Turkey’s powerful Constitutional Court serves as an administrative attaché of state elites in overseeing the political arena and transforming the society. Looking at the courts as administrative agents suggests that the ruling elite might turn to courts not in an attempt to safeguard their immediate interests, but to transform the society by extending the reach of the state. The authors contend that in countries where the state pursues a civilizing mission, judicial empowerment is an attractive tool for defending the state against powerful segments of the society who might subscribe to different civilizing projects.
Ackerman, Bruce.1997. The rise of world constitutionalism. Virginia Law Review83 (4): 771-97.
2.
Ahmad, Feroz.1977. The Turkish experiment in democracy 1950-1975. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs.
3.
Aldıkaçtı, Orhan.1980. Yaşadığımız kriz ve anayasanın değiştirilmesi [The crisis we are living through and constitutional change]. In Tercűman: Anayasa ve seçim sistemi semineri [Tercűman: Seminar on constitutional and electoral system]. Istanbul, Turkey: Tercűman Yayınevi.
4.
Arjomand, Said A.2003. Law, political reconstruction and constitutional politics . International Sociology18 (1): 7-32.
5.
Aybay, Rona.1977. Some contemporary constitutional problems in Turkey. British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies4 (1): 21-27.
6.
Belge, Ceren.2006. Friends of the court: The republican alliance and selective activism of the constitutional court of Turkey. Law & Society Review40 (3): 653-91.
7.
Dodd, Clement Henry.1983. The crisis of Turkish democracy. Beverly , North Humberside, UK: Eothen Press.
8.
Epp, Charles R.1998. The rights revolution: Lawyers, activists, and supreme courts in comparative perspective. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
9.
Evren, Kenan.1982. Ankara speech. Ankara, Turkey, October 29. http://www.belgenet.com/12eylul/evren_291082.html (accessed June 12, 2008).
10.
Finkel, Jodi.2004. Judicial reform in Argentina in the 1990s: How electoral incentives shape institutional change. Latin American Research Review39 (3): 56-80.
11.
Ginsburg, Tom.2003. Judicial review in new democracies: Constitutional courts in Asian cases. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
12.
Ginsburg, Tom, and Tamir Moustafa.2008. Introduction: The functions of courts in authoritarian politics. In Rule by law: The politics of courts in authoritarian regimes, eds. Tom Ginsburg and Tamir Moustafa.Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
13.
Gőle, Nilűfer.1997. The quest for the Islamic self within the context of modernity . In Rethinking modernity and national identity in Turkey, ed. Sibel Bozdoğan and Reşat Kasaba, 81-94. Seattle: University of Washington Press.
14.
Haggard, Stephan, and Robert R. Kaufman .1995. The political economy of democratic transitions. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
15.
Hawkins, Darren, David Lake, Daniel Nielson, and Michael Tierney .2005. Delegation under anarchy . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
16.
Helmke, Gretchen.2003. Checks and balances by other means: Strategic defection and the "re-election" controversy in Argentina. Comparative Politics35 (2): 213-28.
17.
Heper, Metin.1985. The state tradition in Turkey. Beverly , North Humberside, UK: Eothen Press.
18.
Hirschl, Ran.2000. The political origins of judicial empowerment through constitutionalism: Lessons from four constitutional revolutions. Law and Social Inquiry25 (1): 91-149.
19.
Hirschl, Ran.2004. Towards juristocracy: The origins and consequences of new constitutionalism. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
20.
Hirschl, Ran.2008. The judicialization of mega politics and the rise of political courts. Annual Review of Political Science11:93-118.
21.
Huntington, Samuel P.1991. The third wave: Democratization in the late twentieth century. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
22.
Hűrriyet.2003. Bumin: Anayasa Mahkemesi senato gibi [Bumin: The Constitutional Court is like a senate]. May 15. http://webarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/2003/05/15/289323.asp (accessed February 13, 2009).
23.
Incal v. Turkey, no. 22678/93, ECHR 1998-IV (1998, June 9). http://www.echr.coe.int (accessed July 4, 2009).
24.
Kili, Suna.1971. Turkish constitutional developments and assembly debates on the constitutions of 1924 and 1961. Istanbul, Turkey: Robert College Research Center.
25.
