Does participation in conflicts abroad lead to a great risk of conflict escalation at home? We contend that involvement in interstate conflict can impact the likelihood of civil conflict escalation via international conflict’s effects on domestic repression. During international conflict, states employ their military abroad to cope with an external threat, so they may have fewer resources with which to repress. Insurgencies may thus seize the opportunity to target the state. We predict that states that maintain high levels of repression during international conflict will be less likely to experience civil conflict escalation, but that states whose repressive output weakens increase their risk of such escalation. Utilizing mediation analysis, we find evidence that involvement in international conflict shifts repressive patterns, influencing internal conflict intensity. Specifically, governments that increase repression in the shadow of international conflict are less likely to witness civil conflict escalation while states that maintain or decrease repression are more likely.
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