Special assessments on property are a fiscal innovation employed by many local governments. Unable to raise property taxes due to limitations, localities have turned to these charges as an alternative method to fund local services. In this article, we seek to explain differential levels of special assessment financing through the analysis of property tax records of a sample of single-family homes in California. We theorize that special assessments, as opposed to other forms of taxation, will be used when residents hold anti-redistributive preferences. We show that annual assessment payments are correlated with the ethnic diversity and median family incomes of the census places within which they are located. We also show that assessments with narrow geographic ranges are levied extensively on expensive homes in poorer cities. We discuss the implications of special assessments for progressive taxation and the potential for fiscal secession within U.S. cities.
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