Despite recent criticism of agency theory to inform corporate governance research, the author of this article remains wholly unconvinced and argues that the theory has much to offer to help scholars understand organizational complexities. In response to Michael Lubatkin’s critique of agency theory, he highlights shared interests between the scholarship of organizational behaviorists and microeconomists and contends that both discipline areas can do more than merely coexist.
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