Kili, Suna.1992. Turkish constitutional development: An appraisal. Capital University Law Review21:1059-80.
26.
Koğacıoğlu, Dicle.2004. Progress, unity, and democracy: Dissolving political parties in Turkey. Law & Society Review38 (3): 433-62.
27.
Kommers, Donald P.1997. The constitutional jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
28.
Linz, Juan, and Alfred Stepan.1996. Problems of democratic transition and consolidation. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
29.
Magalhaes, Pedro.1999. The politics of judicial reform in Eastern Europe. Comparative Politics32 (1): 43-62.
30.
McCally, Sarah P.1956. Party government in Turkey. Journal of Politics18 (2): 297-323.
31.
Őzbudun, Ergun.2006. Political origins of the Turkish Constitutional Court and the problem of democratic legitimacy. European Public Law12 (2): 213-23.
32.
Patton, Marcie J.2007. AKP reform fatigue in Turkey: What has happened to the EU process?Mediterranean Politics12 (3): 339-58.
33.
Root, Hilton, and Karen May.2008. Judicial systems and economic development . In Rule by law: The politics of courts in authoritarian regimes , ed. Tom Ginsburg and Tamir Moustafa.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
34.
Rustow, Dankwart.1970. Transitions to democracy. Comparative Politics2 (3): 337-63.
35.
Sakallıoğlu, mit Cizre.1996. Parameters and strategies of Islam-State interaction in Republican Turkey. International Journal of Middle East Studies28 (2): 231-51.
36.
Sancar, Mithat.2006. Constitutional democracy: Obstacle to, or safeguard of democracy. In Democracy and the Judiciary, ed. Ozan Ergűl.Ankara, Turkey: Union of Turkish Bar Associations.
37.
Sezer, Ahmet Necdet.2000. Opening speech, Ankara, Turkey. http://www.anayasa.gov.tr/general/icerikler.asp?contID=267&menuID=64 (accessed June 30, 2009).
38.
Shambayati, Hootan.2008a. Courts in semi-democratic/ authoritarian regimes: The judicialization of Turkish (and Iranian) politics. In Rule by law: The politics of courts in authoritarian regimes, ed. Tom Ginsburg and Tamir Moustafa.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
39.
Shambayati, Hootan.2008b. The guardian of the state: The Turkish Constitutional Court in comparative perspective. In Constitutional reconstruction in Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan, ed. Said A. Arjomand. Oxford, UK: Hart .
40.
Shambayati, Hootan, and Gűliz Sűtçű .2009. Tutelage or accountability? The Constitutional Court and the Justice and Development Party. Manuscript.
41.
Shapiro, Martin.1986. Courts: A comparative and political analysis. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
42.
Stone, Alec.1992. The birth of judicial politics in France: The Constitutional Council in comparative perspective. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
43.
Tamkoç, Metin.1976. The warrior diplomats: Guardians of the national security and modernization of Turkey. Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press.
44.
Tanőr, Bűlent.1986. Iki anayasa: 1961 ve 1982 [Two constitutions: 1961 and 1982]. Istanbul, Turkey: Beta Basım Yakima Dağıtım A.S.
45.
TCC, E. 2008/1, K. 2008/2. 2008a, July 30. http://www .anayasa.gov.tr/eskisite/KARARLAR/SPK/K2008/K-20082SPK.htm (accessed June 30, 2009).
46.
TCC, E. 2008/16, K. 2008/16. 2008b, June 5. http://www .anayasa.gov.tr/eskisite/KARARLAR/IPTALITIRAZ/YD/k-2008-16yd.htm (accessed June 30, 2009).
47.
T.C. Anayasa Mahkemesi (Constitutional Court of Turkey). n.d. Anayasa mahkemesi emekli başkanları [Retired judges of the Constitutional Court]. http://www.anayasa.gov.tr/eskisite/ emekli.htm (accessed September 21, 2008).
48.
Tezcür, Günes Murat.2009. Judicial activism in perilous times: The Turkish case. Law & Society Review43 (2): 305-36.
49.
Trochev, Alexei.2004. Less democracy, more courts: A puzzle of judicial review in Russia. Law & Society Review38 (3): 513-48.
50.
Weiker, Walter.1963. The Turkish revolution, 1960-1961. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
