low. In Lagos, SSS 1, 2, and 6 scored low. Integratively, SSS 1 and 6 score low in both jurisdictions. At the federal level, all preparatory ESSs seem sufficient, but regarding SSSs, both SSS1 and SSS2 score poorly. For Lagos, in preparation, ESS2 scores low, and both SSS1 and 2 also score low. Further, at the federal level, all procurement ESSs score poorly, but as per SSSs, both SSS5 and SSS6 score low. Similarly, for Lagos, in procurement, all ESSs also scored poorly, while only SSS6 scored low. Furthermore, at the federal level, both ESS7 and SSS7 scored low. While Lagos, ESS7, scored low, SSS7 scored very high.
Ultimately, Nigeria’s greatest weakness in sustainable PPP steering strategies and formal rules relationships occurs within the procurement stage. Corroboratively, Nwangwu (2012) acknowledged that Nigeria’s extant PPP rule, the ICRCA, does not furnish specific rules on how PPP procurement and contracts should be accomplished. Similarly, Dandago et al. (2023) deduced that sustainable PPP procurement in Nigeria is hindered in practice by intransigent procurement, which might limit the liberty to adjust outcomes. Whereas the greatest strength occurs within the preparatory stage. This is conceivable because anecdotes from the interviewees suggest that the process in which public procurers must consult other public actors or private organizations, e.g., via canvassing the market, to fine-tune both plans and regulations, incentivizes sustainable PPP planning rules at the preparatory stages.
In addition, ESSs are better arranged in formal rules than the SSS. At the Federal level, there were higher numbers of non-reporting on the SSSs than the ESSs. Similarly, in Lagos, there were also more non-reportages on the SSSs than the ESSs. According to Solape (personal communication, July 21, 2023): “We have a regime where laws are slighted or are much more leaning toward environmental considerations as opposed to taking cognizance of social impacts. So, more of the laws that existed before the ESG are predominantly environmental-centered. So, we have the social sustainability principles being left out.”
The above narration confirms the findings by Hueskes et al. (2017), who concluded that the social perspective of sustainability principles is hugely uncared for in infrastructure PPP projects.
Besides, both FGN and LSG are evenly matched, as per sustainable PPP institutional sophistication. For instance, out of the seven ESSs, three low scores were recorded at the federal level compared to four low scores at the Lagos level. Both jurisdictions have one very low score, respectively. Regarding the SSSs, the federal level has five very low scores compared to three low scores at the Lagos government level. Furthermore, SSSs recorded two very high scores in Lagos, whereas the federal level only had one high score. In terms of environmental sustainability considerations, the FGN fared better than the LSG. As per the social sustainability considerations, LSG fared better than the FGN. Consequently, both jurisdictions must, as a necessity, upgrade current regulations to be in line with sustainable PPP planning demands.
There is a need to pay particular attention to the ESS5 in Nigeria’s PPP legal framework. In both jurisdictions, the ESS5 panned out very low. The priority seems to be only on a commercially acceptable bid, a low bid, that neglects environmental sustainability. In addition, we deduced that SSS1 requires revisions in terms of its nomenclature. Three Interviewees attest to this notion. For instance, Chibuz (personal communication, December 22, 2022) said: “I don’t think it is a good practice to write software into law. Software is a tool that is subject to rapid changes. If you make the mistake of making such provisions, you might run into powerful private sector advocacy groups that want to write their patented products into law. The approach is to write a framework that enables you to use best-in-class technology. Reframing SSS1 to effective stakeholders’ participation using technology would be appropriate.”
The submission above suggests the need for the use of phrases broad enough in sustainable PPP rules’ prescriptions and such that allow the use of technologies to evaluate social risks, and not necessarily a particular software, such as BIM. This will help to avoid legal issues on patented products.
Significantly, comparisons between sustainable PPP legal frameworks at both the FGN and LSG have beneficial outcomes. First, since both the federal and Lagos state governments have their own PPP frameworks, but they operate within the same national context, comparing them helps understand how these frameworks interact and conflict. Next, comparing a national PPP document with a state-level PPP document allows for a focused analysis of how national rules and regulations translated into on-the-ground implementation and what challenges arose from the interaction between these levels of government. In sum, by focusing on Lagos, we demonstrate how a state with a developed PPP program navigates the complexities of working within a federal system and offer valuable insights into the broader application of sustainable PPPs across the remaining sub-national governments in Nigeria.
Conclusions
Answering the overarching research question, fourteen sustainable PPP steering strategies are partially prescribed in formal rules in Nigeria. Generally, an inadequate mix of institutional sophistication exists between the steering strategies and PPP formal rules. The greatest strength in sustainable PPP steering strategies, prescriptions, and formal rules relationship occurs within the preparatory stage. The greatest weakness occurs within the procurement stage. Three issues are responsible for the hiatus in relationships regarding sustainable PPP steering strategies and formal rules. These are lack of necessary components, the complete absence of legal provisions, and contradictions in the prescriptions. However, the lack of necessary components is the most debilitating issue.
