4E cognition (embodied, embedded, extended, and enactive) is a growing, open and pluralistic research tradition that offers new philosophical and scientific avenues to study the mind. Both its origins and current expansive movement are theoretically and geographically diverse. Chile, the mother country of the influential biologists Francisco Varela and Humberto Maturana, represents one of its roots, but also, as the variety of contributions in this special issue shows it, one of its fields of new blossoms. In this editorial introduction, regarding the roots, we focus on the enactive approach developed by Francisco Varela and its relationship with Maturana’s autopoietic theory. We discuss the way in which the particular theoretical and historical horizons of these two research programs conditioned, to a large extent, their philosophical stances regarding cognition. Regarding the new blossoms, we introduce the seven articles composing the present special issue and briefly comment on their contributions in terms of methodology, practical applications, theoretical extensions, and conceptual reflection.
DávilaX.MaturanaH. (2023). Cultural-Biology: Our human living in conversations and reflection. Adaptive Behavior, 31, 517–528.
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7.
FroeseT. (2011). From second-order cybernetics to enactive cognitive science: Varela’s turn from epistemology to phenomenology. Systems Research and Behavioral Science, 28(6), 631–645. https://doi.org/10.1002/sres.1116
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GaeteM. I. (2023). Suffering and sense of self: The tension between reflection and experience—the case of depression. Adaptive Behavior, 31, 467–486. https://doi.org/10.1177/10597123221093101
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GaravitoM. C.Dávila-GonzálezJ. (2019). Editorial introduction to the special issue: 4E cognition research in Colombia. Adaptive Behavior, 27(1), 3–5. https://doi.org/10.1177/1059712318819485
10.
Gonzalez-GrandónX.FroeseT. (2018). Grounding 4E cognition in Mexico: Introduction to special issue on spotlight on 4E cognition research in Mexico. Adaptive Behavior, 26(5), 189–198. https://doi.org/10.1177/1059712318791633
11.
Grasso-CladeraA.Costa-CordellaS.RossiA.FuchsN. F.ParadaF. J. (2023). Mobile Brain/Body Imaging: Challenges and opportunities for the implementation of research programs based on the 4E perspective to cognition. Adaptive Behavior, 31, 423–448. https://doi.org/10.1177/10597123211072613
LanfrancoR. C.Canales-JohnsonA.LuceroB.VargasE.NoreikaV. (2023). Towards a view from within: The contribution of Francisco Varela to the study of consciousness. Adaptive Behavior, 31, 405–422. https://doi.org/10.1177/10597123221080193
14.
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15.
MaturanaH.VarelaF. (1980). Autopoiesis and cognition: The realization of the living. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science.
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MaturanaH.VarelaF. (1987). The tree of knowledge: The biological roots of human understanding. Shambhala Publications.
17.
MilkowskiM. (2011). Beyond formal structure: A mechanistic perspective on computation and implementation. Journal of Cognitive Science, 12, 359–379. https://doi.org/10.17791/jcs.2011.12.4.361
18.
MilkowskiM. (2013). Explaining the computational mind. MIT Press.
19.
Palacios-GarcíaI.ParadaF. J. (2023). The holobiont mind: A bridge between 4E cognition and the microbiome. Adaptive Behavior, 31, 487–496. https://doi.org/10.1177/10597123211053071
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23.
PylyshynZ. W. (1984). Computation and cognition: Toward a foundation for cognitive science. MIT Press.
24.
ShapiroL. (2011). Embodied cognition. Routledge.
25.
SprevakM. (2010). Computation, individuation, and the received view of representation. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 41, 260–270.
26.
ThompsonE. (2005). Sensorimotor subjectivity and the enactive approach to experience. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 4, 407–427. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-005-9003-x
27.
ThompsonE. (2007). Mind in life: Biology, phenomenology, and the sciences of mind. Harvard University Press.
28.
ThompsonE.CosmelliD. (2011). Brain in a vat or body in a world? Brainbound vs enactive views of experience. Philosophical Topics, 39(1), 163–180. https://doi.org/10.5840/philtopics201139119
29.
Valenzuela-MoguillanskyC.DemšarE. (2023). Toward a science of experience: Outlining some challenges and future directions. Adaptive Behavior, 31, 449–466. https://doi.org/10.1177/10597123221084739
30.
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33.
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VillalobosM.DewhurstJ. (2017). Why post-cognitivism does not (necessarily) entail anti-computationalism. Adaptive Behavior, 25(3), 117–128. https://doi.org/10.1177/1059712317710496
36.
VillalobosM.PalaciosS. (2021). Autopoietic theory, enactivism, and their incommensurable marks of the cognitive. Synthese, 198(S1), 71–87. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-019-02376-6
37.
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VörösS.FroeseT.RieglerA. (2016). Epistemological odyssey: Introduction to special issue on the diversity of enactivism and neurophenomenology. Constructivist Foundations, 11(2), 189–204. http://constructivist.info/11/2/189
