Although agency theory dominates corporate governance research, its behavioral assumptions stand in direct competition to the worldviews held by most organizational scholars. In this article, the author argues that it is high time for organizational scholars to stop deferring to economists and start to develop their own governance theories, for which their conceptual base is far better suited.
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