Sage Journals: Discover world-class research

Abstract

Cognitivism, a framework strongly shaped by developments in computer and communication sciences, has dominated the study of cognition since the 1960s. From the 1990s onward, however, alternative frameworks have gained prominence. Among these, anti-cognitivism designates approaches that deliberately reject cognitivist assumptions, with some examples found in Radical Embodied Cognition, Radical Enactivism, and Autopoietic Enactivism. In this paper, a distinction between pluralist and eliminativist anti-cognitivism is proposed. Pluralists regard cognitivist and non-cognitivist approaches as, at least in principle, complementary, while eliminativists argue that cognitivism is misguided and should be discarded. The paper starts by clarifying cognitivism to avoid common misunderstandings. After that, focusing on enactive and embodied versions of anti-cognitivism, it analyzes its most influential arguments against cognitivism and concludes that eliminativism fails to provide a convincing case against cognitivism, and that pluralism better reflects the epistemological commitments of at least some versions of anti-cognitivism, namely those that adopt an ecological perspective.

Keywords

radical embodied cognition radical enactive cognition cognitivism representations scientific explanations scientific concepts

Get full access to this article

View all access options for this article.

References

Abdou

Shehata

Choko

Nishizono

Matsuo

Muramatsu

Inokuchi

(2018). Synapse-specific representation of the identity of overlapping memory engrams. Science, 360(6394), 1227–1231. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aat3810

Adams

Aizawa

(2010). Defending the bounds of cognition. In The extended mind (pp. 67–80). The MIT Press. https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/9780262014038.003.0004

Aizawa

(2015). What is this cognition that is supposed to be embodied? Philosophical Psychology, 28(6), 755–775. https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2013.875280

Aizawa

(2017). Cognition and behavior. Synthese, 194(11), 4269–4288. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-014-0645-5

Allen

(2017). On (not) defining cognition. Synthese, 194(11), 4233–4249. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1454-4

Allott

Lohndal

Rey

(2021). Chomsky’s “Galilean” explanatory style. In Allott

Lohndal

Rey

(Eds.), A companion to chomsky (1st ed., pp. 515–528). Wiley. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119598732.ch33

Andonovski

(2021). Causation and mnemonic roles: On Fernández’s functionalism. Estudios de Filosofía, 64, 139–153. https://doi.org/10.17533/udea.ef.n64a07

Andonovski

(2023). Autonoesis and the Galilean science of memory: Explanation, idealization, and the role of crucial data. European Journal for Philosophy of Science, 13(3), 42. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-023-00548-3

Andonovski

(2024). Engrams as mental files. Synthese, 204(6), 154. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-024-04801-x

10.

Baddeley

A. D.

Eysenck

M. W.

Anderson

M. C.

(2020). Memory (3rd edition). Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group.

11.

Baggs

Sanches De Oliveira

(2024). Rewilding psychology. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 379(1910), 20230287. https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2023.0287

12.

Baker

Lansdell

Kording

K. P.

(2022). Three aspects of representation in neuroscience. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 26(11), 942–958. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2022.08.014

13.

Bechtel

(2008). Mental mechanisms: Philosophical perspectives on cognitive neuroscience. Psychology - L. Erblaum.

14.

Bokulich

(2011). How scientific models can explain. Synthese, 180(1), 33–45. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9565-1

15.

Boyd

(1991). Realism, anti-foundationalism and the enthusiasm for natural kinds. Philosophical Studies, 61(1–2), 127–148. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00385837

16.

Brancazio

(2018). Irreducible aspects of embodiment: Situating scientist and subject. Australasian Philosophical Review, 2(2), 219–223. https://doi.org/10.1080/24740500.2018.1552101

17.

Campbell

(2014). Our faithfulness to the past: The ethics and politics of memory. Oxford University Press.

18.

Cao

(2022). Putting representations to use. Synthese, 200(2), 151. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-022-03522-3

19.

Carnap

(1950). Logical foundations of probability. University of Chicago Pr.

20.

Carvalho

E. M. D.

Rolla

(2020). An enactive-ecological approach to information and uncertainty. Frontiers in Psychology, 11. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2020.00588

21.