Answering the first sub-question of the research, sustainability-relevant PPP formal rules exist in four categories of legal frameworks in Nigeria. These are the PPP rules, regulations, and policies; procurement laws, regulations, and policies; general environmental and social sustainability laws, regulations, and policies; and sectoral laws, regulations, and policies. Although PPPs appear to be overregulated, both the sector-specific rules and the general laws, policies, and regulations have the most potential to attain sustainable PPP rules in Nigeria. However, extant PPP and procurement rules are hugely deficient in this regard.
Answering the second sub-question of the research, prescriptions regarding sustainable PPP steering strategies in Nigeria’s formal rules exist within five different levels of institutional relations, i.e., very low, low, average, high, and very high. The low level, however, is the most dominant. Next is the average level. A triad of very low, very high, and high follows equally. Several barriers affect the extent of the prescription of sustainable PPP steering strategies in Nigeria. For example, the conversations around sustainable PPP steering strategies were primarily the result of funders’ requirements and not necessarily the obligations on environmental and social safeguards. Further, the reluctance of legislators and regulators to proactively amend the existing PPP laws to reflect both ecological and social sustainability demands is another critical concern. Moreover, Nigeria runs a bicameral legislature, where bureaucracy, political, and economic interests remain bottlenecks to sustainable PPP legal frameworks. Market, regulatory, and capacity bottlenecks are also prevalent.
Answering the third sub-question of the research, ESS4, ESS5, ESS6, ESS7, SSS1, and SSS2 all require urgent and holistic revision within the Nigerian PPP legal frameworks. ESS5, in particular, has a very low-level status across the two jurisdictions studied, while ESS4, ESS6, ESS7, SSS1, and SSS2 all have a low-level status. Furthermore, the nomenclature of SSS1 requires an amendment from the term ‘building information modeling’ to effective stakeholders’ participation. Doing this will help avoid both proprietary and patent issues.
Theoretically, this study extends both the significance and adaptability of the IAD framework beyond its focus on rules and norms on individual incentives in common pool governance, to multiple dynamic systematic options, to understand what happens within the sustainable PPP black box. However, the study has some limitations. First, a broader sample that includes other states in Nigeria would make the results more generalizable. Next, fewer PPP formal rules exist at LSG than at the FGN for a wider comparison. Existing literature linked the slow development of sub-national PPPs in Nigeria to the exogenous challenges bedeviling the entire ecosystem. Although LSG is a sub-national, it stands as the avant-garde of PPP regulations, procurement, processes, and several projects. Multiple explanations may underlie such a contradiction, posing a rich area for additional research.
Additionally, the study’s scope is limited by its meta-analysis approach. The examination of informal practice-formal rules settings concentrates on which of the ESS and the SSS are included in written documents. This does not reflect the extent to which actors engage with these steering strategies in practice. For example, a PPP private partner could do more than the procuring entity anticipates. However, they could also do less, especially if sustainable PPP steering strategies are not designed to be enforceable.
As an action point, the FGN and all 36 state governments in Nigeria should consider developing a sustainable PPP legal framework. This legislation could serve as a model for all levels of government, including local governments, and incorporate both environmental and social sustainability strategies, emphasizing fewer, better, and simpler approaches. This will involve developing the legal framework for PPPs through thorough consultation in areas that most directly impact sustainability considerations and planning; making enforcement more aligned with sustainable PPP principles; enhancing the judiciary’s effectiveness in enforcing sustainable PPP contracts; utilizing foreign courts for arbitration settlements; and establishing specific legislation on the ‘competitive dialogue’ approach at the procurement stage.
Therefore, future research should include case studies to evaluate the relationships that exist between PPP formal rules and working rules concerning ESS and SSS. This will provide a more effective diffusion of sustainability concepts within PPP regulatory spaces. Nonetheless, to safeguard sustainable PPP planning, there is a need to harmonize the different and incoherent hard and soft laws within primary and secondary legislation in Nigeria. Although such an option will not be drastic, nor cause regulatory arbitrage in infrastructure procurement, it will rather help secure better environmental and social sustainability in PPP legal frameworks.
Footnotes
Consent to Participate
Informed consent (verbal) was obtained from all subjects involved in this study.
Author contributions
Conceptualization, Abimbola A. Adebayo (A.A.A.), Kris Lulofs (K.L.) and Michiel Adriaan Heldeweg (M.A.H.); methodology, A.A.A. and K.L.; validation, A.A.A., K.L. and M.A.H.; formal analysis, A.A.A. and K.L.; investigation, A.A.A.; writing-original draft preparation, A.A.A.; writing-review and editing, A.A.A., K.L. and M.A.H.; supervision, K.L., and M.A.H. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.
Funding
The authors received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Declaration of conflicting interests
The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Data Availability Statement
Data is available on request.