If All Else Fails,A Corporate Death Penalty?

Abstract

Corruption remains. Misdeeds continue. Punishments if any have been light. Corporations that totally fail to meet accepted standards of conduct should be forced to cease existence. Companies that achieve goals via corruption, cause permanent environmental damage, cause physical pain and death, and violate basic human rights should be subject to a corporate death penalty. The traditional death penalty relates to individuals. I move the death penalty discussion to the organizational level. There are weapons available that can make a corporate death penalty possible. Business actions that fail to adhere to norms of good conduct continue. If Volkswagen or other examples in this volume were forced out of existence, this would send a message. Tools exist; it is time to use them.

Keywords

corporate death penalty Volkswagen emissions scandal corporate corruption corporate misconduct

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