Chang

(2014). Is water H₂O? Evidence, realism and pluralism. Springer.

22.

Chemero

(2000). Anti-representationalism and the dynamical stance. Philosophy of Science, 67(4), 625–647. https://doi.org/10.1086/392858

23.

Chemero

(2009). Radical embodied cognitive science. MIT Press.

24.

Chemero

Silberstein

(2008). After the philosophy of mind: Replacing scholasticism with science. Philosophy of Science, 75(1), 1–27. https://doi.org/10.1086/587820

25.

Chirimuuta

(2018). Explanation in computational neuroscience: Causal and non-causal. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 69(3), 849–880. https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axw034

26.

Chirimuuta

(2024). The brain abstracted: Simplification in the history and philosophy of neuroscience. The MIT Press. https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/13804.001.0001

27.

Chomsky

(1978). A theory of core grammar. Glot, 1, 1–26.

28.

Chomsky

(1980). Rules and representations. Columbia Univ. Press.

29.

Choucry

Nomoto

Inokuchi

(2024). Engram mechanisms of memory linking and identity. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 25(6), 375–392. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41583-024-00814-0

30.

Ciaunica

(2022). The map, the territory, and the cartographer: Linking the “pure” formal models to the “murky” material world. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 45, Article e189. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x22000590

31.

Colaço

(2022). What counts as a memory? Definitions, hypotheses, and “Kinding in Progress”. Philosophy of Science, 89(1), 89–106. https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2021.14

32.

Colombo

Piccinini

(2024). The computational theory of mind. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009183734

33.

Craver

C. F.

(2013). Explaining the brain: Mechanisms and the mosaic unity of neuroscience. (First published in paperback, reprinted 2013). Clarendon Press.

34.

Crippen

(2025). Enactivism: A newish name for mostly old ideas? Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 24(1), 103–127. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-024-10019-6

35.

De Brigard

(2020). The explanatory indispensability of memory traces. The Harvard Review of Philosophy, 27, 23–47. https://doi.org/10.5840/harvardreview202072328

36.

De Brigard

(2024). Episodic memory without autonoetic consciousness. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 379(1913), Article 20230410. https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2023.0410

37.

Deisseroth

(2011). Optogenetics. Nature Methods, 8(1), 26–29. https://doi.org/10.1038/nmeth.f.324

38.

Di Paolo

E. A.

Cuffari

E. C.

De Jaegher

(2018). Linguistic bodies: The continuity between life and language. The MIT Press. https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/11244.001.0001

39.

Dutilh Novaes

(2020a). Carnap meets foucault: Conceptual engineering and genealogical investigations. Inquiry, 68(9), 1–27. https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174x.2020.1860122

40.

Dutilh Novaes

(2020b). Carnapian explication and ameliorative analysis: A systematic comparison. Synthese, 197(3), 1011–1034. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-1732-9

41.

Dutilh Novaes

Reck

(2017). Carnapian explication, formalisms as cognitive tools, and the paradox of adequate formalization. Synthese, 194(1), 195–215. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0816-z

42.

Einstein

(2012). Situated neuroscience: Exploring biologies of diversity. In Bluhm

Jacobson

A. J.

Maibom

H. L.

(Eds.), Neurofeminism: Issues at the intersection of feminist theory and cognitive science. Palgrave-Macmillan.

43.

Favela

L. H.

(2024). The ecological brain: Unifying the sciences of brain, body, and environment. Routledge.

44.

Favela

L. H.

Chemero

(2015). The animal-environment system. In Coello

Fischer

M. H.

(Eds.), Foundations of embodied cognition. Volume 1: Perceptual and emotional embodiment (pp. 59–74). Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group.

45.

Favela

L. H.

Machery

(2023). Investigating the concept of representation in the neural and psychological sciences. Frontiers in Psychology, 14, 1165622. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2023.1165622

46.

Favela

L. H.

Machery

(2025). The concept of representation in the brain sciences: The current status and ways forward. Mind & Language, 40(2), 215–225. https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12531

47.

Feest

(2017). Phenomena and objects of research in the cognitive and behavioral sciences. Philosophy of Science, 84(5), 1165–1176. https://doi.org/10.1086/694155

48.

