This article examines the contention that states with early presidential primaries or caucuses receive disproportionate distributive policy benefits. The basic theory is that presidential candidates pledge more federal spending per capita to these states because doing well in their contests is critical to capturing the nomination. Candidates then deliver on these promises if they win the White House. Using by-state procurement per capita data from 1984 to 2004, four conditional hypotheses derived from this thinking are tested. The results show that primary or caucus order matters only during competitive nominations when the ultimately victorious presidential candidate won the state’s contest.
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