Boundaries are prominent ingredients of reality, including—most importantly—the boundaries of organisms and the perceived boundaries of things (their surfaces). It is also customary to think of minds as kinds of bounded loci for thoughts, representations, and other internal entities, targeting the borderline between the internal domain and the external world as a genuine barrier. Therefore, not surprisingly, boundaries and surfaces have become targets of disciplined formal-ontological investigations. However, to have a boundary (or surface) is not only a purely geometrical or topological feature, for boundaries play certain roles. For that reason, this article unpacks boundaries in general, and surfaces in particular, in terms of interactions between structured entities, most importantly—living creatures capable of (minimal) cognition. It is argued that boundaries should be thought of as products of and at the same time as critical constraints imposed on structural coupling between complex beings, including the interactions between the (minimally) cognitive subjects and their surroundings.
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