Feest

(2025). Operationism in psychology: An epistemology of exploration. University of Chicago Press.

49.

Floridi

(2010). Information: A very short introduction. Oxford University press.

50.

Fodor

J. A.

(2001). The mind doesn’t work that way: The scope and limits of computational psychology. (1. paperback ed). MIT Press.

51.

Gallagher

(2017). Enactivist interventions: Rethinking the mind. Oxford University Press.

52.

Gallagher

(2018a). Building a stronger concept of embodiment. In The Oxford handbook of 4E cognition (1st ed., pp. 353–368). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198735410.013.18

53.

Gallagher

(2018b). Decentering the brain: Embodied cognition and the critique of neurocentrism and narrow-minded philosophy of mind. Constructivist Foundations, 14(1), 8–21.

54.

Gallagher

(2018c). The extended mind: State of the question. The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 56(4), 421–447. https://doi.org/10.1111/sjp.12308

55.

Gallistel

C. R.

King

A. P.

(2010). Memory and the computational brain: Why cognitive science will transform neuroscience (Nachdr). Wiley-Blackwell.

56.

Giere

R. N.

(2006). Scientific perspectivism. University of Chicago Press.

57.

Gładziejewski

Miłkowski

(2017). Structural representations: Causally relevant and different from detectors. Biology & Philosophy, 32(3), 337–355. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10539-017-9562-6

58.

Goldman

A. I.

(2012). A moderate approach to embodied cognitive science. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 3(1), 71–88. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-012-0089-0

59.

Grieben

Tekülve

Zibner

S. K. U.

Lins

Schneegans

Schöner

(2020). Scene memory and spatial inhibition in visual search: A neural dynamic process model and new experimental evidence. Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics, 82(2), 775–798. https://doi.org/10.3758/s13414-019-01898-y

60.

Hitchcock

Woodward

(2003). Explanatory generalizations, part II: Plumbing explanatory depth. Noûs, 37(2), 181–199. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0068.00435

61.

Hochstein

(2016). One mechanism, many models: A distributed theory of mechanistic explanation. Synthese, 193(5), 1387–1407. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0844-8

62.

Hughes

R. I. G.

(2010). The theoretical practices of physics: Philosophical essays. Oxford University Press.

63.

Hutto

D. D.

(2018). REC: Revolution effected by clarification. Topoi, 36(3), 377–391. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-015-9358-8

64.

Hutto

D. D.

(2023). Remembering without a trace? Moving beyond trace minimalism. In Sant’Anna

McCarroll

C. J.

Michaelian

(Eds.), Current controversies in philosophy of memory (pp. 61–81). Routledge.

65.

Hutto

D. D.

Myin

(2013). Radicalizing enactivism: Basic minds without content. MIT Press.

66.

Hutto

D. D.

Myin

(2017). Evolving enactivism: Basic minds meet content. MIT Press.

67.

Hutto

D. D.

Myin

(2018). Going radical. In The Oxford handbook of 4E cognition (1st ed., pp. 95–116). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198735410.013.5

68.

Hutto

D. D.

Peeters

Segundo-Ortin

(2017). Cognitive ontology in flux: The possibility of protean brains. Philosophical Explorations, 20(2), 209–223. https://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2017.1312502

69.

Hutto

D. D.

Satne

(2015). The natural origins of content. Philosophia, 43(3), 521–536. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-015-9644-0

70.

Ianì

(2019). Embodied memories: Reviewing the role of the body in memory processes. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 26(6), 1747–1766. https://doi.org/10.3758/s13423-019-01674-x

71.

Josselyn

S. A.

Frankland

P. W.

(2018). Memory allocation: Mechanisms and function. Annual Review of Neuroscience, 41(1), 389–413. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-neuro-080317-061956

72.

Josselyn

S. A.

Tonegawa

(2020). Memory engrams: Recalling the past and imagining the future. Science, 367(6473), eaaw4325. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aaw4325

73.

Kandel

E. R.

(2007). In search of memory: The emergence of a new science of mind. Norton.

74.

Kirchhoff

M. D.

(2025a). Idealization and mental fictionalism. Philosophical Psychology, 1–22. https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2025.2552422

75.

