I discuss the notion of bodies proposed by Villalobos and Razeto-Barry. I consider it a good move in a direction away from overly formal aspects of autopoietic theory, but in need of refinement. I suggest that because organismic boundaries are dialectical processes and not immanent walls, some autopoietic bodies can extend by incorporating parts of their environment as in the case of insects that use trapped air bubbles to breathe underwater.
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