This study examines how affective polarization impacts the partisan divide in perceptions of cable news networks’ political biases. Results from a 2016 U.S. presidential election survey show that affective polarization deepens this divide, even after controlling for election involvement, partisanship strength, and cable news usage. Partisanship strength is more closely associated with in-party love than out-party hate, but out-party hate has a stronger association with media bias perception, indicating that out-group hate is more influential in shaping partisans’ media bias perception.
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