Kirchhoff

M. D.

(2025b). The idealized mind: From model-based science to cognitive science. The MIT Press.

76.

Kriegeskorte

Diedrichsen

(2019). Peeling the onion of brain representations. Annual Review of Neuroscience, 42(1), 407–432. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-neuro-080317-061906

77.

Kunz

Deuker

Zhang

Axmacher

(2018). Tracking human engrams using multivariate analysis techniques. Handbook of Behavioral Neuroscience, 28, 481–508. https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-812028-6.00026-4

78.

Lazzeri

(2016). On some common objections to a behavioral approach to psychological categories. Philosophical Psychology, 29(3), 405–418. https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2015.1121540

79.

Leonelli

(2016). Data-centric biology: A philosophical study. The University of Chicago Press.

80.

Luis-Islas

Luna

Floran

Gutierrez

(2022). Optoception: Perception of optogenetic brain perturbations. Eneuro, 9(3). https://doi.org/10.1523/ENEURO.0216-22.2022

81.

Malavolta

Carvalho

Ferreira

R. S.

(2025). Ecological perspectivism: understanding perspectival realism through ecological psychology. Synthese, 206, 1–25. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-025-05222-0

82.

Marr

(1982). Vision: A computational investigation into the human representation and processing of visual information. MIT Press.

83.

Martínez

(2019). Representations Are Rate-Distortion Sweet Spots. Philosophy of Science, 86(5), 1214–1226. https://doi.org/10.1086/705493

84.

Massimi

(2022). Perspectival realism. Oxford University press.

85.

Meyer

Brancazio

(2022). Putting down the revolt: Enactivism as a philosophy of nature. Frontiers in Psychology, 13, 948733. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2022.948733

86.

Meyer

Brancazio

(2023). Enactivism: Utopian & scientific. Constructivist Foundations, 19(1), 1–11.

87.

Miłkowski

(2015). The hard problem of content: Solved (long ago). Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric, 41(1), 73–88. https://doi.org/10.1515/slgr-2015-0021

88.

Mitchell

S. D.

(2002). Integrative pluralism. Biology and Philosophy, 17(1), 55–70. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1012990030867

89.

Myin

Van Dijk

(2022). The is and oughts of remembering. Topoi, 41(2), 275–285. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-021-09784-9

90.

Najenson

(2021). What have we learned about the engram? Synthese, 199(3–4), 9581–9601. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03216-2

91.

Najenson

(2025). Encoding without perceiving: Can memories be implanted? Philosophical Psychology, 38(4), 1–28. https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2023.2295927

92.

Nambu

M. F.

Lin

Y.-J.

Reuschenbach

Tanaka

K. Z.

(2022). What does engram encode? Heterogeneous memory engrams for different aspects of experience. Current Opinion in Neurobiology, 75, Article 102568. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.conb.2022.102568

93.

Neander

(2017). A mark of the mental: In defense of informational teleosemantics. The MIT Press.

94.

Noë

(2004). Action in perception. MIT Press.

95.

Piccinini

(2015). Physical computation: A mechanistic account. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199658855.001.0001

96.

Piccinini

(2020). Neurocognitive mechanisms: Explaining biological cognition (1st edition). Oxford University Press.

97.

Piccinini

(2022). Situated neural representations: Solving the problems of content. Frontiers in Neurorobotics, 16, Article 846979. https://doi.org/10.3389/fnbot.2022.846979

98.

Pietroski

Rey

(1995). When other things aren’t equal: Saving Ceteris Paribus laws from vacuity. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 46(1), 81–110. https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/46.1.81

99.

Potochnik

(2017). Idealization and the aims of science. The University of Chicago press.

100.

Potochnik

Sanches De Oliveira

(2020). Patterns in cognitive phenomena and pluralism of explanatory styles. Topics in Cognitive Science, 12(4), 1306–1320. https://doi.org/10.1111/tops.12481

101.

Quilty-Dunn

Porot

Mandelbaum

(2022). The best game in town: The Re-Emergence of the language of thought hypothesis across the cognitive sciences. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 46, 1–55. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X22002849

102.

