Mario Villalobos and Pablo Razeto-Barry argue that enactivists should understand living beings not as autopoietic systems, but as autopoietic bodies. In doing so, they surrender the principle of multiple realizability of the spatial location of living beings. By way of counterexample, I argue that more motivation is required before this principle is surrendered.
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VillalobosM.Razeto-BarryP. (2019). Are living beings extended autopoietic systems? An embodied reply. Adaptive Behavior. Advance online publication. doi:10.1177/1059712318823723
