How the Flattened Costs of Grassroots Lobbying Affect Legislator Responsiveness

Abstract

Leading theories of grassroots lobbying assert that legislators should respond positively to the volume of grassroots lobbying messages because volume indicates the salience of an issue among constituents. This notion rests on the idea that the costs of producing a large volume of grassroots lobbying signals the value of the information to legislators. Advances in technology and strategy, however, have flattened the costs associated with producing such information—it costs much less to generate one additional e-mail message than before. In this environment, the volume of grassroots lobbying no longer signals the value of the information it contains. Instead, I believe trust becomes the critical factor in evaluating grassroots lobbying. I test this theory using a survey of state legislators. I find that lobbying message volume has no effect on legislator responses to higher salience issues, and a negative effect on lower salience issues.