Villalobos and Razeto-Barry’s embodied reformulation of the autopoietic theory (AT) replaces AT’s reference to autopoietic ‘systems’ with a reference to autopoietic ‘bodies’ so as to prevent an extended enactivist reading of AT. I argue that the specific notions of ‘body’ and ‘embodiment’ invoked by Villalobos and Razeto-Barry appear to be in tension with AT and are problematic as such.
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