A legalistic conception of the Constitution predominates in political science and legal studies, according to which the Constitution is a law that attempts to determine the powers that institutions are authorized to exercise under circumstances specified in advance. One such power is lawmaking, which is said to be reserved to Congress and denied to other institutions. Yet scholars are also aware of the Constitution’s manifold ambiguities, observing that precise legal guidance about the extent and boundaries of institutional authority is scarce. I contest the current consensus by arguing that these ambiguities are a feature, not a bug, of the Constitution’s agonistic design. Using the Constitution’s own utterances as signals of a broader constitutional theory—constitutional agonism—I contend that the Constitution conceives of law expansively: many different forms of state action (besides statutes) count as law in that they are binding on those to whom they are directed. At the same time, each of these forms of state action is only conditionally authoritative, each being subject to revision, and possibly nullification, by other forms of state action. In turn, constitutionally induced conflict is intended to advance broader normative objectives such as oversight, accountability, and deliberation.
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