Bridging the Gap between Electoral and Participatory Democracy: The Electoral Motivations behind Participatory Budgeting in Chicago

Abstract

This paper explores the electoral dynamics of participatory budgeting projects in Chicago, IL, a topic neglected in the participatory democracy literature. Combining qualitative fieldwork with electoral data, I argue participatory budgeting is more likely to be adopted by elected officials who identify as progressive, face strong electoral competition, and are non-incumbents. These officials mobilize support for participatory budgeting to enhance their democratic legitimacy and build their constituency networks. In contrast to research focused on participatory budgeting as a non-partisan deliberative initiative, I attribute the uneven emergence of participatory budgeting projects in Chicago to the strategic electoral interests of aldermen, suggesting explanations of participatory budgeting focused on the drivers of the process should assign a greater role to electoral interests. More broadly, this research suggests approaching policy transfer as a contextually embedded process that precludes normative assumptions about particular policies absent a consideration of the institutional and social environment.