Though my motives may differ somewhat, I agree with the target article Villalobos and Razeto-Barry, (VR; 2019) in rejecting the tentative claims of Virgo, Egbert and Froese, (VEF; 2011) and others that the relevant boundaries for autopoietic systems may extend beyond their physical boundary. I appeal to a habeas corpus principle: the boundary that matters is that which allows an individuated self-maintaining entity to survive transfer from one environment to another.
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