Scholars generally assume that administrative forms matter. Whether organizational structure and administrative procedures substantially influence the end results of administrative decisions, however, remains a controversial question. In specifying agency design, legislators have attempted to control bureaucratic agents and, by extension, outcomes. This study’s comparison of pipeline siting decisions in Washington, Oregon, and Montana examines how different administrative schemes can affect siting outcomes. The results are counterintuitive. Findings suggest that those who attempt to regulate a complex technology may well encounter difficulty in determining future outcomes through organizational reform and that although form matters, exogenous events may exert even greater influence over outcomes.
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