In our federal, constitutional system of government, the states are often lauded as “laboratories of experimentation” for public policy, including for public environmental law. Yet private actors are playing an increasingly important role as parallel regulators through the adoption of private environmental governance. Private environmental governance can functionally advance one of federalism’s core values: policy experimentalism. To the extent that private governance by business firms arouses skepticism for this experimental role because firms’ motives to achieve profit in a competitive environment differ from the incentives motivating public regulators, private universities offer an alternative institutional locus for experimentalism. Using Yale University’s recent adoption of a private carbon charge as a case study, this article argues that universities should play a greater role in private environmental governance experimentalism, and are worthy of more scholarly focus.
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