Raja

(2018). A theory of resonance: Towards an ecological cognitive architecture. Minds and Machines, 28(1), 29–51. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11023-017-9431-8

103.

Raja

(2021). Resonance and radical embodiment. Synthese, 199(S1), 113–141. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-020-02610-6

104.

Raja

(2024). The motifs of radical embodied neuroscience. European Journal of Neuroscience, 60(5), 4738–4755. https://doi.org/10.1111/ejn.16434

105.

Raja

Anderson

M. L.

(2019). Radical embodied cognitive neuroscience. Ecological Psychology, 31(3), 166–181. https://doi.org/10.1080/10407413.2019.1615213

106.

Raja

Sanches De Oliveira

(2024). Two species of realism. European Journal for Philosophy of Science, 14(3), 35. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-024-00596-3

107.

Ramirez

Liu

Lin

P. A.

Suh

Pignatelli

Redondo

R. L.

Ryan

T. J.

Tonegawa

(2013). Creating a false memory in the hippocampus. Science, 341(6144), 387–391. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1239073

108.

Ramsey

W. M.

(2025). The hard problem of content is neither. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 16(1), 153–174. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-023-00714-9

109.

Righetti

(2021). The pre-reflective roots of the madeleine-memory: A phenomenological perspective. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 22(2), 479–499. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-021-09774-7

110.

Righetti

(2024). Re-enactment and embodied resonance in episodic memory: Reconciling phenomenological approaches and constructive theories. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-024-10026-7

111.

Robins

S. K.

(2016). Optogenetics and the mechanism of false memory. Synthese, 193(5), 1561–1583. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1045-9

112.

Robins

S. K.

(2023). The 21st century engram. WIREs Cognitive Science, 14(5), Article e1653. https://doi.org/10.1002/wcs.1653

113.

Robins

S. K.

(forthcoming). A place for the memory trace. In Aronowitz

Nadel

(Eds.), Memory, space, and time. Oxford University Press.

114.

Rolla

(2018). Radically enactive high cognition. Dissertatio, 47, 26–41. https://doi.org/10.15210/dissertatio.v47i0.12390

115.

Rolla

(2021). A mente enativa. Editora Fi. https://doi.org/10.22350/9786559173341

116.

Rolla

(2022). Do babies represent? On a failed argument for representationalism. Synthese, 200(4), 278. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-022-03728-5

117.

Rolla

Huffermann

(2022). Converging enactivisms: Radical enactivism meets linguistic bodies. Adaptive Behavior, 30(4), 345–359. https://doi.org/10.1177/10597123211020782

118.

Rolla

Novaes

(2022). Ecological-enactive scientific cognition: Modeling and material engagement. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 21(3), 625–643. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-020-09713-y

119.

Ross

L. N.

(2018). Causal selection and the pathway concept. Philosophy of Science, 85(4), 551–572. https://doi.org/10.1086/699022

120.

Ross

L. N.

(2025). Explanation in biology (1st ed.). Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009300940

121.

Ross

L. N.

(Forthcoming). Causal control: A rationale for causal selection. In: Minnesota studies in philosophy of science on “Causation in Biology”. University of Minnesota Press.

122.

Rupert

(2005). Minding one’s cognitive systems: When does a group of minds constitute a single cognitive unit? Episteme, 1(3), 177–188. https://doi.org/10.3366/epi.2004.1.3.177

123.

Russell

J. L.

(2023). Problems for enactive psychiatry as a practical framework. Philosophical Psychology, 36(8), 1458–1481. https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2023.2174423

124.

Sanches De Oliveira

(2023a). Explanatory diversity and embodied cognitive science: Reflexivity motivates pluralism. In Studies in brain and mind (pp. 51–76). Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-39744-8_4

125.

Sanches De Oliveira

Raja

Chemero

(2021). Radical embodied cognitive science and “Real cognition”. Synthese, 198(S1), 115–136. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-019-02475-4

126.

Sanches De Oliveira

Van Es

Hipólito

(2023). Scientific practice as ecological-enactive co-construction. Synthese, 202(1). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04215-1

127.

Sanches De Oliveira

(2023b). The strong program in embodied cognitive science. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 22(4), 841–865. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-022-09806-w

128.

Sanches De Oliveira

G. S.

Chemero

(2015). Against smallism and localism. Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric, 41(1), 9–23. https://doi.org/10.1515/slgr-2015-0017

129.

Schacter

D. L.

(2021). The seven sins of memory: How the mind forgets and remembers (Updated edition). Mariner books. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.

130.

Schacter

D. L.

Addis

D. R.

(2007). The cognitive neuroscience of constructive memory: Remembering the past and imagining the future. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 362(1481), 773–786. https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2007.2087

131.

Schöner

(2016). Dynamic thinking: A primer on dynamic field theory. Oxford University Press.

132.

Segundo-Ortin

Hutto

D. D.

(2021). Similarity-based cognition: Radical enactivism meets cognitive neuroscience. Synthese, 198(S1), 5–23. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-019-02505-1

133.

Shagrir

(2012). Structural representations and the brain. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 63(3), 519–545. https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axr038

134.

Shea

(2018). Representation in cognitive science (1st edition). Oxford University Press.

135.

Silberstein

Chemero

(2013). Constraints on localization and decomposition as explanatory strategies in the biological sciences. Philosophy of Science, 80(5), 958–970. https://doi.org/10.1086/674533

136.

Suárez

(2024). Inference and representation: A study in modeling science. The University of Chicago Press.

137.

Sun

Yang

Martin

Tonegawa

(2020). Hippocampal neurons represent events as transferable units of experience. Nature Neuroscience, 23(5), 651–663. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41593-020-0614-x

138.

Telakivi

(2023). Extending the extended mind: From cognition to consciousness. Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-35624-7

139.

Thagard

(1992). Conceptual revolutions. Princeton University Press.

140.

Tonegawa

Morrissey

M. D.

Kitamura

(2018). The role of engram cells in the systems consolidation of memory. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 19(8), 485–498. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41583-018-0031-2

141.

Tulving

(2005). Episodic memory and autonoesis: Uniquely human? In Terrace

Metcalfe

(Eds.), The missing link in cognition: Origins of self-reflective consciousness. Oxford University Press.

142.

Van Gelder

(1995). What might cognition Be, if not computation? Journal of Philosophy, 92(7), 345–381. https://doi.org/10.2307/2941061

143.

Van Gelder

(1998). The dynamical hypothesis in cognitive science. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 21(5), 615–628. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x98001733

144.

Vernazzani

(2019). The structure of sensorimotor explanation. Synthese, 196(11), 4527–4553. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1664-9

145.

Vetere

Tran

L. M.

Moberg

Steadman

P. E.

Restivo

Morrison

F. G.

Ressler

K. J.

Josselyn

S. A.

Frankland

P. W.

(2019). Memory formation in the absence of experience. Nature Neuroscience, 22(6), 933–940. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41593-019-0389-0

146.

Vilarroya

(2017). Neural representation. A survey-based analysis of the notion. Frontiers in Psychology, 8, 1458. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2017.01458

147.

Woodward

(2003). Making things happen: A theory of causal explanation (1st ed.). Oxford University PressNew. https://doi.org/10.1093/0195155270.001.0001

148.

Woodward

(2010). Causation in biology: Stability, specificity, and the choice of levels of explanation. Biology & Philosophy, 25(3), 287–318. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10539-010-9200-z

149.

Woodward

(2016). The problem of variable choice. Synthese, 193(4), 1047–1072. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0810-5

150.

Woodward

Hitchcock

(2003). Explanatory generalizations, part I: A counterfactual account. Noûs, 37(1), 1–24. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0068.00426

151.

Xie

Miyata

(2014). Real-time simulation of lightweight rigid bodies. The Visual Computer, 30(1), 81–92. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00371-013-0783-7

152.

Ylikoski

Kuorikoski

(2010). Dissecting explanatory power. Philosophical Studies, 148(2), 201–219. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-008-9324-z

153.

Zednik

(2011). The nature of dynamical explanation. Philosophy of Science, 78(2), 238–263. https://doi.org/10.1086/659221

In Which Sense Should We be Radical? On Two Radical Alternatives to Cognitivism

Abstract

Keywords

Get full access to this article

References